Darla A. Wilson

The moving party sought to set aside on consent a trial judgment declaring that it was not a bona fide purchaser without notice of a residential property.

The trial judge had made significant negative credibility findings against witnesses called on behalf of the moving party and its predecessor in title.

The Court of Appeal refused to allow the appeal on consent, holding that courts cannot set aside judgments based solely on party agreement without considering whether doing so would be appropriate in light of the law and facts, and whether it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court found that setting aside the judgment, which incorporated findings of misconduct, would undermine the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder on the sole ground that the trial judge erred in dismissing a mistrial application.

The Crown had improperly elicited inadmissible hearsay evidence regarding the appellant's connection to a residential address and inadmissible opinion evidence identifying the appellant in surveillance video from that address.

The trial judge provided a timely and forceful mid-trial corrective instruction and reinforced it in the final charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the mistrial application, finding that the corrective instructions were adequate to remedy any prejudice and that a mistrial was not necessary.

The court emphasized that mistrial is a remedy of last resort and that where corrective instructions can safely repair a compromised trial, they should be employed.

On appeal from a Superior Court decision, the mother challenged the appeal judge's order upholding an extended society care order and varying her access status from access recipient to access holder.

The mother argued that the appeal judge should have ordered a new trial on all issues due to a finding of procedural unfairness regarding the access holder determination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a breach of procedural fairness on a discrete issue does not require a new trial on all matters when the appellate court can properly decide the issue based on the evidentiary record.

The court admitted fresh evidence but found it did not change the outcome, as the evidence supported the extended society care order.

Appeal from a conviction for second-degree murder.

The appellant admitted to being the shooter and guilty of manslaughter but contended that his intoxicated state and the suddenness of events should have created reasonable doubt as to whether he possessed the requisite mens rea for murder.

The trial judge provided a rolled-up instruction to the jury on the cumulative effect of evidence regarding intoxication on the mental element for murder.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately describe evidence of his intoxication from a bartender and evidence of a brewing altercation inside the bar.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach and upheld the conviction, applying the curative proviso based on the overwhelming Crown case.

The appellant RSA appealed a motion judge's decision regarding insurance policy priority following a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff was struck by a vehicle owned by D'Souza and driven by Lamoureux.

The central issue was whether the plaintiff's OPCF 44R underinsured motorist endorsement or D'Souza's personal umbrella liability policy (PLUP) would respond after the primary automobile policy limits were exhausted.

The motion judge determined that the OPCF 44R took priority over the PLUP, that RSA could not deduct the PLUP limits from its OPCF 44R payments, and that RSA could not issue a third-party claim against Certas or subrogate against the defendants.

The Court of Appeal upheld all of these determinations.

Appeal from conviction for sexual assault and related offences.

The sole ground of appeal concerned an unsuccessful application to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay.

After accounting for defence delay, the trial judge found net delay of over 18 months and identified two exceptional circumstances, including pandemic-related backlog.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to articulate how pandemic delay specifically impacted the case and by speaking in generalities.

The appellate court upheld the trial judge's reasoning, finding it was open to her to rely on her familiarity with the jurisdiction and the pandemic delay it was experiencing, and that she was not required to assign the delay to a particular period of time.

The appellant appealed a three-year penitentiary sentence imposed for two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking involving approximately 1.2 kilograms of cocaine and over 800 grams of methamphetamine.

The Crown had sought six years while the defence sought a two-year-less-a-day conditional sentence.

The appellant argued the trial judge erroneously relied on other seized items (cash, cocaine press, ammunition, and other drugs) to determine his level of involvement, contending these items had not been proven as separate offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding the trial judge properly considered facts from the agreed statement of facts to assess the appellant's level of involvement and imposed a fit sentence considering all circumstances, including mitigating factors and the appellant's genuine remorse.

The appellants sought a panel review of a motion judge's decision denying their extension of time to perfect materials for a panel review of a prior decision dismissing their appeal for delay.

The underlying dispute concerned unpaid storage costs and the respondents' rights to sell stored property under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The appellants requested an adjournment citing injuries from a motor vehicle accident but failed to provide adequate medical documentation.

The appellants also requested recusal of one judge based on alleged bias, which was denied.

The panel upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision to deny the extension of time, finding no reversible error in the application of the governing principles and noting that the appeal had become moot as the property had been auctioned.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to add three non-LSO defendants as necessary parties to his action and to amend his pleadings to include a negligence claim against them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision on three grounds: (1) the issue of whether the non-LSO defendants were necessary parties had been finally determined in prior proceedings and raising it again constituted an abuse of process; (2) the negligence claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the appellant had discovered the relevant facts by December 2020, well before the proposed amendment in June 2023; and (3) the negligence claim constituted an abuse of process as it could have been made in the original statement of claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant brought an action against her former lawyers alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligence in connection with a wrongful dismissal settlement.

