Robert A. Blair

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation.

The Crown conceded that the appeal should be allowed and a new dangerous offender proceeding ordered because the trial judge did not have the benefit of R. v. Johnson and failed to consider the Long Term Offender provisions in the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new dangerous offender proceeding.

The respondent was acquitted of tax evasion and making false statements.

After the acquittal, he brought a free-standing Charter application for costs under s. 24(1), alleging breaches of ss. 7 and 8.

The trial judge entertained the application, denied the Crown an opportunity to lead evidence, and awarded costs against the Crown.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to entertain the application after the verdict of acquittal and erred in denying the Crown the opportunity to call evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made unsupported findings regarding the appellant's memory and improperly enhanced the complainant's credibility by accepting bizarre and improbable allegations as probably true.

Combined with the Crown's failure to disclose evidence relevant to the complainant's mental state, these errors raised fairness concerns.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on all counts.

The respondent pleaded guilty to criminal harassment after travelling from British Columbia to Ontario to attend his wife's home, having recently told his daughter he purchased a gun to bring the family back together.

He received a suspended sentence and three years' probation.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the respondent's status as a first offender, the distance separating the parties, and the protective conditions imposed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, raising for the first time the issue of whether the Board had jurisdiction to order random breath and urine sampling as a condition of his residing in the community.

The Court of Appeal declined to hear the jurisdictional issue, noting that the condition had been in effect since 2002, the record was unclear as to whether the appellant had consented to it, and it was unclear whether the treatment team would have recommended community living without it.

Finding no merit in the other issues raised, the court dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions, including criminal harassment, and his sentence.

He argued the trial judge improperly based the harassment conviction solely on conduct from other counts and erred in addressing the Crown's failure to call a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered prior threatening phone calls and correctly addressed the absent witness given the ample confirmatory evidence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as moot.

The vendor and purchaser of certain businesses disagreed on the method of calculating working capital adjustments under an asset purchase agreement.

An accounting firm, KPMG, was directed to calculate the adjustments according to approaches advocated by both parties.

The purchaser sought leave to appeal an order requiring it to make a payment based on KPMG's calculation, arguing KPMG exceeded its jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that KPMG stayed within its mandate and its determination was final and binding.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding spousal and child support, arguing the trial judge failed to award compensatory support, failed to discount the respondent's business expenses, and improperly imputed an income of $40,000 to her based on expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately addressed the compensatory aspects of support under Moge, properly assessed the respondent's income, and made no error in qualifying the expert or imputing income to the appellant given her failure to make reasonable efforts to obtain employment.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer, who took over the case shortly before trial expecting a guilty plea, was inadequately prepared when the trial proceeded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that claims of ineffective assistance based on inadequate preparation only lead to a miscarriage of justice if the lack of preparation undermines the reliability of the verdict.

The appellant failed to show any prejudice or that the trial could have been conducted differently.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application for certiorari.

The trial court had adjourned the matter to two dates: a pre-trial date and a confirmation date.

The matter was not spoken to on the first date, and the appellant argued this resulted in a loss of jurisdiction over the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 803 of the Criminal Code permits remands to more than one date, and the failure to place the matter on the docket on the first date did not result in a loss of jurisdiction.

The appellant, a priest, appealed his five-year sentence for the repeated, long-term sexual abuse of two young altar boys.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a significant penitentiary term was required given the circumstances and that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was not manifestly excessive.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the police officer lacked adequate grounds to make a breath demand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the totality of the information relied on by the officer provided adequate grounds for the demand.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for prolonged assaults on a vulnerable victim.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the trial judge and held that the sentence reflected the serious nature of the offences and the vulnerability of the victim.

The sentence was not demonstrably unfit, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant mother purchased a used pool slide and asked the respondent pool store if it was 'okay' to install it on her 4-foot-deep aboveground pool.

The store employees assured her there would be 'no problem' but failed to warn her of the risk of catastrophic injury if the slide was used improperly in shallow water.

The appellant daughter used the slide, entered the water head first, and was rendered quadriplegic.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the pool store breached its duty of care by failing to warn of the non-obvious danger, and that this failure caused the injury.

The daughter was found 20 per cent contributorily negligent for ignoring her mother's instructions to slide feet first.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual exploitation involving teenage complainants, arguing the trial judge misdirected himself on the meaning of a position of trust and improperly relied on evidence said to be tainted by collusion and police pressure.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge correctly applied the governing authorities under s. 153(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and was entitled to find a relationship of trust based on the appellant's close involvement with the family and the entrusted care of the young persons.

The court also held that the trial judge was not required to reject all impugned evidence and that the convictions rested largely on unchallenged evidence.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of refusing to provide a suitable breath sample.

The Crown appealed to the summary conviction appeal court, which quashed the acquittal and entered a conviction.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in law by considering the officer's knowledge of the alert device's workings as relevant to whether the appellant intentionally refused to provide a sample.

However, the Court held that the summary conviction appeal court judge erred by entering a conviction, as the trial judge had not made all the necessary findings of fact.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal noted a six-month delay in the delivery of the Board's reasons and urged the Board to deliver reasons promptly in the future.

The Court declined to assess alleged factual errors, noting that a new hearing was scheduled for the following week where counsel could ensure the Board had a proper appreciation of the facts.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on how his alcohol consumption related to the issue of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that alcohol consumption was a minor feature of the defence's case, which primarily relied on expert evidence regarding a major depressive episode.

The court found that the trial judge had referred to the alcohol evidence several times in the charge, and the lack of objection from experienced trial counsel indicated the instructions were fair.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault, arguing that the summary conviction appeal court judge failed to provide adequate reasons and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and applied unequal scrutiny to the testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal court judge's reasons were adequate and permitted effective appellate review.

The Court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding the trial judge's assessment of credibility, the complainant's prior statements, and the use of confirmatory evidence.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and leave to appeal the sentence was refused.

The appellant appealed from an order committing him for trial on first degree murder.

The preliminary inquiry judge committed him on the basis of liability for murder through s. 21(2) and first degree murder through s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued these sections could not be combined to found liability for first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if combining the sections was an error of law, there was an evidentiary basis to commit for first degree murder through the combined effect of aiding and abetting and s. 231(5).

The court found evidence that the appellant aided and abetted in two murders committed by his co-accused during a robbery and forcible confinement, and that his actions passed the causation threshold in R. v. Harbottle.