Robert A. Blair

The parties reached a settlement regarding the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement dismissing the appeal without costs.

The appellant, who was largely unsuccessful at trial, appealed to the Court of Appeal where his appeal on liability was dismissed but the costs order was varied.

After being denied leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant brought a motion before the trial judge under Rule 59.06 to amend or vary the trial order.

The trial judge dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the subsequent appeal, holding that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to vary an order of the Court of Appeal and that Rule 59.06 applies to orders and judgments, not reasons for judgment.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision regarding family law issues and a declaration that she was a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the appellant had effective legal advice when entering into the 2003 Minutes of Settlement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a restitution order imposed by the sentencing judge on his own motion without advance notice.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the appellant's ability to pay, noting a lack of evidence regarding his expenses and income.

Given that the appellant had already served his conditional sentence and probation, and had paid over $10,000 in restitution despite only receiving $5,000 from the fraud, the appeal was allowed and the restitution order was reduced to the amount already paid.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking to reduce his period of parole ineligibility from 14 to 10 years based on fresh Gladue evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence added little more than context and that the sentencing judge was fully alive to the appellant's difficult personal circumstances, including his aboriginal status.

The court upheld the increased period of parole ineligibility due to the brutality of the victim's slow death and the indignities perpetrated on the victim.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the common sense inference and intoxication.

The appellant admitted to causing the elderly victim's death and sexually assaulting her but claimed an alcohol-induced blackout negated the requisite intent for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the common sense inference was properly left to the jury and the intoxication instruction did not improperly shift the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm and other offences, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in classifying an inoperable rifle without a breech bolt as a 'firearm' under the Criminal Code, as there was no evidence that parts to make it operable were available on the scene.

The convictions for robbery with a firearm were quashed and substituted with robbery with an imitation firearm.

The court dismissed the appellant's arguments regarding the admissibility of KGB statements from two witnesses.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court upholding the trial judge's discretion on pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for eight firearm-related offences, arguing the convictions were unreasonable and the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) principles.

The appellant was arrested after police found a bag containing a firearm and ammunition in the back seat of a car he was leaning into.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude based on circumstantial evidence that the bag belonged to the appellant and that he was in possession of it.

The court also found no merit in the W.(D.) ground of appeal.

The appellant brought an action seeking rescission of a property sale and damages.

He requested a bilingual proceeding under s. 126 of the Courts of Justice Act.

On the date of the respondents' summary judgment motion, no bilingual judge was available.

The motion judge refused an adjournment, finding the appellant was using language rights to delay, and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the right to a bilingual proceeding is quasi-constitutional and not subject to judicial discretion to deny based on perceived abuse of process.

The matter was remitted to a bilingual judge.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering him to pay $424,343.09 to the respondent bank.

The appeal was heard alongside another case involving the same appellant and raised the same substantive issue: the right to a hearing before a bilingual judge under section 126 of the Courts of Justice Act.

For the reasons given in the companion case, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the summary judgment, and remitted the original motion to a bilingual judge of the Superior Court.

The appellant appealed his conviction for defrauding a financing company of approximately $90,000 using an altered invoice for non-existent forestry equipment.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding the equipment did not exist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, and concluding the combination of the false invoice and non-existent equipment was sufficient to found a conviction for fraud.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis of undisclosed evidence.

At trial, evidence suggested a witness had been charged but the charges were dropped due to a 'glitch', when in fact the witness was never charged.

The Court of Appeal applied the principles from R. v. Dixon and found that the failure to disclose this information impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence, as counsel could not adequately explore whether the witness's testimony was a quid pro quo for not being charged.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

Following the disposition of four appeals, the Court of Appeal fixed the costs of the appeal and the underlying proceedings.

The appellant was awarded costs on a full indemnity basis, with the respondents ordered to pay a portion on a partial indemnity basis and the remainder to be paid from the Fund.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal at $75,000, and the costs of the underlying Rule 10 and Rule 21 motions at $135,000.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder based on a DNA match from a saliva sample he provided to police while on post-release supervision.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred by applying the balance of probabilities standard to determine whether he voluntarily consented to providing the sample, asserting that the common law confessions rule standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the common law confessions rule is confined to statements due to reliability concerns, and the balance of probabilities standard remains appropriate for assessing consent to bodily samples.

The appellant father appealed an Ontario Superior Court order requiring the return of his 14-year-old son to Canada from Oklahoma.

The child had been living in Oklahoma with the father, and U.S. courts had previously refused the respondent mother's Hague Convention petition for the child's return, citing the child's mature objection to returning to Canada under Article 13(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Ontario courts should decline jurisdiction in favour of the Oklahoma courts based on principles of comity and deference to the U.S. courts' reasonable interpretation of the Hague Convention.

The appellant was severely injured while exercising a horse at a racetrack.

His worker's compensation claim was denied because the trainer who hired him failed to maintain coverage as required by the Rules of Thoroughbred Racing.

The appellant sued the trainer, the Ontario Racing Commission, and the racetrack owner for negligence.

The trial judge found only the trainer liable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that neither the Commission nor the racetrack owner owed a private law duty of care to the appellant to ensure compliance with the rules, as their statutory mandates were to serve the public interest rather than private individuals.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision granting partial summary judgment to the respondents on the issue of product ownership.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that there was no triable issue regarding the appellant's ownership of the product, noting the appellant's pleadings and a 1996 licensing agreement were inconsistent with ownership.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, striking the declaration that the respondent owned the product because the respondent had not filed a counter-claim.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding her liable for the outstanding balance of her former law firm's accounts for services rendered in matrimonial litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the accounts.

The trial judge properly considered relevant factors, including the nature of the services, time expended, and the appellant's ability to pay, and correctly noted that the appellant had acquiesced to the fees by making partial payments without complaint for many months.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding liability for a fire, arguing the trial judge erred in qualifying the respondent's causation expert, apportioning liability, and denying an adjournment request on the first day of trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert's practical experience sufficient for admissibility, upholding the contributory negligence apportionment, and finding no error in the discretionary refusal of the adjournment given the history of prior indulgences granted to the appellant.

The plaintiff, a member of the OMERS pension plan, brought an action on behalf of plan members against the OMERS Board, two corporations, and three former OMERS employees, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, knowing receipt of trust property, knowing assistance, and unjust enrichment arising from the outsourcing of real estate management.

The defendants successfully moved to strike several claims under Rule 21.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while some breach of fiduciary duty claims were properly struck, the claims for knowing receipt, knowing assistance, and unjust enrichment should be allowed to proceed against all defendants.

The Court also held that the plaintiff was entitled to costs from the pension fund on a full indemnity basis, as the action was brought to ensure the due administration of the fund and for the benefit of all beneficiaries.