Robert A. Blair

The appellant appealed from a decision of a summary conviction appeal judge, arguing that the judge failed to apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to the trial judge's reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the summary conviction appeal judge properly examined the trial judge's reasons in conjunction with the evidence and correctly concluded there was evidence to support the findings.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a serious weapons offence involving a loaded handgun.

He argued that his investigative detention violated his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly concluded that reasonable grounds for detention existed based on reliable confidential information corroborated by surveillance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the prevalence of handgun crimes in the community.

The respondent pleaded guilty to a third drinking and driving offence, which was treated as a second offence for sentencing purposes.

Due to an administrative error, the Ministry of Transportation also treated it as a second offence, suspending his licence for three years instead of indefinitely.

After the respondent completed the requirements, the Registrar reinstated his licence.

Two years later, the Ministry discovered the error and suspended the licence indefinitely.

The Divisional Court granted mandamus to reinstate the licence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Ministry's appeal, holding that the Ministry could not disavow the Registrar's earlier exercise of statutory authority to reinstate the licence after the respondent had relied on it.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Provincial Offences Appeal court that had dismissed an appeal from a conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding a potential for a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants brought a derivative claim under the Family Law Act.

The principal claim was statute-barred, but no claim had been brought by the Estate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that if the principal claim is statute-barred, the derivative claim is also barred, regardless of whether the Estate brought a claim.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the police and Crown attorneys for malicious prosecution, Charter breaches, and other torts following his acquittal on sexual assault charges.

The motion judge struck most of his fresh amended statement of claim under Rules 21 and 25.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by effectively conducting a summary judgment motion rather than accepting the pleaded facts as true, and by applying too narrow a test for malice at the pleadings stage.

The action was permitted to proceed against all defendants except the Police Services Board (save for vicarious liability).

The appellant, an Aboriginal woman with a history of trauma including residential school attendance, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after causing permanent brain damage to her two-year-old child.

She was sentenced to two years less a day in custody.

On appeal, she argued the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider her circumstances as an Aboriginal offender under the Gladue framework and erred in assessing aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly applied the Gladue methodology and that a custodial sentence was appropriate given the gravity of the offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant contractor and respondent First Nation were parties to a construction contract containing an arbitration clause.

After a dispute arose and the contract was terminated, the appellant commenced an action against the respondents and several other parties, claiming relief beyond what was arbitrable under the contract.

The appellant then moved for a mandatory order requiring the respondents to proceed to arbitration.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding that arbitrating only part of the dispute would risk multiplicity of proceedings and inconsistent results.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motions judge made no error in principle in exercising her discretion under the Courts of Justice Act to refuse the mandatory order.

The plaintiffs commenced a medical malpractice action following the death of Emilio Spirito, naming several hospitals, doctors, and 'Doctors AB, CD, EF, GH'.

After the two-year limitation period under the Trustee Act expired, the plaintiffs sought to amend the claim to substitute the appellants for Doctors AB and CD.

The motion judge allowed the amendment, finding it was a case of misnomer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeal, holding that correcting a misnomer does not constitute adding a party, and therefore s. 21 of the Limitations Act, 2002 does not bar the amendment.

The defendants in a class action regarding payday loans appealed the dismissal of their renewed motion to stay the proceeding based on arbitration clauses in the loan agreements.

They argued that recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions changed the law, entitling them to a stay despite their previous unsuccessful stay motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the doctrine of issue estoppel applied.

The court exercised its discretion against allowing relitigation, finding that the plaintiffs' reliance on the prior determination and the advanced stage of the litigation outweighed the defendants' loss of the right to arbitrate.

The appellant appealed an order regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy endorsement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly resolved the ambiguity in Endorsement II to achieve commercial reality and reflect the reasonable expectations of the parties, rather than applying a strict rule of giving the same words the same meaning which would have rewritten the policy.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a previous order that struck his claim against the Real Estate Council of Ontario.

The appellant sought an adjournment of the appeal, claiming his lawyer was out of the country, but provided no proof of retainer.

The Court of Appeal denied the adjournment and dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding the appellant's evidence did not meet the requirements of Rule 59.06(2) to set aside the order.

The court also noted the proposed action constituted an abuse of process and a collateral attack on a decision the appellant had failed to appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences involving a loaded, sawed-off shotgun found under the driver's seat of a car he was driving.

At trial, the sole issue was whether the appellant had knowledge of the shotgun's presence.

The trial judge relied on circumstantial evidence, including the gun's location and the appellant's exclusive use of the car, to infer knowledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no legal error and the inference of knowledge was reasonably open on the evidence.

The young person appealed his sentence of 24 months' custody and supervision and 18 months' probation for aggravated assault and breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the total sentence of 42 months exceeded the three-year maximum permitted under section 42(15) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court also found the sentencing judge erred by failing to give full credit for the seven months and one week spent in pre-sentence custody.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing the probation period to 12 months and adjusting the pre-sentence custody credit, while upholding the remainder of the sentence as fit.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5000 after taking $90,000 from an elderly complainant under the guise of real estate investments.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly caution the jury about the dangers of relying on the complainant's testimony, given her prior inconsistent statements at the preliminary hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions on credibility and prior inconsistent statements were adequate and a Vetrovec warning was not required.

The appellants were convicted of offences relating to the theft and sale of firearms.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in applying the W. (D.) framework to the accused's testimony, improperly treated a lack of memory as an undisclosed alibi, and failed to exercise sufficient caution when accepting the evidence of an unsavoury witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof, appropriately cautioned himself regarding the unsavoury witness, and provided adequate reasons in accordance with R. v. R.E.M.

The respondent commenced an action in Georgia, which was stayed on consent due to an arbitration clause specifying the Arbitration Act (Ontario).

The respondent then applied to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator.

The appellant argued the Georgia court had jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Ontario court had jurisdiction under sections 9 and 10 of the Arbitration Act, as agreed by the parties.

The order was varied to name a specific arbitrator.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to permit him to call his wife as a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error given the lengthy delays, the failure to list the wife in the affidavit of documents, the failure to notify opposing counsel until the date of trial, and the wife's unavailability on the first day of trial.

Costs of $7,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a promissory note, arguing statutory defences under the Bills of Exchange Act for failure to present the note and notify the guarantor of dishonour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants failed to plead these statutory defences at trial and did not seek leave to amend their pleadings upon discovering the relevant evidence.

The court noted that the appellants' prior conduct of making payments on the note could infer a waiver of presentment, and without amended pleadings, the respondent had no need to reopen the case.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee damages for wrongful dismissal, including 18 months' pay in lieu of notice, damages for the lost opportunity to sell his book of business, and a three-month extension for Wallace damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's calculation of the notice period and the award for the lost opportunity to sell the book of business.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part by setting aside the Wallace damages, finding that awarding them alongside damages for the lost opportunity to sell the book of business amounted to double recovery.