Robert A. Blair

The appellant appealed a jury's damages award in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

She argued that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the meaning of 'material' contribution regarding causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge was not deficient when read as a whole.

The court noted that the jury was entitled to accept the defence theory, supported by the appellant's own medical expert, that her condition could have been caused by factors other than the accident.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal action against his former employer.

At trial, the parties relied on entirely different documents containing starkly different terms to support their conflicting versions of the employment contract.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's version of events and preferred the employer's documentary evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments were amply supported by the evidence and attracted considerable deference, with no palpable and overriding error demonstrated.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of s. 435.01(1) of the Canada Elections Act, which restricts direct public financing to political parties that obtain at least 2% of the national vote or 5% of the vote in constituencies where they run candidates.

The application judge found the thresholds violated ss. 3 and 15 of the Charter and could not be saved under s. 1.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the thresholds violate s. 3 by exacerbating disparities in the capacity of smaller parties to communicate, the infringement is justified under s. 1 as a measure to preserve the integrity of the electoral process and prevent the misuse of public funds.

The Court also found no violation of ss. 15, 2(b), or 2(d), and held that political parties lack standing to sue in their own names outside of proceedings under the Act.

The respondent had a claim against a company that went into receivership.

A vesting order transferred the debtor's assets to the appellant, expunging the respondent's claim against those assets.

The appellant obtained an Order to Continue the proceedings under Rule 11 to pursue a counterclaim against the respondent.

The motion judge varied the Rule 11 order to allow the respondent to pursue its original claim against the appellant as a stand-alone claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a Rule 11 order is purely procedural and cannot create substantive rights that were expunged by the vesting order.

The respondent was limited to asserting its claim by way of set-off against the appellant's counterclaim.

The appellant real estate brokerage sued for commissions allegedly owing on the sale of a nursing home.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against the individual defendants, who were the sole shareholders, officers, and directors of the corporate defendants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding breach of contract, unjust enrichment, or inducing breach of contract, as there was no contract with the individuals personally and no evidence they signed in a personal capacity.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that the respondent Bank was a holder in due course of a cheque.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the Bank took the cheque in good faith and without notice of any defect in title when it was deposited.

The Court rejected the argument that the subsequent issuance of a bank draft constituted the negotiation of the cheque by the Bank.

The appellant sued her former lawyer for professional negligence, alleging he settled her motor vehicle accident claim too soon and for too little.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the lawyer met the standard of care and the appellant was motivated to settle early.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in qualifying a mediator as an expert and in permitting a defence expert to testify despite a breach of an order excluding witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or her conclusion that the lawyer met the standard of care.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, failing to remain, and careless storage of firearms.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the warrantless entry into the appellant's home was not justified by hot pursuit or consent, thereby violating section 8 of the Charter and requiring the exclusion of the firearms evidence.

The driving convictions were upheld, but the total sentence was reduced to three years and the DNA order was set aside.

The appellant appealed a conviction for possession of child pornography found on a shared household computer.

The court held that criminal possession requires knowledge of the nature of the material and a measure of control over it, and that control means power or authority whether exercised or not.

Although there was no finding that the appellant downloaded or viewed the videos, his admitted knowledge of their presence for several months and his direction that they be deleted before police examination established sufficient control.

The court rejected any characterization of the conduct as innocent possession for immediate destruction and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant First Nation enacted its own labour relations code after a union was certified to represent workers at a casino located on its reserve.

The appellant argued that its code displaced the provincial Labour Relations Act based on its aboriginal and treaty rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish an aboriginal practice, custom, or tradition that supported the right to enact a labour relations code.

The Court also held that the Crown did not breach its duty to consult and accommodate, as the appellant's claim was not sufficiently credible and the appellant had taken unilateral action.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action for a declaration of ownership or an easement over a small triangle of land on a shared driveway.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the respondents had established adverse possession, noting the finding was based on a reasonable assessment of witness testimony.

The Court also upheld the conclusion that no prescriptive easement was acquired, as there was no evidence the appellants were prevented from accessing their utility fixtures.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements made by an alleged co-conspirator to an undercover police officer.

The Court of Appeal held that the co-conspirator's statements fell within the 'rare case' exception where a traditional hearsay exception must yield to the principled approach.

Because the co-conspirator was available to testify and the statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, the necessity and reliability requirements were not met.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed a judgment holding them liable as guarantors of a line of credit extended to an automobile dealership.

They argued that a forged Acknowledgement provided to the bank vitiated their earlier guarantees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the bank never sought to enforce the forged document, the appellants suffered no prejudice, and the guarantor knowingly provided subsequent valid Acknowledgements.

Arguments regarding breach of a side agreement and lack of independent legal advice were also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample support in the record for the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants had failed to comply with previous court orders.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $7,500.

The appellant, who was adopted as an infant, sought to discover the identity of her birth father.

She challenged the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions of the Child and Family Services Act and the Vital Statistics Act, arguing they violated her rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the provisions did not violate equality rights as they did not make stereotypical assumptions, nor did they infringe section 7, as unconditional disclosure of third-party identifying information is not a principle of fundamental justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the distinction between murder and manslaughter, after-the-fact evidence, and the defence theory of natural causes.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge, noting the lack of objections from trial counsel.

The fresh evidence application was denied as it did not meet the Palmer test and could not reasonably be expected to have affected the verdict given the powerful circumstantial evidence of culpable homicide.

The plaintiff, an OPP officer, sued the defendant newspaper and its reporters for defamation over articles criticizing his conduct during the 9/11 rescue efforts in New York.

At trial, the defendants relied on the traditional defence of qualified privilege, which the trial judge rejected for two of the articles.

The jury awarded the plaintiff $125,000 in damages.

On appeal, the defendants argued for the adoption of the public interest responsible journalism defence.

The Court of Appeal recognized the new defence as part of Ontario law, holding that it strikes an appropriate balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation.

However, the court dismissed the appeal because the defendants had not pleaded or litigated the responsible journalism standard at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge should have conducted an inquiry into whether the triers in the jury selection process understood their role or were biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding there was no obligation for such an inquiry and that a 'Yes' response during a challenge for cause does not automatically disqualify a potential juror.

The appellant shot and killed his ex-girlfriend before shooting himself in the head, resulting in a severe brain injury and retrograde amnesia.

At trial, he argued that his inability to remember the events surrounding the homicide rendered him unfit to stand trial and violated his right to make full answer and defence.

The trial judge dismissed these applications, and he was convicted of second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that testimonial competence is not a condition precedent to fitness to stand trial, and that amnesia alone does not render an accused unfit or justify a stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed a decision of the summary conviction appeal judge, who had acquitted the respondent of a zoning by-law infraction on the basis that notice and an opportunity to comply were preconditions to prosecution.

The respondent conceded this was an error in law.

The Court of Appeal agreed, rejected the respondent's alternative arguments regarding officially induced error and the trial justice's treatment of expert evidence, allowed the appeal, and restored the conviction.