Howard Krongold

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial Crown improperly invited the jury to use prior consistent statements of the complainant for the truth of their content in closing address.

The trial judge failed to correct this submission and provided no instructions to the jury on the limited use of prior consistent statements.

This error in law tainted the conviction, particularly as the evidence concerning one complainant was used as similar fact evidence in relation to another complainant.

Additionally, the trial judge failed to provide a meaningful review of the evidence at trial beyond a cursory review of similar fact evidence.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder in 2001 and sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 25 years, challenged the constitutionality of judicial screening provisions introduced into the "faint hope" clause.

When the appellant committed the murder in 1995, she had an automatic right to apply directly to a jury for a reduction in her parole ineligibility after serving 15 years.

By the time she was eligible to apply in 2013, legislation required her to first satisfy a judge that there was a "substantial likelihood" her application would succeed before a jury could hear it.

The Court of Appeal held that the retrospective application of the 2011 judicial screening amendments violated her Charter rights under section 11(i), as the amendments increased her punishment by substantially decreasing her chances of obtaining a reduction in parole ineligibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of unlawful possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

During a police raid on an apartment, officers found a gun that came loose from the appellant's hands as he fell to the ground after being tackled by a lead officer.

The appellant testified that he did not possess a gun, did not put his hands out when falling, and did not see a gun on the floor.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence and accepted the officer's testimony.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately scrutinize the officer's evidence regarding certainty versus reliability, stress effects on recollection, split-second observations, and potential reconstruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly scrutinized the evidence and reached conclusions entitled to deference.

Five appellants were convicted of offences arising from a home invasion robbery.

The Crown's case alleged a planned robbery with violence, while the defence maintained the incident arose from a drug transaction that escalated when the victim produced a firearm.

The appellants appealed on grounds that the trial judge's conduct rendered the trial unfair, that jury selection instructions were inadequate, and that prior consistent statement instructions were deficient.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's questioning of defence witnesses and extemporaneous comments during jury instructions created a cumulative appearance of bias toward the prosecution, seriously compromising the fairness of the trial.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The accused appealed a conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the trial reasons failed to resolve a key inconsistency in the complainant's evidence and did not adequately explain credibility findings.

A majority of the Court adopted the majority appellate reasons and held that the trial reasons were responsive to the live issues and parties' core arguments.

The appeal was dismissed, with one judge dissenting and favouring allowing the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault, assault, and break and enter to commit an indictable offence against two former domestic partners.

The trial judge found both complainants credible and reliable, concluding that neither consented to certain sexual acts including penetration with the appellant's fist.

The appellant did not testify but argued the complainants had unconsciously convinced themselves of non-consent.

The trial judge imposed a global sentence of nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions based on material inconsistencies in one complainant's evidence and the admissibility of cross-count similar fact evidence, and challenged the sentence on totality grounds.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant challenged the grounds for his arrest and the basis for issuance of a search warrant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the Debot criteria, finding ample basis for both the arrest and warrant based on police surveillance evidence.

The trial judge made no errors in sentencing or in calculating pre-trial custody.

Both appeals were dismissed.

During a trial for robbery, forcible confinement, and attempted murder, the Crown brought an application to cross-examine the accused on the underlying facts of his prior convictions for three suffocation murders.

The court had previously dismissed a similar fact application to admit this evidence.

However, after the accused indicated he would testify that he did not understand the deadliness of a plastic bag fastened over someone's head, the Crown sought to revisit the ruling.

The court granted the application, finding that the accused's anticipated testimony constituted a material change in circumstances and that the defence could not use the prior exclusionary ruling as a sword to mislead the jury.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in rejecting his evidence as lacking credibility and defying logic.

The appellant specifically challenged three of the trial judge's six reasons for rejection.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant's conditional sentence resumed operation effective November 8, 2017.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearm-related offences and his sentence.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence that he possessed and fired a firearm into the complainant's vehicle.

The appellant argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by requiring him to identify an alternative suspect.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the trial judge's question regarding alternative suspects was merely rhetorical and that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof.

The court found ample evidence supported the conviction and dismissed the appeal.

The accused, charged with attempted murder, robbery, forcible confinement, and weapons offences, brought pre-trial motions to sit at the counsel table and to sever the firearms charges.

The court dismissed the seating application, finding the accused posed a security risk and that his presence in the prisoner's box would not cause undue prejudice.

The court also dismissed the severance application, concluding that the evidence was not complex, the counts were factually connected, and a separate trial would cause further delay and consume additional resources.

