Xenia Proestos

The offender, who was 18 at the time, was convicted of participating in the activities of a terrorist group after applying to join a white supremacist organization.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court weighed the serious nature of terrorism offences and the need for denunciation against the offender's youth, vulnerability, renunciation of extremist beliefs, and strict pre-trial bail conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 months' imprisonment followed by 3 years' probation, emphasizing the prospect of rehabilitation through specialized treatment.

The accused was charged with knowingly participating in or contributing to the activities of a terrorist group (Atomwaffen Division/National Socialist Order) for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity, contrary to section 83.18(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proved that the accused completed an application to join the terrorist organization, pledging loyalty and offering his skills as a mechanic and military training.

The court found that the accused knew AWD/NSO was a terrorist organization, participated in its activities by offering his skills, and did so for the purpose of enhancing the terrorist group's ability to carry out terrorist activity.

The accused was found guilty.

This decision concerns a motion for a directed verdict in a terrorism prosecution under section 83.18(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, Seth Bertrand, was alleged to have participated in or contributed to the activities of the Atomwaffen Division (AWD), a listed terrorist group, for the purpose of enhancing its ability to facilitate or carry out terrorist activity.

The court found that there was some evidence on each essential element of the offence, including the accused’s application to join AWD, his statements, and his actions, such that a properly instructed jury could convict.

The motion for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of various drug-related offences following a large-scale police investigation involving wiretaps, tracking warrants, and search warrants.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the application judge erred in dismissing their pre-trial Garofoli applications challenging the constitutionality of the searches and interceptions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the application judge's assessment of the wiretap authorizations, the reliance on confidential informants, the refusal to excise certain information from the warrants, and the determinations regarding reasonable expectations of privacy in condominium units and common areas.

The appellant, George Nnane, appealed his convictions for two counts of fraud, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel's performance fell below the standard of reasonable professional judgment, specifically by failing to adequately cross-examine a key witness, projecting disbelief of the appellant's testimony during examination-in-chief, and delivering an ineffective jury address.

Despite a strong Crown case, the court concluded that the cumulative effect of counsel's conduct undermined the fairness of the trial.

The conviction appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The sentence appeal was not addressed.

The appellant, convicted of drug trafficking and firearm offences, appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's summary dismissal of a motion to re-open a Garofoli application, arguing the wrong test was applied and the affiant officer's credibility was in question.

The sentence appeal argued the judge "jumped" the Crown's position without notice and misapprehended his criminal record, leading to an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that while the trial judge applied the wrong test for summary dismissal, the motion was substantively heard on its merits.

The court also found that the sentencing errors did not impact the sentence, which was fit given the gravity of the offences, the appellant's high-level role in a commercial drug operation, and his extensive criminal record.

During a criminal proceeding, the defendants applied to exclude recordings of intercepted conversations.

The Crown sought to admit sessions 381 and 842.

The court found that portions of session 381 were sufficiently audible and contextualized to be admitted, while prejudicial portions regarding personal drug use were excluded.

The court ruled that session 842 was inadmissible hearsay, as the statements had no evidentiary value unless admitted for the truth of their contents.

In a voir dire during a criminal proceeding, the Crown sought to admit evidence of web-browsing intercepts and MMS messages allegedly captured from the accused's cell phone using novel police interception software.

The court reviewed the requirements for authenticating electronic documents under sections 31.1 to 31.3 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court found that the police witness lacked the necessary expertise and actual knowledge to confirm that the intercepted data accurately reflected what was accessed or displayed on the accused's device.

As the technology was novel and untested by the police, and no expert evidence or corroborating data was provided, the Crown failed to authenticate the electronic documents.

The evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The appellant, Rayon Williams, appealed his convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, raising three grounds: errors in finding no ss. 9 and 8 Charter breaches regarding his arrest and vehicle search, and an error in jury instruction concerning sunglasses found with the drugs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly determined reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and search based on corroborated confidential informant information and police investigation.

The court also found no error in the jury instruction, as the sunglasses issue was not central and lacked sufficient evidentiary support.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued supplementary reasons to its judgment, addressing the disposition and sentence after setting aside the appellant's conviction for possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

Given the appellant had served her original sentence and demonstrated rehabilitation, the court accepted a joint submission to dismiss the appeal, substitute a verdict of guilty for simple possession of oxycodone, and impose an absolute discharge effective from the original sentencing date.

The appellant was convicted of possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in allowing a police officer to give an opinion on the ultimate issue of trafficking and in instructing the jury not to speculate about a missing witness.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in permitting the expert opinion on the ultimate issue, as it was not necessary and risked the jury accepting it without critical consideration of the evidence, particularly the absence of evidence on dosages and consumption rates.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding the error was not harmless.

