Robert A. Blair

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person charged with robbery.

The trial judge excluded the young person's statement to the police because the officer failed to explain that any statement was required to be made in the presence of a consulted third party, as mandated by section 146(2)(b)(iv) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there is a significant difference between a young person's right to have a third party present and the requirement that a statement be taken in their presence.

The failure to provide this information was not a mere technical irregularity under section 146(6).

The respondent was involved in a motor vehicle accident while his driver's licence was suspended for unpaid fines, a fact of which he was unaware.

The appellant insurer denied coverage on the basis that the respondent was not authorized by law to drive.

The trial judge granted relief from forfeiture under s. 129 of the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that s. 129 only grants discretion to relieve against forfeiture for imperfect compliance with post-loss requirements, such as proof of loss, and does not apply to pre-loss breaches of policy conditions.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent.

The Court of Appeal (majority) allowed the appeal, finding that the admission relied upon by the motion judge did not establish liability for the full proceeds of the machines purchased by Husky.

The Court concluded that there were material facts in dispute regarding whether the respondent acquired ownership of the machines and whether it paid for them, which were necessary to determine the quantum of loss.

The appeal was allowed, with costs reserved to the trial judge.

The plaintiffs appealed a Divisional Court order compelling the plaintiff to attend two defence medical examinations.

The defendant had previously brought a motion to adjourn the trial to conduct defence medicals, which was dismissed.

The defendant subsequently brought a second motion to compel attendance at rescheduled medicals prior to trial, which was also dismissed by the motion judge but allowed on appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiffs' appeal, holding that the second motion was substantially the same as the first, and the defendant was precluded by issue estoppel from relitigating the matter.

Following a successful appeal, the appellants and respondents agreed that the court's previous statement regarding costs at first instance was erroneous.

The court received written submissions on the proper disposition of costs at first instance.

Given that the appeal reversed the partial summary judgment granted to the respondents, both parties were entirely unsuccessful at first instance.

The court set aside the costs order below and remitted the costs of the motions at first instance to the trial judge, who would be in the best position to assess their relative importance in light of the trial result.

The respondent obtained Letters Rogatory from a U.S. District Court to examine a former in-house counsel of a corporation in Ontario.

The application judge ordered the witness to attend for examination by U.S. counsel pursuant to U.S. rules.

The witness appealed, arguing the application judge failed to apply the proper legal test and that permitting U.S. counsel to conduct the examination infringed Canadian sovereignty and the provincial legislation governing the legal profession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge properly applied the criteria for enforcing Letters Rogatory and that allowing U.S. counsel to conduct the examination for a foreign action did not constitute practising law in Ontario or infringe sovereignty.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision including his pension in the equalization of net family property and dismissing his claims for spousal support and the inclusion of a pre-separation debt.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's disability pension had effectively become a retirement pension since he was over sixty years of age, and was therefore subject to equalization.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's dismissal of the spousal support claim due to a lack of medical evidence and a finding of purposeful unemployment, nor in the dismissal of the debt claim due to lack of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice that struck a jury notice and ordered security for costs.

The respondents brought motions to quash the appeal on the basis that the order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that while the right to a jury trial is a substantive right, an order striking a jury notice is collateral and does not determine the substantive issues in dispute.

The security for costs order was also held to be procedural and interlocutory.

The motions to quash the appeals were granted, with the Court noting that the delay caused by appealing to the wrong court should not be held against the appellant if he seeks leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a default judgment.

He argued that his delay in responding to the statement of claim was adequately explained and that he had a triable defence of economic duress regarding a collection agreement, claiming the respondent barricaded his moving equipment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's rejection of the delay explanation and concluding that the facts did not establish a triable defence of economic duress, as the appellant had other practical alternatives and waited over a year to raise concerns.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement varying the lower court's judgment in accordance with a consent order filed by the parties.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial judge erred in her factual findings and misdirected herself on the legal principles regarding confidential information by focusing on ownership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual and credibility findings.

The Court also held that the lack of proof of ownership of the confidential information was highly relevant, as there was no evidence the appellants had the legal right to compel its return or were authorized agents of the owner.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claims against her employer for wrongful dismissal, discrimination, and negligent administration of her long-term disability policy, and against her insurer for wrongful denial of benefits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the employer's outsourcing and four-month working notice were reasonable, and that the employer had no obligation to reinstate her to full-time work.

The Court also agreed that the appellant failed to satisfy the 120-day elimination period for disability benefits and that the insurer was justified in stopping payments based on medical evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, a lawyer and his professional corporation, appealed an order striking their 120-page statement of claim and expunging it from the record.

The claim alleged multiple causes of action arising from the termination of their retainer by the City of Waterloo.

The motion judge found the pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action, contained irrelevant allegations, and improperly disclosed privileged and confidential information.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the pleading was prolix, lacked material facts, and improperly placed arguably privileged information in the public domain.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed as it would not affect the outcome.

The appellants, owners and operators of adult entertainment parlours, appealed the dismissal of their application to quash a City of Ottawa by-law regulating their establishments.

The by-law prohibited touching between dancers and customers and required live entertainment to be performed in open designated areas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the City had the authority to enact the by-law under the Municipal Act, 2001, for health, safety, and consumer protection purposes.

The Court rejected arguments that the by-law was ultra vires, void for vagueness, or a colourable attempt to prohibit the businesses.

Charter challenges under s. 2(b) regarding signage and mandatory notices were either rejected or saved under s. 1, and claims under ss. 7 and 8 lacked a sufficient evidentiary record.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal on the basis that leave to appeal was required under s. 49 of the Arbitration Act.

The appellant brought a cross-motion to extend the time to seek leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the underlying application was a claim for an order staying arbitration under s. 48 of the Act, which requires leave to appeal.

The appeal was quashed.

However, the court granted the extension of time to seek leave, noting the initial failure was due to solicitor error and there was no meaningful prejudice to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to vary a trial judgment regarding an equalization payment and the matrimonial home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no provision in the Family Law Act to vary an equalization payment based on changed circumstances.

The court also held that the appellant's claims regarding the matrimonial home were res judicata, as they had been dealt with on the merits at trial, resulting in the respondent being granted permanent exclusive possession.

The appellant wife appealed an order directing an interim payment of $350,000 to the respondent husband.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's order did not settle any substantive rights between the parties and was therefore interlocutory in nature.

As a result, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed a four-year sentence for a non-residential break and enter.

The sentencing judge had heavily weighed the aggravating factor that the appellant recruited his 14-year-old daughter and her boyfriend to commit the offence.

The Court of Appeal held that while this was a serious aggravating factor, increasing the sentence by almost three years for it was too harsh.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to three years total, comprising 15 months of pre-trial custody credit and 21 months of new custody.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of a certiorari application regarding a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the accused on charges of aggravated assault and failing to provide the necessaries of life.

The charges related to injuries suffered by the accused's infant children.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider the totality of the evidence and impermissibly weighed competing inferences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the certiorari judge's conclusion that the preliminary inquiry judge properly considered the evidence and engaged only in the limited weighing permissible for circumstantial evidence at a preliminary inquiry.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a group assault on a 15-year-old boy.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification, party liability, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning for a specific witness.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to cross-examine a witness on prior inconsistent statements under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.