Robert A. Blair

The plaintiffs were riding a tandem bicycle downhill when they lost control, struck an embankment, and suffered severe injuries, resulting in the husband's death.

The trial judge found the defendant municipality entirely liable for the accident due to road disrepair and inadequate signage.

On appeal, the defendant argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence beyond the expert's qualifications and in failing to find contributory negligence.

The Court of Appeal held that while the expert should not have testified on matters outside his expertise, the defendant suffered no prejudice.

However, the Court found the trial judge ignored evidence of the husband's excessive speed and failure to keep a proper lookout, and apportioned liability 60% to the defendant and 40% to the plaintiffs.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

The Crown conceded that the statutory presumption did not apply and it bore the onus to prove the absence of bolus drinking, which was a critical assumption underlying the expert's opinion.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown failed to meet this onus and that the trial judge misunderstood the burden of proof.

The appeal was allowed and a verdict of acquittal was substituted.

The appellant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to traffic cocaine and attempted importation of cocaine.

He raised several grounds of appeal, including that his trial should have been held in Gatineau instead of Ottawa, that he was denied full answer and defence, that the trial judge erred in limiting the role of amicus curiae, that the jury was not exclusively francophone, and that his right to counsel was violated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding that Ontario courts had jurisdiction due to overt acts committed in Ontario, that the appellant was given adequate time and access to prepare his defence, and that the jury composition complied with the Criminal Code.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexual interference, incest, and assault causing bodily harm against the complainant, and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give limiting instructions regarding prior consistent statements, discreditable conduct, and witness opinions on credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error given the defence's tactical decisions at trial, the lack of objections, and the overall fairness of the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-year term was within the permissible range for the grave sexual exploitation and physical abuse inflicted.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing minutes of settlement.

They argued the court should imply a term that the respondent would refrain from actively assisting in OMVIC proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no evidence to support such an implied term, as the respondent could not agree to avoid being subpoenaed or telling the truth.

The appellant appealed a lower court decision, arguing errors in the assessment of credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law by the appeal judge and confirming that the trial judge properly decided the credibility issues and understood the appellant's case.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the court received written submissions regarding costs.

Given the complexity of the matter and the significant amount at issue, the successful respondent was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $23,623.26 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for drug trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting his statement to the police and in relying on the evidence of a witness.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis or her assessment of the witness's evidence.

The court also rejected the appellant's request for sentence credit for time spent on bail under strict conditions, noting he was arrested for drug trafficking while on release.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that the respondent's cell probe comments did not amount to an adoption of a co-accused's entire recanted statement, and by refusing to admit the respondent's criminal record for violence after the defence adduced evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence.

The Crown also argued defence counsel made inflammatory remarks in closing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and concluding that while defence counsel's remarks about race were inappropriate, they did not meet the heavy onus required to overturn a jury acquittal.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her application for mandamus with certiorari in aid against a Justice of the Peace who refused to issue process against the respondent doctor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that there was no jurisdictional error because the consensual medical examination lacked evidence of intent to cause bodily harm.

The Court also agreed that issuing process would be an abuse of process given prior unsuccessful civil and criminal proceedings.

The appellant appealed his sentence for sexual offences against a ten-year-old child, arguing that the pre-sentence report contained improper, emotive language that tainted the sentencing process.

The Court of Appeal agreed the probation officer exceeded proper bounds but found no indication this affected the trial judge's careful and measured assessment.

Given the appellant's prior record for a similar offence and his continued denial, the sentence was deemed fit and necessary for the protection of society.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's decision allowing the respondents' claims for the balance of a vendor take-back loan and wrongful dismissal, and dismissing the appellants' action for breach of contract and fiduciary duty arising from a complex business sale.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the contractual documents, finding that the non-competition covenant had to be read in conjunction with a mutual undertaking that granted a right of first refusal for distribution contracts.

The Court also agreed that the respondent did not owe a fiduciary duty to the appellants, as the parties were at arm's length and of equal strength.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant and her sisters retained the respondent law firms for estate litigation.

By agreement, the law firms' accounts were paid by a corporation owned by the sisters.

The appellant later discovered the accounts contained substantial undisclosed premiums and sought to have them assessed.

The motion judge dismissed the request, finding the appellant lacked standing as the corporation paid the bills.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was the true client and had standing.

Furthermore, the Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to order an assessment because the solicitors failed to disclose the premiums or advise the clients of their right to an assessment.

The appellant was awarded $20,000 in general damages by a jury in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge deprived the appellant of costs under Rule 76.13, finding it was unreasonable to proceed outside the simplified procedure regime.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's costs ruling could not be reconciled with his pre-verdict assessment of the case, including his jury instruction suggesting a range up to $75,000 and his dismissal of the respondents' threshold motion.

The appellant was awarded costs of the action and the appeal.

The appellant sued Canada for a declaration that its refusal to compensate him for internment and forced labour during World War II violated sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The appellant died before the action came to trial, and his estate trustees obtained an Order to Continue.

Canada successfully moved to vary the order so that the estate could only pursue non-Charter claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the estate's appeal, applying Supreme Court precedent to hold that an estate does not have standing to pursue relief under the Charter, including under section 7.

The appellant's land was unlawfully taken by the respondent's predecessor in 1989.

The parties settled the ensuing litigation in 1991, agreeing to proceed under the Expropriations Act, but the respondent failed to implement the settlement for 13 years.

The appellant commenced a new action in the Superior Court for compensation and damages.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the Ontario Municipal Board had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court has jurisdiction because the action arises from the respondent's failure to implement a settlement of a Superior Court proceeding.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's ruling that he was entitled to only 90 days' notice upon the non-renewal of a contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that because the contract allowed for termination during its term on 90 days' notice, the notice of non-renewal could not exceed 90 days.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's records were too unreliable to establish anything more than nominal damages for the shortfall in notice.

The appellant, convicted of a designated sexual offence, challenged the constitutionality of Christopher's Law, which mandates that sex offenders register with police.

He argued the law was ultra vires the province, rendered inoperative by federal paramountcy, and violated his rights under sections 7, 11, and 12 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the legislation was a valid exercise of provincial power aimed at community safety, did not conflict with federal law, and did not constitute punishment.

The court also held that the law did not violate section 7, as its requirements were not overbroad or grossly disproportionate to the objective of protecting the public.

The appellant purchased commercial land from the respondent and granted a Vendor Take Back Mortgage.

The mortgage contained a provision making it due and payable five days after the appellant obtained a shoring and excavation permit, and another provision allowing for prepayment on specific dates.

The permit was issued on January 10, making the mortgage due on January 15.

The appellant attempted to exercise the prepayment option on January 15.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that because the mortgage had matured and become due and payable on January 15, it could not be prepaid on that date.

The self-represented appellant appealed a discretionary order imposing a charging order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle that would justify appellate interference with the motion judge's discretion.