Howard Krongold

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple firearms offences, including weapons trafficking.

The Court of Appeal held that agreeing to purchase a firearm does not constitute a 'transfer' under s. 99 of the Criminal Code, quashing that conviction.

The Court also applied the Kienapple principle to stay three of the remaining five convictions, finding they arose from the same transaction and constituted a single criminal wrong.

The appellant's total sentence was reduced by three years.

The respondent walked into a police station and confessed to burning down his mother's house, stating he was homeless and wanted to go to jail.

The police officer repeatedly warned him of the consequences and advised him to seek counsel, which he eventually did before giving a full statement.

The trial judge excluded the statement, finding it was involuntary due to the respondent's oppressive personal circumstances and the 'inducement' of jail time, leading to an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by finding oppression and inducement absent any police misconduct, and by conflating the voluntariness analysis with the ultimate reliability of the statement.

The appellants were convicted in relation to the death of a young man who was assaulted twice in one night—first by Manasseri inside a bar, and then by Kenny outside.

Manasseri was convicted of second-degree murder, and Kenny of assault causing bodily harm.

On appeal, both argued their charges were improperly joined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the joinder ground.

However, the Court admitted fresh expert medical evidence regarding the cause of death, quashed Manasseri's conviction, and ordered a new trial.

For Kenny, the Court applied the newly released Jordan framework, found the 68-month delay unreasonable, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The accused, a political worker during the 2011 federal election, was convicted under the Canada Elections Act for his role in a 'robo-calls' scheme that directed voters to false polling stations.

He was sentenced to nine months' incarceration and 12 months' probation.

Both the accused and the Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the sentencing judge properly balanced the mitigating factors of the youthful first-time offender with the need for denunciation and deterrence for an unprecedented electoral fraud offence.

The Court declined the Crown's request to establish a sentencing range of two to five years for electoral fraud.

The accused, a political worker during the 2011 federal election, was convicted under the Canada Elections Act for his role in a 'robo-calls' scheme that directed voters to false polling stations.

He was sentenced to nine months' incarceration and 12 months' probation.

Both the accused and the Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the sentencing judge properly balanced the mitigating factors of the youthful first-time offender with the need for denunciation and deterrence for an unprecedented electoral fraud offence.

The Court declined the Crown's request to establish a sentencing range of two to five years for electoral fraud.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking after police found 50 marijuana plants in her car trunk during a search incident to arrest.

The trial judge found that the police violated the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights by conducting a dangerous, masked takedown at gunpoint, and violated her s. 10(b) rights by failing to fully inform her of her right to counsel and delaying her access to counsel for over five hours.

The trial judge also found the arresting officers lied under oath, but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in concluding that Charter breaches occurring after the discovery of evidence could not satisfy the 'obtained in a manner' requirement of s. 24(2).

The Court reassessed the Grant factors, found the breaches to be extremely serious, and excluded the evidence, entering an acquittal.

The appellant was convicted of drug and breach charges after police found cocaine during a search.

The initial investigative detention on the street was lawful, but the police subsequently arbitrarily detained the appellant in a cruiser, failed to provide him with his right to counsel, and conducted two unreasonable searches, including a strip search where an officer gratuitously inflicted pain.

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches but admitted the evidence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis by treating the absence of systemic police misconduct as a mitigating factor, failing to consider the impact on the appellant's Charter rights, and overemphasizing the seriousness of the charges.

The evidence was excluded and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed her conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired, contrary to section 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

She was found asleep in her car with keys in the ignition after a tire blowout, having called a tow truck.

The trial judge found she failed to rebut the presumption of intent to drive and had de facto care and control, concluding there was a realistic risk of danger.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or legal conclusions regarding intent to drive and realistic risk of danger.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and aggravated assault, brought an O'Connor application seeking third-party records from the investigating police service.

The requested records included the training records of the interrogating officers and gang intelligence information regarding several witnesses.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the officers' training was irrelevant to the voluntariness of the accused's statements, which depends on the officers' actual conduct.

The court also held that the gang intelligence information was protected by informer privilege and that compelling its production would improperly conscript the police to conduct investigations on behalf of the defence.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion seeking to exclude evidence of alleged flight as after-the-fact conduct in a prosecution for first-degree murder.