The conviction was set aside, and the court requested submissions on substituting a conviction for simple possession and an appropriate sentence.

Mr. Hoang was sentenced following convictions for five counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking (heroin, fentanyl, carfentanil, cocaine), two counts of possession of proceeds of crime, and two counts of unsafe storage of a firearm and ammunition.

The court considered aggravating factors including the large quantities of highly toxic opioids, the presence of a firearm, and admitted prior uncharged trafficking offences.

Mitigating factors included his first-time offender status and pro-social network.

The court imposed an 18-year global sentence for the most serious trafficking offences, with other sentences running concurrently, and ordered a half-parole eligibility delay, forfeiture of cash and vehicle, a fine, DNA sample, and firearms prohibition.

The accused was tried on multiple counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and unsafe storage of a firearm.

Police surveillance and searches of the accused's vehicles and home revealed large quantities of narcotics, including heroin, cocaine, and carfentanil, hidden in a secret vehicle compartment and other containers, along with over $250,000 in cash and a loaded shotgun.

The accused claimed to be a mere delivery person unaware of the narcotics or the firearm.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as fabricated, finding overwhelming circumstantial evidence of his central role in a wholesale trafficking operation.

The accused was found guilty on all counts except three drug possession counts related to untested substances found in his home.

The appellant appealed his sentence following guilty pleas to mischief, possession of a restricted firearm, and possession of methamphetamine.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by not granting 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody due to COVID-19 and claimed he was forced into a joint submission by trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding the credit was part of a joint submission and the ineffective assistance claim was unsubstantiated.

However, the Crown conceded that the 15-month sentence for one count of possession of a controlled substance exceeded the 12-month statutory maximum for a summary conviction.

The appeal was allowed in part to reduce the sentence on that count to 365 days, less pre-sentence custody.

The applicants sought broad disclosure and privileged prosecutorial communications to support an abuse of process claim after new charges were laid following a prior stay of related charges arising from the same investigation.

The court held that the tax evasion allegations were demonstrably independent of the prior stay because the investigation had been ongoing well before the original takedown and continued throughout.

However, the timing and surrounding circumstances of the later money laundering and possession of property obtained by crime charges created a sufficient threshold basis to review prosecutorial discretion and order targeted disclosure.

Applying the prosecutorial-discretion abuse standard and the innocence-at-stake framework, the court concluded solicitor-client privilege could be pierced as a last resort to test whether those charges were laid to circumvent the earlier stay.

Michael Simonelli’s application was dismissed, while Raffaele Simonelli’s application was allowed in part.

The applicant, charged with multiple drug and firearms offences, brought a Charter application under s. 8 and 24(2) to set aside a General Warrant and exclude evidence obtained from his vehicle and residence.

He argued the General Warrant lacked reasonable grounds to believe 'information' would be found in his vehicle, and that warrantless pole camera surveillance of his home violated his rights.

The court found the Information to Obtain established reasonable grounds for the General Warrant, as real evidence like controlled substances constitutes 'information'.

The court also held the pole camera surveillance did not violate s. 8 as it captured only the exterior of the home visible to the public.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, Shauvonne Young, appealed her conviction for importing cocaine.

The central issue was the admissibility of a hearsay statement made by her deceased father, who allegedly confessed to arranging the drug importation without her knowledge.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in excluding the statement, either under the declaration against penal interest exception or the principled approach to hearsay, particularly considering the relaxed standard for defence evidence.

The exclusion of this critical evidence led to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after a controlled delivery of a package containing cocaine hidden in food items.

On appeal, they argued the verdicts were unreasonable because the importation was complete before they handled the package, and that the circumstantial evidence did not prove they knew the package contained drugs.

They also argued the trial judge erred in leaving wilful blindness with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the ultimate domestic recipient was the importer, the circumstantial evidence supported the jury's inference of knowledge, and the inherently suspicious circumstances justified the wilful blindness instruction.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code pending his re-trial on terrorism charges.

Before the terms of release were finalized, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the applicant's convictions, resulting in him serving a life sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 680 application as moot, noting that any future application for release must be brought under s. 679 for bail pending appeal.

A publication ban under s. 517 was also lifted.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order pending his retrial for terrorist-related offences.

The bail judge had dismissed his application on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The reviewing judge found the bail judge erred by misapprehending a risk assessment, failing to address the applicant's present ideology, and considering irrelevant factors regarding the proposed sureties.

Fresh evidence regarding trial delay, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the applicant's rehabilitation was admitted.

The application was allowed, and the applicant was released on strict bail conditions including house arrest, electronic monitoring, and four sureties.