David Matthew Schell

The applicant condominium corporation sought a permanent order prohibiting a resident, Paolo Scotti, from residing in his unit due to disruptive and aggressive behaviour stemming from his mental illness.

The court found that Mr. Scotti had breached condominium rules but declined to issue a permanent vacating order, noting his mental illness as the cause of misconduct and his recent efforts to comply with treatment.

The court ordered Mr. Scotti to comply with the Condominium Act and condominium instruments but granted no further relief to the applicant, emphasizing the duty to accommodate and the lack of evidence of material breach of the prior interlocutory order.

The accused, a paraplegic, was charged with sexual assault against his Personal Support Worker (PSW).

The complainant alleged the accused groped and kissed her during a routine morning visit, which the accused denied.

Applying the W.D. credibility analysis, the court found the accused not credible due to evasive testimony regarding his physical capabilities.

The complainant was found credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies, with the court noting her demeanor, lack of exaggeration, and absence of a financial motive to fabricate.

The court emphasized the cautious use of demeanor and post-offence conduct as credibility factors.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the defendants brought a threshold motion arguing the plaintiff was barred from recovering non-pecuniary and health care damages under the Insurance Act.

The jury had awarded $10,000 in general damages and $37,133.13 in medical expenses.

The trial judge applied the three-pronged test from Meyer v. Bright and found the plaintiff, a former school principal, suffered permanent serious impairment due to chronic pain syndrome and soft tissue injuries.

The court held the plaintiff met the statutory threshold, dismissing the defendants' motion and allowing the plaintiff to recover the damages awarded by the jury.

The appellant was awarded $20,000 in general damages by a jury in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge deprived the appellant of costs under Rule 76.13, finding it was unreasonable to proceed outside the simplified procedure regime.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's costs ruling could not be reconciled with his pre-verdict assessment of the case, including his jury instruction suggesting a range up to $75,000 and his dismissal of the respondents' threshold motion.

The appellant was awarded costs of the action and the appeal.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that the respondent's use of property for horse-related activities was a legal non-conforming use under the zoning by-law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's findings were supported by the record and that section 45(2) of the Planning Act did not apply.

The respondent's cross-appeal on costs was allowed, as the application judge erred in denying costs based on pre-litigation conduct.