The Crown intended to tender evidence that the accused attempted to travel to Afghanistan shortly after the fatal stabbing, arguing that such conduct was relevant to consciousness of guilt and inconsistent with a claim of self-defence.

The defence argued the travel related to a pre-planned wedding trip and that the evidence would be more prejudicial than probative.

The court held that the relevance and admissibility of the alleged after-the-fact conduct could not be determined in the abstract prior to the evidentiary context of trial.

The application was therefore adjourned to be determined when the evidence is tendered at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for weapons trafficking under s. 99 of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the Crown failed to prove he knew the sale of the gun was unauthorized, and that the finding he aided and abetted the transfer was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence had conceded the knowledge element at trial by focusing exclusively on whether the appellant played a role in the transfer.

The Court also held that the trial judge's conclusion regarding aiding and abetting was amply supported by the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after breaking into his ex-girlfriend's home and attacking her with a knife.

He was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in balancing aggravating and mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the sentence fell within the acceptable range for attempted murder in a domestic context.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving over 80.

He sought disclosure of historical maintenance and usage records for the Intoxilyzer used in his breath tests.

The trial judge ordered disclosure under the first party Stinchcombe regime, and a motion judge refused to quash the order.

The Crown and the Ottawa Police Service appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the records were generated by and in the exclusive possession of the police service, making them third party records governed by the O'Connor regime.

The court further held that the accused failed to meet the 'likely relevant' threshold for third party production, as the request was a speculative fishing expedition.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after shooting a man during a drug transaction.

At trial, the judge charged the jury on self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code but not under s. 35.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the unlawful assault requirement of s. 34(2) and erred by failing to leave s. 35 with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions on s. 34(2) when read as a whole, and concluding there was no air of reality to a s. 35 defence because the appellant, as the initial aggressor drawing a loaded handgun, could not claim he commenced the assault without intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm.

The applicant challenged the retrospective application of the 1997 and 2011 amendments to the faint hope provisions governing reduction of parole ineligibility for murder.

The court held that the proper analytical framework was the retrospective punishment analysis from Whaling, not the Rodgers test for discrete sanctions.

It concluded that the amendments did not increase punishment, did not thwart any settled expectation of liberty, and merely altered the procedure by which the applicant could seek a chance at earlier parole.

The constitutional application was dismissed, and the parole ineligibility reduction application was directed to proceed under s. 745.61 as amended in 2011.

The appellants appealed their convictions for first and second degree murder arising from a firebombing that killed two children.

The Crown's theory was that the primary appellant orchestrated the arson to silence the children's mother, who had accused him of sexual assault, and hired the other appellants to execute the plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's admission of bad character evidence, Vetrovec caution regarding an unsavoury witness, instructions on unlawful object murder, or instructions on post-offence conduct.

The court also upheld the 23-year parole ineligibility period for the appellant convicted of second degree murder.

During a murder retrial, the defence sought a jury instruction alleging the Crown breached the rule in Browne v. Dunn by failing to cross‑examine the accused on several key aspects of his testimony.

The court reviewed the rule governing fairness in cross‑examination and the circumstances in which a failure to challenge a witness’s evidence may require remedial instructions.

Considering the trial context, the prior disclosure of the Crown’s theory, and the cross‑examination that did occur, the court held that no significant Browne v. Dunn breach by the Crown had occurred.

The accused had full opportunity to address the Crown’s theory during testimony and was not ambushed.

The requested jury instruction was therefore refused.

The applicant, convicted of preventing electors from voting in the 2011 federal election and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, applied for bail pending his sentence appeal.

The Crown conceded the applicant would surrender into custody but argued the appeal was frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding the sentence appeal raised arguable issues given the novelty of the offence, and that the public interest favoured release to ensure the appeal would not be rendered moot before it could be heard.

The appellant appealed a ruling under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act that denied disclosure of information sought by defence counsel on the basis of informer privilege.

The incident leading to the appellant's arrest for drug possession occurred in a small community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the requested information might tend to identify the informant.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg under the Criminal Code following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapplied the W(D) framework, failed to properly consider reasonable doubt, and improperly relied on a common-sense inference relating to bolus drinking.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge misdirected himself by relying on the inference from R. v. Paszczenko in circumstances involving alleged post‑driving alcohol consumption.

This misdirection affected the assessment of the accused’s evidence and credibility.

As the evidence was not overwhelming, the error could not be cured under the curative proviso.