Jennifer Guth

This is the fourth ruling in a motion brought by the plaintiffs for approval of a settlement concerning minor plaintiffs' claims, management of net settlement funds, a contingency fee retainer agreement, and the solicitor-client account.

The court had previously approved the settlement for both minor plaintiffs and the solicitor-client account on a quantum meruit basis, but dismissed the request for approval of the contingency fee agreement.

This ruling specifically addresses the final determination of the minor plaintiffs' pro-rata contributions to the solicitor-client account and the net settlement amounts payable to them, while also providing detailed directions for the revision of the draft order.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for approval of a settlement of the minor plaintiffs' claims, the proposed management of the net settlement funds, and the proposed solicitor-client account.

In this third interim ruling, the court adjourned the motion to permit the plaintiffs to file additional evidence regarding the specific calculations for the minor plaintiffs' pro-rata contributions towards the solicitor-client account and the net amounts payable to each minor.

The court also directed the plaintiffs to serve the Office of the Children's Lawyer and to submit a revised draft order complying with Form 59A.

This interim ruling addresses a motion for court approval of a minor settlement, management of net settlement funds, and solicitor-client account.

While the solicitor-client account was approved, the court adjourned decisions on the minor plaintiffs' specific contributions to the account and the detailed management of Brayden's structured settlement funds due to insufficient evidence regarding tax implications and the proposed structure.

The court also denied the plaintiffs' request to dispense with service of motion records on the defendant, emphasizing the need for proper procedural compliance and the defendant's right to review the full terms of the proposed order and release.

The applicant landlord sought to bring a subrogated claim against the respondent tenant for damages arising from a residential fire.

The respondent was also an officer of the applicant corporation.

The core issue was whether the respondent was an insured under the applicant's commercial general liability (CGL) policy, which contained a waiver of subrogation against any individual for whom insurance was provided.

The applicant argued the respondent was only insured in her capacity as an officer, while the respondent contended she was covered as an individual.

Applying principles of insurance contract interpretation, including the *contra proferentem* rule, and relying on precedent, the court found that the respondent was an insured for the purposes of the subrogation waiver, thereby prohibiting the subrogated action.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision that found she was an employee acting in the course of her employment when her parked vehicle was struck by a bus.

The Tribunal's decision barred her civil action against the bus company.

The respondent moved to dismiss the application for delay, which the court denied due to the applicant's medical and personal circumstances.

On the merits, the Divisional Court found the Tribunal's decision was reasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review, declining to award costs due to the applicant's impecuniosity.

The appellants mistakenly delivered heating oil to the plaintiffs' home, which had been converted to natural gas 22 years earlier by the respondents.

The oil was pumped into a decommissioned fill pipe, causing a massive spill and environmental contamination.

The appellants settled the plaintiffs' claim and sought contribution from the respondents for negligently decommissioning the system.

The trial judge dismissed the third-party claim, finding the specific chain of events was not reasonably foreseeable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by focusing on the precise manner of the incident rather than the general foreseeability of a mistaken delivery.

The respondents breached the standard of care by failing to permanently plug the fill pipe.

Following an appeal decision that upheld an award of medical benefits to the insured person, the Director's Delegate assessed the insured's arbitration and appeal expenses.

The Delegate allowed an increased hourly rate for the insured's counsel but denied the insured's claim for lost wages, finding that lost wages do not qualify as disbursements under the Expense Schedule.

Claims for meal allowances were also denied as there was no overnight stay, but mileage was allowed for each separate hearing attendance.

Total expenses were assessed at $12,461.95.

The insurer appealed an arbitration decision allowing the insured's claim for medical benefits for the period between June 1998 and October 2001.

The insurer argued that the claim was barred by issue estoppel because a previous arbitration had dismissed the insured's claim for medical benefits for the period between January 1997 and June 1998.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, finding that the previous decision was limited to the specific benefits claimed for that specific period and did not decide the underlying issues of impairment or causation.

The Delegate also held that issue estoppel is an awkward fit for accident benefits adjudication, which contemplates multiple claims over time, and that the second arbitration was not an abuse of process.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought medical rehabilitation benefits for treatments received between June 1998 and October 2001.

The insurer argued the claim was barred by res judicata due to a prior arbitration decision that denied benefits for an earlier period.

The arbitrator rejected the res judicata argument, finding that entitlement to medical benefits can arise at any time and the issues were not identical.

On the merits, the arbitrator found the applicant's ongoing chiropractic, acupuncture, osteopathic, and massage treatments were reasonable and necessary to manage his symptoms and allow him to work.

The claim for prescription expenses was denied due to lack of evidence.