David Watt

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, as well as his 18-month sentence.

He had facilitated a $40 sale of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer.

At trial, he argued he was merely an agent of the purchaser.

The trial judge rejected this defence, finding his actions fell within the definition of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, noting the appellant located the seller, transported and delivered the drugs, and obtained the purchase price.

The sentence was also upheld as fit for a mature recidivist with a lengthy record of trafficking convictions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, threatening, and breach of probation, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting two out-of-court statements from the complainant, alleging a failure to properly assess threshold reliability factors such as drug use and motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to these issues and properly admitted the statements, noting the complainant denied drug use during the interviews and was fully available for cross-examination at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault after witnesses observed him repeatedly kissing an 11-year-old girl in his truck.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately analyze whether the conduct was for a sexual purpose or occurred in circumstances of a sexual nature.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the repeated kissing between a 44-year-old man and an 11-year-old girl was of a sexual nature was supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and administering a stupefying drug, as well as his 9-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the circumstantial evidence or credibility, and noting that claims for a stay of proceedings based on delay and lost evidence were not properly advanced at trial.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of increasing the credit for pre-trial custody and release, reducing the net sentence to 7 years and 357 days.

The applicant sought release pending the determination of his appeal from convictions for sexual assault and sexual assault with a weapon.

As this was a subsequent application for release, he was required to demonstrate a material change in circumstances.

The applicant argued that a newly obtained decision tree provided to the jury was flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the decision tree was merely a deliberation aid and the jury charge properly explained the essential elements, meaning there was no material change in circumstances to justify a fresh look at release.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario appointed amicus curiae to vet ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised by four appellants.

The amicus was directed to assess the specificity of the grounds alleged and determine whether the claims, if established, were capable of constituting ineffective assistance of counsel.

The amicus was ordered to report back to the court by July 11, 2016, to facilitate moving the appeals forward.

The appellant was convicted of drug and firearm offences.

He appealed the firearm convictions, arguing that Crown counsel impermissibly relied on a confidential informant's hearsay statement for the truth of its contents during the closing address, despite the statement not being in evidence.

The trial judge compounded the error by repeating the Crown's submission.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the uncorrected improper closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the firearm convictions were vacated, and a new trial was ordered for those charges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and gross indecency involving an underage neighbour, arguing that the jury's verdicts were inconsistent because he was acquitted of four other sexual offences, including rape.

He contended that the jury must have reached an impermissible credibility compromise.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were not inconsistent.

The jury was entitled to accept some of the complainant's evidence while rejecting other parts, and it was open to them to distinguish between the offences involving intercourse and those that did not.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm, unlawful confinement, and other firearms offences arising from a home invasion.

He was sentenced to 8 years, less 1:1 credit for pre-disposition custody.

On appeal, the appellant sought enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for pre-disposition custody.

The Crown conceded that under the Supreme Court's decision in Summers, the appellant was entitled to the enhanced credit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to reflect the enhanced credit.

The applicant sought to set aside a 2008 order dismissing his conviction and sentence appeals as abandoned.

He claimed he never instructed his former appeal counsel to abandon the appeal, while counsel maintained he received clear instructions to do so.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the surrounding circumstances, including telephone records, the applicant's subsequent conduct, and counsel's vague recollection and lack of written confirmation.

The Court concluded the applicant did not instruct counsel to abandon the appeal and that it was in the interests of justice to set aside the dismissal and reinstate the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for several offences against his wife, including assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and dangerous driving.

The primary issue was the trial judge's admission of the complainant's videotaped police statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, as she claimed memory loss at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the statement and the trial judge's credibility findings.

However, the Court found the conviction for dangerous driving unreasonable due to insufficient evidence regarding the manner of driving, quashing that conviction and entering an acquittal.

The remaining convictions were upheld.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and her six-month custodial sentence.

The appellant argued that the police lacked reasonable grounds for the traffic stop and search, and that the evidence should be excluded under s 24(2) of the Charter due to a s 10(b) breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the stop was justified under the Highway Traffic Act and that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the smell of marijuana and other observations.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in principle and noting the significant quantity of marijuana and the appellant's perjured testimony.

The appellant was pulled over for driving with a suspended license.

The police officer called a tow truck and conducted an 'inventory search' of the vehicle, discovering marijuana in the trunk.

The trial judge found the search reasonable and admitted the evidence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the officer had no statutory or common law authority to conduct the inventory search, resulting in a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) due to the seriousness of the state misconduct and the significant impact on the appellant's Charter rights.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his jury conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm on three grounds: erroneous jury instructions on the fault element, improper Crown conduct during re-examination and closing address, and an erroneous Corbett ruling regarding his criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions for the appellant were separate from the flawed instructions for his co-accused, the Crown's re-examination under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act was permissible, and the trial judge's Corbett ruling was entitled to deference.

The appellant was discharged at a preliminary inquiry for offences against his domestic partner because the preliminary inquiry judge found no evidence of identity.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari to quash the discharge.

The appellant appealed, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge's error was not jurisdictional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to consider the identity of names and biographical details as some evidence of identity amounted to a failure to consider the whole of the evidence under s. 548(1) of the Criminal Code, constituting a jurisdictional error.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1992 in connection with the death of her stepdaughter, largely based on the pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Decades later, fresh expert evidence unanimously discredited Dr. Smith's findings regarding the cause and mechanism of death.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the original guilty plea was uninformed and the conviction unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearm offences following a high-risk takedown where police seized two loaded handguns.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by dismissing his Corbett application to exclude his prior firearms conviction, dismissing his stay application regarding a lost surveillance video, and improperly instructing the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion on the Corbett application given the defence's attack on police character, and correctly concluded the lost video did not amount to unacceptable negligence or a Charter breach.

The respondent, a mortgage broker, was convicted of 25 counts of fraud over $5,000 for his participation in a large-scale Ponzi scheme.

The sentencing judge imposed a 23-month conditional sentence, characterizing the respondent as a victim of the scheme's mastermind.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle as the jury's verdict implicitly rejected the respondent's claim that he thought the investments were legitimate.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale frauds involving breach of trust, the Court varied the sentence to four years' imprisonment.

The Crown appealed a three-year sentence imposed on the respondent for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

Police found $7,600 in cash and approximately 410 grams of heroin in the respondent's home and garage.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit, as it failed to meet the predominant sentencing objectives of general deterrence and denunciation for a large commercial quantity of heroin.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was increased to six years' imprisonment.

The appellants, a doctor and a nurse, were charged with fraud and forgery related to Health Canada's Medical Marijuana Licensing Scheme.

At the preliminary inquiry, they were committed for trial on fraud but discharged on forgery.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari to the Superior Court, which quashed the discharge and remitted the matter, finding the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to assess the whole of the evidence against the correct elements of forgery.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to properly define the essential elements of forgery, failing to consider the whole of the evidence, and improperly weighing inferences.