The Crown applied to introduce similar fact evidence of three murders (the "Garon murders") committed by the accused, Ian Bush, in 2007, at his trial for the attempted murder of Ernest Côté in 2014.

The Crown sought to use this evidence to prove intent, arguing striking similarities between the acts.

The defence conceded the probative value but argued overwhelming prejudice.

The court, applying the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect, denied the Crown's application, finding that the highly inflammatory nature and gravity of the triple murders would overwhelmingly prejudice the jury, outweighing the probative value, and that a limiting instruction would be ineffective.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault against a minor.

The trial judge stayed the sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching counts pursuant to Kienapple v. R. The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge failed to resolve a critical inconsistency in the complainant's evidence regarding an alleged oral sex incident that was never repeated in subsequent statements or testimony; and second, that the trial judge failed to consider innocent explanations for the complainant's knowledge of sexual acts.

The majority dismissed the appeal, finding the inconsistency was not a live issue at trial and that the core allegations remained consistent.

Justice Trotter dissented, finding the inconsistency was significant and that the trial judge's failure to address it constituted reversible error.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused was charged with first degree murder in December 2012 and the trial was scheduled to commence in November 2016, resulting in a total delay of 48 months.

The trial judge found that after deducting defence delay and discrete events, the net delay of 40 months exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and was not justified by case complexity or the transitional exceptional circumstance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in her complexity analysis and her application of the transitional exceptional circumstance.

The court held that the delay was justified under the transitional exceptional circumstance because the case was prosecuted almost entirely prior to Jordan's release and would not have resulted in a stay under the previous Morin framework.

The applicant, charged with trafficking in heroin, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a declaration that sections 185 and 186 of the Criminal Code are unconstitutional.

The applicant argued that the 'may assist' standard for targeting an individual's private communications for interception violates section 8 of the Charter, which requires a reasonable and probable cause standard.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was bound by Ontario Court of Appeal jurisprudence that upheld the constitutional validity of the Part VI wiretap regime and the 'may assist' criteria.

The accused, Ian Bush, faced charges of three counts of first-degree murder.

This decision addresses several pre-trial applications: the Crown's application to admit hearsay statements and similar fact evidence, and the Defence's applications to exclude the accused's Tax Court of Canada (TCC) file and seized property.

The court granted the Crown's hearsay application, finding the statements necessary and reliable.

It dismissed the Crown's similar fact application, concluding that despite high similarity, the overwhelming prejudice from extensive media coverage of the similar act (attempted murder of a 101-year-old veteran) outweighed its probative value.

The court also dismissed the Defence's applications to exclude the TCC file and seized property, finding them relevant and admissible as evidence of motive and identity.

The applicant sought state funding for his defence under section 7 of the Charter.

Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) offered a certificate conditional on the applicant's spouse consenting to a lien on the matrimonial home, which was registered solely in her name.

The spouse refused.

The court found that issue estoppel did not apply to a previous funding decision as the circumstances had changed (LAO's condition).

The court also determined that the applicant could not reasonably be expected to pursue an application under the Family Law Act to encumber the matrimonial home, as the Act's provisions are for marital breakdown, not ongoing relationships, and the applicant's unregistered interest was not capable of being charged.

Citing precedent, the court affirmed that state funding should not be withheld if family members refuse to assist, provided the applicant personally lacks means.

A conditional stay was issued.

Appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's reliance on the complainant's willingness to undergo a sexual assault examination and prophylactic medications, the finding of painful intercourse, and alleged reversal of the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, his consideration of medical evidence corroborating the complainant's account, or his application of the burden of proof.

The trial judge properly considered the complainant's physical injuries, demeanor, identification of the perpetrator, and the appellant's exclusive opportunity to commit the assault.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on drug trafficking and related charges.

The trial judge had excluded evidence (heroin and cash) under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 violation regarding a wiretap authorization targeting the respondent's cell phone during a murder investigation involving his son.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by taking a piecemeal approach to the evidence in the Information to Obtain (ITO) rather than a contextual one, and by impermissibly substituting his own view for that of the issuing justice.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a manslaughter conviction arising from a fatal stabbing during a bar fight.

He argued that the trial judge erred by excluding a paramedic's statement recounting an alleged witness account said to support self-defence and to impeach a Crown witness, and by failing to leave accident with the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that the first level of hearsay was not shown to be sufficiently reliable, so the statement was inadmissible both substantively and for impeachment.

It further held that the accident defence lacked an air of reality because there was no evidentiary foundation explaining how the deceased could have been stabbed multiple times accidentally.

The appeal was dismissed.