Robert A. Blair

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their medical malpractice action on a motion for summary judgment because it was commenced outside the one-year limitation period under the Health Professions Procedure Code.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred by refusing to consider medical evidence acquired after the action was commenced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the relevant period for the discoverability doctrine is before the action is commenced, and the appellants knew or should have known the material facts to base their claim prior to the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action against the respondent employer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellants' claim was a separate and independent tort of negligent misrepresentation regarding the process to be followed in pursuing a claim, rather than a claim arising in respect of a worker's injury.

The order dismissing the action was set aside.

The appellants appealed a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement, arguing the motion judge erred in ordering a $725,000 payment in cash and seeking to rescind the agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the motion judge failed to consider evidence that the parties intended the sum to be paid via security, such as a promissory note or guarantee, rather than cash.

The judgment was amended accordingly, but the appeal was otherwise dismissed, and the request to rescind the settlement agreement was rejected.

The plaintiff franchisor sued the defendant franchisees for breach of contract.

The motion judge struck large portions of the defendants' statement of defence and stayed portions of their counterclaim, finding the defence pleadings unnecessary for a 'reasonable defence' and the counterclaim duplicative of an intended class action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a defendant is entitled to plead any relevant material facts of at least marginal probative value, and that it was premature to stay the counterclaim based on an uncertified class action to which the defendants were not parties.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that the respondents were entitled to a prescriptive easement for a right-of-way over a driveway on the appellants' property.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding the use was 'as of right' rather than by permission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was open to the trial judge to find on the record that the arrangement between the original owners did not amount to permission, and deference was owed to that factual finding.

The appellants, holders of Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) notes, appealed a decision sanctioning a restructuring plan under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).

The plan included comprehensive releases of third-party financial institutions from liability, including certain claims relating to fraud.

The appellants argued the CCAA does not permit third-party releases and that the releases were unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the CCAA permits third-party releases that are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring.

The Court found the application judge did not err in concluding the plan was fair and reasonable, as the releases were necessary for the restructuring to succeed and benefited the creditors as a whole.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that annulled the parties' marriage based on the law of Iran.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact.

The trial judge's credibility findings, which favoured the respondent over the appellant, were upheld.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their third party claim against the plaintiff's counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that on the pleadings, any negligence alleged against the proposed third party was attributable to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff had not distanced itself from responsibility for its counsel's negligence, making the third party claim inappropriate.

The appellant sued a trustee in bankruptcy and others.

A Registrar dismissed his motion for leave to continue the action under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and the appellant did not appeal.

Instead, he issued a new Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim based on the same facts.

The motion judge struck the new claim on the grounds of res judicata and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the new claim was an attempt to relitigate a determined matter and that the proper avenue was to appeal the Registrar's order.

The appellants, minority shareholders of Asbestos Corporation Limited, commenced an action in Ontario in 1987 for an oppression remedy and other relief following the takeover of the corporation by the Province of Quebec.

The appellants did not pursue the Ontario action until 2003, after exhausting five other proceedings in different forums.

The motion judge dismissed the action for delay and, in the alternative, stayed it on the basis of forum non conveniens and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in her conclusions that the delay was inexcusable, Quebec was the more appropriate forum, and the attempt to relitigate issues already decided elsewhere constituted an abuse of process.

The appellants applied for admission to a Master's program but were denied because they could not comply with the department's funding policy, which required a portion of external funding to come from the supervising professor's research grants.

The appellants sought judicial review, arguing the policy was an admission standard requiring Senate approval and that its application was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the funding policy was a reasonable administrative supplement to minimum admission requirements, not an admission standard, and that the university's discretionary decision was reasonable and procedurally fair.

The appellant father appealed and the respondent mother cross-appealed the trial judge's orders regarding access, property interests, and costs.

The father did not attend the hearing and advised he no longer wished to be involved.

The Court of Appeal allowed the cross-appeal in part, modifying the access order to be as requested by the 14-year-old child, given fresh evidence that she had not seen her father in three years and did not want access.

The court dismissed the cross-appeal regarding property interests and costs, finding no error in the trial judge's application of resulting trust and partnership principles, nor in the discretionary costs award.

The Crown appealed an order staying proceedings against the respondent for child pornography charges due to a 27.5-month delay between arrest and trial.

The trial judge found the delay unreasonable under s. 11(b) of the Charter, attributing it to the slow pace of Crown disclosure and institutional delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the case's complexity, the inherent time requirements, or the balancing of the respondent's prejudice against society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to make support payments to the Family Responsibility Office and a related costs order.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal regarding the support payments, finding it was an interlocutory order over which it lacked jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the appeal regarding costs, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of Justice to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction and that an appeal from an interlocutory order lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision that overturned a Social Benefits Tribunal ruling regarding her disability support claim.

The Divisional Court had characterized the Tribunal's failure to accept certain medical evidence as an error of law.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal had properly considered and weighed all the evidence, including medical reports and the appellant's testimony, and that the Divisional Court had improperly interfered with the Tribunal's factual findings.

The appellant, an airport employee, was convicted of drug importation offences based largely on intercepted telephone calls in Jamaican Patois.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that they need only be satisfied of the voice identification and the accuracy of the English translations on a balance of probabilities.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that this was a misdirection, as it improperly invited the jury to apply a lower standard of proof to individual pieces of evidence on a piecemeal basis before considering the evidence as a whole on the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondent successfully sued her mother for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to protect her from sexual abuse by her father during her childhood.

The mother appealed, arguing the action was barred by the equitable doctrine of laches due to the 42-year delay in bringing the claim, and that she was powerless to intervene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability, finding no acquiescence by the respondent and that the mother failed to establish she was unable to protect her daughter.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding damages, reducing the award for lost income from $100,000 to $20,000 due to a lack of evidentiary foundation for the higher amount.

A cross-appeal regarding trial costs was dismissed.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for multiple sexual offences involving his niece and sought leave to appeal a three-year penitentiary sentence.

The court held that contextual evidence concerning an unrelated child protection matter was admissible as necessary narrative surrounding the appellant's admissions, and any prejudicial effect was outweighed by the probative value of the confessions.

The court also held that the complainant's disclosures to family and friends were admissible as narrative evidence under the prior consistent statement jurisprudence, and that the jury charge did not require further limiting instructions in the circumstances of the defence theory.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because the sentence was not manifestly unfit and disclosed no error in principle.

The appellant appealed her sentence of 90 days intermittent, probation, and a five-year driving prohibition for an impaired driving offence.

The trial judge had imposed the 90-day sentence under the mistaken belief that the appellant had two prior qualifying convictions, making 90 days the mandatory minimum.

The Crown acknowledged that the actual mandatory minimum was 14 days but argued the 90-day sentence should be sustained.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting the appellant's compliance with strict bail conditions for four years, and reduced the custodial sentence to 20 days intermittent.