Robert A. Blair

The appellant appealed his conviction for pointing a firearm, arguing there was insufficient evidence for the trial judge to find the 'gun' was a 'firearm'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence based on witness descriptions, the loading of the gun, the appellant's aggressive behaviour, and his threats to shoot the victims.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, arguing the respondent breached fiduciary duties through non-disclosure of financial dealings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant knew of the non-disclosure and the additional mortgages, yet chose to compromise his claim and sign a release with the benefit of legal advice.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed for failing to meet the Palmer test.

The appellant appealed an order striking his pleading for failing to fully comply with outstanding court orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant had partially complied and that the precise obligations under the orders were unclear.

The order striking the pleading was set aside, and the parties were directed to clarify the obligations, after which the appellant would have 45 days to comply.

The defendants appealed a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $343,560 for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by refusing leave to call two experts, inadequately instructing the jury on future income loss, and that the general damages award was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's rulings.

The plaintiffs cross-appealed the costs award, arguing the trial judge misapprehended that trial preparation time was duplicated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the cross-appeal in part, adjusting the costs reduction for trial preparation.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding adverse possession and the subsequent costs award based on an offer to settle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge applied the proper test for adverse possession and made factual findings well supported by the record.

The trial judge's view of the offer to settle was also deemed reasonable.

The young person appealed the decision to sentence him as an adult.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider the immigration consequences and possible deportation resulting from the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's determination, particularly given the position taken by defence counsel at trial and the absence of a proper evidentiary record regarding deportation.

The appellants appealed an order declaring Mr. Pavicevic dead as of January 10, 1997, under the Declarations of Death Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the criteria for a declaration of death were met.

Because Mr. Pavicevic and the respondent held property as joint tenants, title passed automatically to the respondent upon his presumed death, defeating the appellants' spousal support order which was not registered on title until 2005.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after fatally stabbing the victim following a dispute.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding post-offence conduct, the common sense inference of intent, and the 'rolled-up' charge on mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate, properly cautioned the jury, and correctly placed the burden of proof on the Crown.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory regime established to resolve the distribution of statutory accident benefit losses between insurers does not deprive injured parties of their right to sue in tort actions.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed an order granting summary judgment to the respondents in a medical malpractice action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondents had not filed an expert medical report and failed to meet their burden of showing no genuine issue for trial.

The Court also held that the limitation period defence raised an issue of discoverability that must go to trial.

The summary judgment was set aside and costs were awarded to the appellants.

The respondent was dismissed without cause from his managerial position after 13 months of service.

The trial judge awarded a base notice period of six months and added two three-month Wallace extensions for bad faith in the manner of dismissal, along with damages for mitigation expenses and loss of an Employee Stock Purchase Plan.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the six-month base notice period but set aside the Wallace extensions, finding no evidence of bad faith or high-handed conduct by the employer.

The court also adjusted the damages for mitigation expenses and the stock purchase plan.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and threatening death, arguing the trial judge erred in answering a jury question during deliberations.

When asked if all twelve jurors had to agree on reasonable doubt, the trial judge answered affirmatively, failing to explain a juror's right to disagree.

The Court of Appeal held that this answer improperly conveyed an obligation to agree on a verdict, contrary to established Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior misconduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to provide a clear ruling on the basis for admitting the evidence and the use made of it.

The court noted it was unclear whether the evidence was used as similar fact evidence or for credibility.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for common law severance damages for wrongful dismissal.

The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in limiting the appellant's entitlement to the minimum required by the Employment Standards Act based on a termination clause in his employment contract.

The Court of Appeal held that the clause was unambiguous, not void at law, and supported by consideration given the appellant's promotion and enhanced remuneration.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant insurer sought to preserve the evidence of three experts regarding the cause of an infant's injuries before an action was commenced.

A previous application was dismissed because Rule 36.01 did not allow for preservation of evidence prior to the commencement of a proceeding.

Following an amendment to Rule 36.01 that expanded the definition of a party, the insurer brought a new motion.

The motion judge dismissed it on the basis of res judicata.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the change in the law constituted special circumstances justifying an exception to res judicata.

The court ordered the examination of two experts who had examined the vehicle, but not the expert who only reviewed medical records.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson endangering life and causing damage by fire to a dwelling house with intent to defraud, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the arson endangering life conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the reasonable doubt standard or treatment of after-the-fact conduct.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the intent to defraud count, as the trial judge failed to find the appellant had the requisite intent when causing the fire, and ordered a new trial on that count.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court upholding the custodial sentence based on general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and incest against his daughter.

He argued that the information was unsworn, that his Charter rights were violated because his DNA was not in the national databank prior to conviction, and that the trial judge erred in appreciating the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the procedural or Charter arguments and concluding there was ample evidence to support the convictions.

The young person appealed their conviction for robbery, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on a witness's prior statement to police identifying them as a participant, and in giving weight to the fact that they absconded during the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude the witness had generally adopted the truth of the police statement, and there was no error in considering the absconding.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault following an altercation outside a bar.

The central issue at trial was identity, resting almost entirely on the evidence of an eyewitness.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in analyzing the identification evidence, pointing to discrepancies in hair colour and height.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was fully alive to the potential frailties in the identification evidence and reasonably concluded the Crown had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed the 14-year period of parole ineligibility imposed following his conviction for second-degree murder.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in describing the location of the murder, improperly treated his sexual promiscuity as an aggravating factor, and failed to consider mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's thorough reasons, noting the murder was brutal and the sentence was within the appropriate range.

Although the Court commended the appellant's rehabilitative efforts presented as fresh evidence, it found no basis to interfere with the sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.