The appellant claimed the respondent lawyers conspired with her former employer, preferred the employer's interests, and induced her to enter into an improvident settlement.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding no genuine issue for trial and rejecting allegations of collusion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the motion judge properly assessed whether the respondents' advice was reasonable and whether the settlement was improvident given the litigation risks.

The appellant was convicted of possessing cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime following a police investigation that began with a confidential informant tip.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the police violated his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), and that evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no violation of sections 8 or 9, acknowledging a section 10(b) breach but finding the evidence admissible under section 24(2) analysis.

Three appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in the 2018 shooting death of Nnamdi Ogba.

The appellants appealed on seven grounds, including challenges to jury instructions on modes of participation, admissibility of expert gang evidence, after-the-fact conduct evidence, firearm videos, W.(D.) instructions, Browne v. Dunn breaches, and jury roll compilation errors.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions on modes of participation under sections 21(1)(b) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code were deficient and that there was no air of reality to section 21(2) liability.

The court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The court upheld the admissibility of expert gang evidence and other evidentiary rulings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, possession of child pornography, making sexually explicit material available to a child, and assault.

He argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider expert evidence regarding his cognitive disability when admitting his police statements and assessing his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's admission of the statements or credibility assessment.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding two errors in principle: the trial judge failed to recognize that the appellant's intellectual disability attenuated his moral blameworthiness despite his understanding of consequences, and the trial judge erred in refusing to grant COVID-19 credit.

The sentence was reduced from six years to four years and three months.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition maintaining a detention order for a not criminally responsible accused.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2016 for threats and assault involving an airsoft rifle, had been conditionally discharged in 2020 but returned to detention in 2023.

The Board maintained the detention order based on the appellant's chronic cannabis addiction and the treating psychiatrist's opinion that continued use would create a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable and that it failed to meaningfully consider less restrictive dispositions.

The court ordered a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon following a fatal stabbing at a gathering.

The appellant claimed self-defence, asserting he acted to protect himself and a vulnerable woman from an angry group.

The trial judge instructed the jury to assess the reasonableness of the appellant's response separately for each victim, fragmenting the evidence into isolated incidents.

The jury also asked whether a group could constitute "force" under the self-defence analysis, and the trial judge's response suggested that a group alone could not constitute force without specific action.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions inadequately equipped the jury to evaluate the appellant's self-defence claim by failing to address the group dynamic as a unified threat and by artificially compartmentalizing the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge's jury charge relating to after-the-fact conduct evidence failed to properly equip the jury to decide the case according to law and the evidence.

The Crown presented extensive evidence of the appellant's conduct in the hours following the killing, including exchanges with neighbours, apparent attempts at concealment, admissions to friends, and various activities at commercial establishments.

The trial judge failed to provide a limiting instruction restricting the jury's use of this evidence solely to the issue of intoxication and rational mindset, instead inviting the jury to consider it broadly in determining the appellant's mens rea for murder.

The trial judge also failed to address the risks of consciousness of guilt reasoning and invited the jury to infer callous disregard as evidence of intent to kill.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding three reversible errors in the jury charge.

The appellants appealed an application judge's decision resolving multiple issues regarding an estate and family marina business, including the repayment of a loan and the payment of occupation rent.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding errors in the application judge's findings of fact or her award of costs.

The appeal was dismissed, save for a minor variation to the formal judgment to clarify that only the estate, not the appellant personally, was liable for the loan repayment.

The appellant, 1461043 Ontario Limited c.o.b. as Nuvo Iron, appealed the dismissal of its motion to vary a default judgment to add declarations of intentional breach of trust and that the judgment survived the respondents’ discharge from bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge’s decision, finding no basis in the record for the declarations sought and confirming that a mere breach of trust, even if negligent or incompetent, is insufficient to support a such an order.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal by Jagtar Dhaliwal and Voxx Sports Inc. from a Superior Court decision upholding an arbitrator’s refusal to recuse himself for bias.

The appellants alleged both a reasonable apprehension of bias and actual bias, based on the arbitrator’s prior involvement with respondents’ counsel and comments about the veracity of Mr. Dhaliwal’s affidavit.

The Court found no merit in either claim, holding that the arbitrator’s conduct did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and that adverse credibility findings do not, on their own, establish actual bias.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The appellant, Shafaq Joya, appealed the Ontario Review Board’s decision to continue his conditional discharge and deny his Charter application for an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board’s assessment of risk and refusal to grant an absolute discharge were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also found no Charter breach, as the Board’s decision was based on public safety, not resource limitations.