Robert A. Blair

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that although the trial judge erred in admitting the record of arrest, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of possession.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge erred in finding multiple bail breaches and imposed a sentence inconsistent with her reasons.

The sentence was reduced to 8.5 months, reflecting a 12-month sentence less 3.5 months of pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed a jury decision dismissing his claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh evidence, alleging the respondent's trial counsel improperly cross-examined him on an inaccurate diagram of the intersection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer test for discoverability and there was no support for the allegations of improper conduct.

Furthermore, there was ample evidence to support the jury's findings on liability and causation.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting that the motion judge provided no reasons and the respondent's claim relied on a standard mortgage clause that was not in the material before the court.

The default judgment was set aside on terms that a defence be filed within 30 days, with the writ of seizure and sale remaining in place but enforcement stayed.

The appellant appealed a committal order and sought judicial review of a surrender order to the United States.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Minister's surrender order, noting that even if the appellant's affidavit was accepted as fresh evidence, it did not afford a basis to remit the issue of surrender to the Minister.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appeal from the committal order was dismissed as abandoned.

The accused was found in possession of a loaded prohibited handgun during a traffic stop.

At trial, he was acquitted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code because the trial judge found he lacked the requisite mens rea, specifically knowledge that the barrel length was under 105 mm.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the mens rea for s. 95(1) only requires knowledge that the accused is in possession of a loaded firearm, not knowledge of the specific characteristics that make it prohibited or restricted.

The Court also declined to stay the proceedings despite a three-year delay by the Crown in perfecting the appeal, finding no abuse of process.

A conviction was entered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for dangerous driving involving a police chase, arguing the trial judge erred in principle by using a three-year penitentiary term as a starting point.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that a lower penitentiary sentence was called for given the aggravating features of the conduct.

The appellant appealed a 2007 disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

However, a subsequent 2008 disposition was made which the appellant did not appeal, and his concerns regarding the panel's composition were addressed at both hearings.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal as moot.

The appellant appealed his sentence for impaired driving causing death and bodily harm.

His blood alcohol readings were over three times the legal limit, and this was his third drinking and driving offence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit and upheld the lifetime driving prohibition, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed an eight-year sentence for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred in finding there was no hope for his rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was justified in taking a dim view of the appellant's rehabilitation prospects based on the pre-sentence report and his criminal record, and concluded the sentence was fit.

The accused was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police and was found carrying a loaded prohibited handgun.

He was acquitted at trial of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm on the basis that he lacked the requisite mens rea, as he did not know the barrel was shorter than 105 millimetres.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the mens rea under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code only requires the offender to know they are in possession of a loaded firearm, regardless of whether it is prohibited or restricted.

The Court also declined to stay the proceedings despite a nearly three-year delay by the Crown in perfecting the appeal, finding no actual prejudice.

The appellant failed to appear at the hearing of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and ordered costs of $10,000 payable by the appellant personally to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis, to be a charge on the appellant's portion of the estate.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's analysis and conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $7,500.

The appellants mistakenly delivered heating oil to the plaintiffs' home, which had been converted to natural gas 22 years earlier by the respondents.

The oil was pumped into a decommissioned fill pipe, causing a massive spill and environmental contamination.

The appellants settled the plaintiffs' claim and sought contribution from the respondents for negligently decommissioning the system.

The trial judge dismissed the third-party claim, finding the specific chain of events was not reasonably foreseeable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by focusing on the precise manner of the incident rather than the general foreseeability of a mistaken delivery.

The respondents breached the standard of care by failing to permanently plug the fill pipe.

The respondent used a portion of the appellants' driveway to park his car, relying on a prescriptive easement.

The application judge granted a declaration of a prescriptive easement, finding that a 40-year right had crystallized before the appellants' predecessor in title gave written permission in 1991.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in calculating the time period under the Real Property Limitations Act, as the 20 or 40-year period must be the period 'next before' the commencement of the action.

The 1991 written permission defeated the statutory claim.

Furthermore, the doctrine of lost modern grant did not apply because the use was always with the oral permission of the predecessors in title.

The appeal was allowed and the application dismissed.

The appellants appealed their eight-year sentences, which were significantly higher than the Crown's recommendations at trial.

The Court of Appeal found the sentences constituted an error in principle given the Crown's recommendations, the appellants' ages, and their prospects for rehabilitation.

The sentences were reduced to six years.

In a subsequent addendum, the Court clarified that the two months of pre-trial custody credit granted by the trial judge applied to the reduced six-year sentences, leaving five years and ten months to be served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of second degree murder, seeking to strike his guilty pleas based on fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the proposed fresh evidence incredulous, contrived, and unworthy of belief.

The Court concluded the pleas were fully informed and voluntary, and that the appellant was manipulative and attempting to deceive the court.

The appellant, a former Venturers leader, appealed his convictions for historical indecent assault against two complainants.

He argued that the jury's verdicts were unreasonable due to inconsistencies and improbabilities in the complainants' evidence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a properly instructed jury acting judicially could reasonably have rendered the verdicts.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal regarding one complainant, finding the evidence surrounding the incident highly improbable.

The appellant appealed from a conviction by the Ontario Court of Justice.

At the request of the appellant, the appeals were abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction by a Superior Court of Justice judge sitting without a jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it to be essentially fact-driven and concluding that the trial judge did not err in his analysis or conclusion.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision upholding the respondent's acquittal.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that the question of whether a presumption was rebutted is one of mixed fact and law, and based on the trial judge's findings of fact, the appeal did not raise a pure question of law.