Robert A. Blair

The appellant, a dual status offender under the authority of the Ontario Review Board, was convicted of manslaughter for killing a fellow inmate.

The Crown applied to have him declared a dangerous offender.

The sentencing judge found the statutory criteria met and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued procedural flaws regarding notice and the Attorney General's consent, and that the judge erred in not exercising residual discretion given the Review Board's concurrent jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the procedural requirements were met and the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism justified the dangerous offender designation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences after a handgun was found in his pocket during a traffic stop.

He argued the stop under the Highway Traffic Act was a ruse for an unconstitutional criminal investigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the stop was legitimate and not a pretext.

The court also dismissed an application to admit fresh evidence, finding it failed the Palmer test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge rejected his evidence simply because she believed the complainant, and that the reasons were insufficient under the Sheppard test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge did not expressly articulate the basis for rejecting the appellant's evidence, a fair reading of the reasons as a whole showed she considered all the evidence, including the complainant's emotional state and the 911 call, which supported the complainant's version of events.

The appellant, an unsuccessful prospective purchaser of the debtor's assets, sought to appeal an order appointing an interim receiver and approving the sale of the debtor's assets to another party.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the appellant lacked standing.

The court reaffirmed that an unsuccessful bidder does not have a legal or proprietary right in the property being sold and therefore does not have a direct interest sufficient to challenge a sale approval order.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break, enter and theft, breach of probation, and breach of recognizance, as well as his global sentence of 44 months.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge on identification evidence, restricted cross-examination on the Sophonow report, misdirected the jury on inferences from a cell phone call, and failed to grant two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The court also upheld the sentencing judge's discretionary decision to deny two-for-one credit based on the appellant's history of disobeying court orders.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their request to stay a contempt proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the material before the motion judge did not support the request, particularly as there was no evidence that an application for an extension of time for leave to appeal the underlying interlocutory injunction order could succeed.

The appellants appealed a contempt order and the penalty imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even excluding the alleged hearsay evidence, there was ample evidence to support the findings of contempt.

The court also upheld the penalty, characterizing it as moderate in the circumstances, and awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order referring a solicitor's account for assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's exercise of discretion, as the motion judge had identified sufficient reasons to establish special circumstances.

Following the dismissal of the employees' appeal regarding related employers under the Employment Standards Act, the successful respondents sought costs.

The appellants and the Director of Employment Standards argued against a costs award, citing financial hardship and the public interest nature of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to excuse the appellants on financial grounds and noted the Director could not use its statutory role to shield itself from costs after fully participating as an advocate.

However, because the appeal raised the interpretation of s. 4 of the Employment Standards Act for the first time in the court—a matter of broad public interest—the court ordered no costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the complainant's credibility and by stating that penetration was not relevant to establish sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury would have understood the evidence relevant to the complainant's credibility and that the trial judge was correct in law regarding penetration.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was not outside the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a child protection matter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to a limited extent, ordering that the ongoing status review hearing proceed by way of an expedited new trial before a different judge, with the status quo remaining in the interim.

The respondent obtained a Norwich order for pre-action discovery against the appellants to investigate alleged fraudulent conveyances and misrepresentations following a failed corporate acquisition.

The appellants appealed the order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the Norwich order, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to consider whether the pre-action discovery was necessary.

The Court held that the respondent already possessed sufficient information to formulate a pleading and that the extraordinary equitable remedy of a Norwich order was not required.

A fraudster induced the respondent financing company to advance funds, which were used to purchase shares in an investment account.

The fraudster then pledged these shares to the appellant bank to secure a line of credit.

The respondent obtained a tracing order and claimed the funds based on unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant bank was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and had a valid security interest in the shares.

The appeal was allowed, and the funds were awarded to the appellant bank.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, uttering threats, and sexual assault against his spouse.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's assessment of credibility, as the case turned almost entirely on the conflicting testimony of the appellant and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny, holding the appellant accountable for every inconsistency while glossing over significant contradictions in the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding her statements to police.

The trial judge also misapprehended material parts of the appellant's evidence.

Concluding that the appellant did not receive a fair trial, the Court of Appeal set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The appellant home builder appealed a trial judgment dismissing its counterclaim against a developer and its negligence claim against Tarion Warranty Corporation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against the developer, finding the trial judge failed to make necessary findings of fact and misapprehended a prior court order, necessitating a new trial.

However, the appeal against Tarion was dismissed, as the appellant's failure to file required financial statements for registration renewal was wilful, and Tarion's refusal to accept the late application was justified under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that the arbitration clause in its Alliance Agreement with the respondent did not require a party to file a notice of request to arbitrate with the Arbitration and Mediation Institute of Ontario to commence arbitration.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in his interpretation of the arbitration clause.

The Court held that the standard of review for contractual interpretation in this case was correctness, and that the clear wording of the agreement required the arbitration to be conducted under the 'then-current rules' of the Institute, which mandated filing a notice with the Institute to commence proceedings.

The appellant appealed the judgment of Justice Andra Pollak of the Superior Court of Justice dated April 24, 2008, and the subsequent cost award.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent fixed at $8,000.

The bankrupt company's creditors appealed an order dismissing their motion under s. 135(5) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to challenge a proof of claim filed by a judgment creditor.

The proof of claim was based on a Singapore judgment.

The creditors argued that the judgment creditor received payments from a third party that should be set off against the judgment debt to prevent double recovery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the creditors did not have an unqualified right to challenge a valid judgment debt under s. 135(5).

The court further held that the creditors were privies of the bankrupt company and were barred by the doctrine of res judicata from re-litigating the mitigation and set-off issues, which had already been determined in the Singapore proceedings.

The appellants brought an action in the Superior Court claiming they were exempt from paying GST on certain financial services under the Excise Tax Act.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the Tax Court of Canada had exclusive jurisdiction.

On appeal, the appellants argued the Superior Court had constitutional or concurrent jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the claim was not constitutional in nature and that the Tax Court of Canada Act, read with the Excise Tax Act, clearly gave the Tax Court exclusive jurisdiction over GST rebate claims.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge engaged in speculation regarding the complainant's evidence, placed undue reliance on her demeanour, and applied unequal scrutiny to the defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made logical inferences from the record, properly considered corroborating evidence of the complainant's post-encounter conduct, and conducted a balanced and fair assessment of the evidence.