David Watt

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing that his arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds once evidence obtained from an illegal police entry into a condominium was excluded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the totality of the remaining circumstances provided sufficient grounds for the arrest.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence and quashed the two-year probation order, as the Crown conceded it was illegal under s. 731(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed her convictions for fraud and uttering, as well as her sentence, following a trial before a judge sitting without a jury.

She argued that the trial judge erred in his findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or misapprehension of evidence in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The sentence appeal seeking to delete the probation order was also dismissed, with the court noting the appellant failed to apply to the sentencing judge under s. 732.2(3) of the Criminal Code for such relief.

The appellant was convicted of possession of Oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking after smuggling pills into a detention centre while serving an intermittent sentence.

She appealed her conviction and sentence of two years' imprisonment, arguing the trial judge erred in finding she had the requisite intent and misapplied the W. (D.) test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable based on the quantity and packaging of the pills, and upheld the sentence as fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, was convicted of domestic violence offences and sentenced to 8 years and 4 months.

The trial judge awarded pre-disposition custody credit at a ratio of 1.25:1.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Summers, the appellant appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on consent, varying the pre-disposition custody credit to a ratio of 1.5:1, reducing the effective sentence from 60 months to 52 months.

The appellant, who had a 30-year history of predatory sexual offences against young males, was convicted of two counts of sexual assault with a weapon and designated a dangerous offender.

He appealed the designation, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding his voluntary use of anti-androgen medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence would not have affected the result and upholding the trial judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable possibility of controlling the appellant's risk in the community given the voluntary nature of the medication.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to one year imprisonment and two years' probation.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed because he expected a 45-day sentence based on his counsel's advice.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing insufficient weight was given to his traumatic brain injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the plea was valid as the appellant knew he faced a custodial sentence, and the sentencing judge had properly considered his medical condition as a mitigating factor.

The applicant, convicted of assault, sexual assault, and uttering a death threat, applied for an order under s. 683(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant (his ex-wife) in aid of a potential fresh evidence application on appeal.

The applicant sought to question her about documents obtained from Citizenship and Immigration Canada post-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding this was not an exceptional case justifying the renewed questioning of a sexual assault complainant.

The court noted the complainant had already admitted at trial to contacting immigration to have the applicant deported, and the fresh evidence argument could be made without further cross-examination.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision affirming his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon against his daughter.

He argued the trial judge erred in law by invoking the collateral facts rule to curtail cross-examination of the complainant regarding internet postings.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that second appeals in summary conviction proceedings are exceptional and the proposed ground of appeal did not raise a question of law of general significance or demonstrate a clear legal error.

The appellant, a mature recidivist, appealed a 10-year penitentiary sentence imposed after pleading guilty to seven counts of bank robbery and one count of failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

The offences were committed while he was unlawfully at large.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to award credit for pre-sentence custody and by misapplying the principles of proportionality and totality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was not entitled to pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719(3) because he was serving sentences for other offences during that time, and the trial judge made no error in principle regarding proportionality and totality.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for failing to stop a vehicle while being pursued by police.

He argued the summary conviction appeal judge erred in widening the offence to include momentary movement and finding that flight on foot constitutes vehicular flight.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding the appellant misstated the record regarding the vehicular stop and that the flight on foot was properly used as evidence of mens rea, not as an element of the offence.

The appellant, detained in the forensic mental health system after being found not guilty by reason of insanity, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention.

He argued the ORB erred in finding he posed a significant threat to public safety and in failing to direct the hospital regarding a sleep deprivation issue caused by hourly bed checks.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's decision was reasonably supported by evidence of the appellant's threatening behaviour and paranoia, and that the ORB's recommendation for an independent third-party opinion on the bed check issue was appropriate.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for marijuana production, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity.

The trial judge had excluded evidence under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, finding police lacked reasonable grounds to arrest the passenger in the respondent's car.

On appeal, the Crown argued the police had grounds for an investigative detention, a position not advanced at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it would be unfair to allow the Crown to rely on a new factual scenario and legal theory not raised before the trial judge.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences after a handgun was found in the driver's footwell of a vehicle in which he was the sole passenger.

The driver was acquitted.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to assess his case independently from the driver's and by rendering an unreasonable verdict based on speculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's opportunity, proximity to the firearm, and after-the-fact conduct.

The sentence appeal was allowed to grant enhanced pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related offences, as well as his 14-year sentence.

The convictions arose from a home invasion where the victim was shot in the chest.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in his treatment of a Vetrovec witness, in admitting a gun under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

He also argued the sentence violated the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the witness or the s. 24(2) analysis, and rejected the fresh evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the shooting was a cold-blooded assault resulting in near-fatal injuries.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after beating his common-law spouse to death.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a W. (D.) instruction regarding his exculpatory statements to police and by refusing to leave the partial defence of provocation to the jury.

He also appealed his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof and intent, and that there was no air of reality to the provocation defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was reasonable given the aggravating factors.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the respondent on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of stolen property.

The trial judge entered the stay on his own initiative when the trial Crown was 22 minutes late due to a conflicting sentencing matter in Superior Court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge was right to be displeased, a stay of proceedings was not warranted as there was no prejudice to the respondent's right to a fair trial and the integrity of the justice system was not diminished.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, and failed to explain the marked departure finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehensions of evidence and ample support for the trial judge's findings of fact.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the availability of an Aboriginal-specific treatment program.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was reasonable for the sentencing judge to conclude there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk the appellant posed in the community, especially given his lengthy criminal record, history of violent offences while on drugs, and the lack of supervision that would follow a long-term offender order.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court, arguing that the judge erred in inferring an agreement under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code to regularize proceedings instituted beyond the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the judge had an adequate evidentiary foundation to infer the agreement.

The court held that the correctness of this conclusion raised a question of mixed fact and law, which cannot be appealed under s. 839(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to detain him and search his vehicle, alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the traffic stop under the Highway Traffic Act was lawful, even with a dual purpose of intelligence gathering.

The officer was justified in asking the appellant to step out of the vehicle to verify his identity, at which point the drugs were in plain view.