Robert A. Blair

The respondent, a first offender, pleaded guilty to importing 9.56 kilograms of high-grade heroin into Canada as a courier.

The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of seven years and nine months, treating heroin as only marginally more dangerous than cocaine and considering the respondent's wilful blindness as a mitigating factor.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that heroin is significantly more dangerous than cocaine and that wilful blindness is not a mitigating factor.

The Court established a sentencing range of 12 to 17 years for first offender couriers importing large amounts of high-grade heroin for personal gain, and increased the respondent's sentence to 14 years and nine months.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial judge erred in her costs award by misstating the length of the trial and made errors in assessing the evidence and credibility of the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the reference to a six-day trial was a mere slip and the costs award was reasonable.

The Court also found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's appreciation of the evidence, noting she properly addressed credibility on each disputed issue.

The appellant held an automobile fleet insurance policy with the respondent insurer but failed to disclose that it had employed a driver with a record for impaired driving.

After the driver was involved in a serious accident, the insurer denied coverage for the claim.

The appellant argued that the insurer was required to void or cancel the policy rather than simply deny coverage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no support for the appellant's position and affirming that Standard OAP1 Policy s. 1.4 permits the insurer to deny claims when the insured fails to notify them of a significant change in risk.

The Republic of France sought the extradition of the appellant, a Canadian citizen, following his in absentia convictions for forging a travel document and membership in a terrorist organization.

The appellant appealed his committal for surrender on forgery-related offences and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and application, finding ample evidence to support the committal and concluding that the Minister's surrender decision was reasonable and did not violate the appellant's Charter mobility rights.

The Court of Appeal issued an amended endorsement to include a costs provision that was inadvertently omitted from its original endorsement.

The appellants were ordered to pay costs to the respondents in the agreed-upon amount of $12,970 all-inclusive.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his defamation claim against his former employer.

The claim was based on the employer submitting a statutory form to employment insurance authorities stating the appellant had been 'dismissed' and a follow-up statement that the dismissal was for breach of policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge.

The court held that the statements were protected by qualified privilege and there was no evidence of malice to overcome that privilege.

The appellants appealed an order striking their amended statement of claim.

A previous motion judge had struck substantially all of the original claims but granted leave to amend with guidance on curing the defects.

The subsequent motion judge found that the amended claim repeated the struck allegations, failed to remedy the defects, and added non-viable claims.

The Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order granting custody of his two children to the respondent maternal grandparents.

The children's mother had died, and the children had lived with their grandparents for most of the past ten years, expressing a strong desire to remain with them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue of fact requiring a trial and agreeing that the motion judge properly prioritized the best interests of the children over the father's biological connection.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence.

The appellant commenced an action alleging the respondents conspired to falsely accuse him of fraud, while criminal proceedings against him for that fraud were ongoing.

The motion judge struck the claim, characterizing it as malicious prosecution lacking the essential element of a favourable determination in the criminal proceedings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that even if framed as conspiracy to injure, the claim could not proceed in the face of ongoing criminal proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed and the claim struck in its entirety.

The respondent was seriously injured when his motorcycle struck a freight train at a rural railway crossing at night.

The crossing had only a passive warning system.

The trial judge found the appellant railway company 75% negligent for failing to conduct nighttime inspections and failing to implement additional safety measures, and the respondent 25% contributorily negligent due to excessive speed and impairment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the railway company's appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on standard of care, causation, and contributory negligence.

The appellant appealed an order regarding the payment of a $7,500 costs order and an issue concerning an affidavit of documents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the costs order but granted an extension for payment, failing which the action would be dismissed.

The appeal regarding the affidavit of documents was quashed without prejudice.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for fraud.

They argued that a statement made during a vehicle stop should have been excluded due to Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal assumed a s. 10(a) breach but found the statement admissible under s. 24(2), noting the breach was not serious and the officer acted in good faith.

The court also found no s. 8 or s. 10(b) breaches.

The statement was admissible against the co-accused as an adoptive admission by silence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

On the sentence appeal, the court agreed a conditional sentence was unwarranted but reduced the custodial sentences to six months imprisonment to better reflect specific deterrence and rehabilitation.

Restitution orders were maintained but clarified as joint and several.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in resolving inconsistencies in the child complainant's evidence and that the Crown improperly split its case by using his police statements only during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The court held that the trial judge's credibility assessment was supported by confirming evidence and entitled to deference.

Furthermore, the Crown's use of the voluntary statements during cross-examination was solely for assessing credibility and did not constitute improper case splitting.

A journalist made a freedom of information request for anonymized data from police databases to investigate racial profiling.

The police refused, arguing that extracting the data required creating a new algorithm, which meant the requested information was not a 'record' under s. 2(1)(b) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The adjudicator ordered the police to respond to the request, but the Divisional Court quashed the order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal restored the adjudicator's order, holding that where requested information can be produced from an institution's existing computer software by means of technical expertise normally used by it, it constitutes a record under the Act.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that overturned the respondent's conviction.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, citing the very lengthy delay in perfecting the appeal and the significant prejudice the respondent had endured over a lengthy period of time.

The appellant appealed her sentence for offences involving the exploitation of young teenage girls.

The trial judge had rejected a joint submission, imposing a sentence that emphasized denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to give greater weight to those principles given the serious nature of capitalizing on the sale of children's sexual services.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first-time offender, appealed his 11-year sentence for two robberies involving a loaded firearm and extreme gratuitous violence.

The Court of Appeal noted his youth, lack of prior record, and positive rehabilitation efforts while in custody.

Finding the original sentence excessive compared to similar cases, the court granted leave to appeal and reduced the sentence to eight years.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's dismissal of his motion to vary spousal support, terminate daycare expenses, and reapportion section 7 child support expenses.

The appellant argued that the respondent mother's transition from a student to full-time employment constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the mother's employment was foreseeable and necessary given the father's continuous failure to meet his support obligations.

The court also upheld the motion judge's temporary apportionment of section 7 expenses based on the parties' 2006 tax returns, noting the father's failure to make full and frank financial disclosure.

The appellant appealed the decision of Justice Henry Vogelsang of the Superior Court of Justice dated January 14, 2008.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasons given by the lower court judge.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a decision of the Superior Court of Justice, which had allowed a Crown appeal from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found nothing in the case warranting leave to appeal and denied the application.