Robert A. Blair

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges related to impaired driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The trial judge found the accused was driving while impaired but had a reasonable doubt as to whether the impairment caused the complainant's bodily injury and whether the accused knew he had been in an accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were grounded in the evidence and not based on speculation.

The appellants, who received long-term disability benefits, brought a proposed class action challenging the insurer's deduction of CPP Child Benefits from their payments.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the deductions were permitted by the policies and not contrary to the Canada Pension Plan, and awarded the insurer $215,000 in costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal and the costs award, confirming that while the factors in s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act must be given significance, they do not automatically insulate an unsuccessful class plaintiff from an adverse costs award.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for the death of his wife, which was initially investigated as a horse riding accident.

Fifteen years later, the police re-opened the investigation and the appellant confessed during a polygraph interview.

On appeal, the appellant argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated, the trial judge erred in not leaving manslaughter to the jury, and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence suggesting an accidental death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breach, no air of reality to manslaughter, and that the fresh evidence failed the Mohan and Palmer tests.

The sentence appeal regarding the 14-year parole ineligibility period was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States.

He argued the extradition judge erred in accepting his counsel's waiver of submissions and concession of the case, and that appellate delay affected the fairness of the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the judge was entitled to accept counsel's position, the evidence for committal was overwhelming, and the appellate delay caused no prejudice and was partly attributable to the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge shifted the burden of proof and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof and made findings grounded in the evidence.

The sentence appeal, which sought a conditional discharge instead of the imposed fine and probation, was also dismissed as the trial judge made no error in principle.

The appellant appealed an effective sentence of 18 months imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred by rejecting what amounted to a joint submission from the Crown and defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge gave fair notice and adequate reasons for concluding the suggested sentence was contrary to the public interest, noting the appellant was an incorrigible con-man who victimized women and showed no respect for court orders.

The appellants appealed their 8-year sentences, which were significantly higher than the Crown's recommendations at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the 8-year sentences constituted an error in principle given the Crown's recommendations, the ages of the appellants, and their prospects of rehabilitation.

The appeals were allowed and the sentences were reduced to 6 years for each appellant.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for the respondent's investment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility were supported by the record and revealed no error.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed a certiorari application and upheld a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences rather than determining if the inferences sought by the Crown were available on the evidence.

The matter was remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge with a direction to commit the respondent to stand trial on all charges.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in interpreting the phrase 'known to the police' and in delaying the ruling on his stay application until the end of the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's interpretation reasonable and the timing of the stay ruling a proper exercise of discretion that caused no prejudice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was deemed fit.

The appellant, an executor of the Lorraine Penna estate, appealed the dismissal of a motion for a declaration that claims against the estate were statute-barred.

The respondents sought to hold the estate liable for the fraudulent actions of a co-trustee in the administration of the Paul Penna estate.

The Court of Appeal held that the two-year limitation period in s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act applied and was preserved by s. 19 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the fraud exception in s. 43(2) of the former Limitations Act did not apply because the deceased trustee was not a party or privy to the fraud.

The court also declined to apply the special circumstances doctrine to add the estate as a defendant.

The appeal was allowed in part, declaring the summary judgment motion barred by the limitation period.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for habeas corpus regarding a prison transfer.

He argued that the Warden's reasons for ordering the transfer were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reviewing judge that, although the reasons could have been better, the appellant knew he was being transferred due to security concerns triggered by an altercation with his cell mate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the reasons could have been fuller, the trial judge directed his mind to the application of W.(D.).

The court noted that the foundation for the conviction was evident from the record and the defence position was utterly implausible.

Following an appeal, the parties provided joint submissions regarding the costs of the trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the trial judgment be amended on consent to award the plaintiff fixed costs in the amount of $39,196.08.

The Crown appealed acquittals on multiple sexual offence counts involving two young complainants in a judge-alone trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapprehended the Crown's purpose in seeking to rely on the evidence on each count as similar fact evidence across the indictment, wrongly characterizing the purpose as an attack on credibility rather than proof of a pattern refuting coincidence and confirming the complainants' accounts.

The court further held that, in a non-jury multi-count trial where the evidence was already before the court, reasoning prejudice and moral prejudice carried little weight.

The proposed similar fact evidence was highly probative and should have been admitted.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, an Aboriginal woman with a tragic history of abuse and mental health issues, abducted a newborn infant from a hospital after her own child was stillborn.

She pled guilty and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by using a prior seven-year sentence as a baseline and failing to properly apply the principle of restraint and the Gladue framework for Aboriginal offenders.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to two and a half years' imprisonment.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to add party plaintiffs and granting the respondent's motion for partial summary judgment.

The motion judge dismissed the appellants' motion because they failed to file a confirmation form and did not request leave under rule 48.04(1), without permitting submissions on these issues.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge's orders must be set aside on grounds of natural justice and fair procedure.

The parties separated after a 24-year marriage.

At separation, the husband's textile business was valued at up to $11.25 million.

By trial, market forces had reduced its value by $8-9 million.

The trial judge ordered an equalization payment of over $4 million based on the separation-date value, finding that a market-driven decline could not be considered under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a post-separation market-driven decline in value can be considered under s. 5(6)(h).

Given the dramatic decline, the wife's trust claims, and the preservation order, equalizing the properties based on the separation date was unconscionable.

The equalization payment was reduced to $900,000.

The appellant appealed a divorce judgment that awarded sole custody of the parties' biological child to the respondent and determined the respondent's child from a former relationship was a child of the marriage.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment to allow him to retain counsel and by misapplying the Child Support Guidelines.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the refusal to adjourn was a proper exercise of discretion given prior adjournments and lack of prejudice.

The Court also found no error in the child support order, noting the appellant failed to cross-examine the biological father on his ability to pay or demonstrate how shared custody provisions were triggered.

The respondents obtained an Anton Piller order and subsequent orders requiring the appellant to allow access to his premises to re-image computer hard drives.

The motion judge found the appellant in contempt for failing to comply with these orders and struck his statements of defence for failing to pay costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to properly apply the three-pronged test for civil contempt, including the requirement for clear and unequivocal orders and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court also set aside the order striking the defences, holding that the motion judge improperly reversed the onus and failed to give the appellant an opportunity to cure his default.