Robert A. Blair

The Crown moved for an order permitting it to file an extended factum and appointing amicus curiae in an appeal.

The respondent opposed the appointment of amicus and argued he had been deprived of his trial files.

The Court of Appeal granted the Crown's motion, allowing an extended factum of 42 pages for both parties, and appointed amicus curiae due to the complexity of the record.

The Court also directed that the respondent be provided with his files and scheduled a case management hearing to set timelines for the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The trial judge relied on the statutory presumption under s. 348(2)(a) of the Criminal Code to find the requisite intent, as the appellant broke into an apartment but left after thirty seconds without committing an offence.

The appellant argued that leaving without committing an offence constituted 'evidence to the contrary' to displace the presumption.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the intent is ascertained at the point of entry and that merely failing to commit an offence inside does not constitute evidence to the contrary, as this would render the statutory presumption meaningless.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking conspiracy, criminal organization offences, and possession of a prohibited weapon.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence from a cooperating witness, failed to consider the mens rea for the criminal organization counts, and erred in finding possession of a punch dagger.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding sufficient corroboration for the witness's testimony and that the conspiracy findings established the requisite mens rea.

However, the appeal was allowed in part to stay three counts based on the Kienapple principle, as conceded by the Crown.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

He argued that he merely held his hand over the complainant's face in response to a racial slur and that she did not suffer bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that evidence of swelling, cuts, bleeding, and headaches was sufficient to constitute bodily harm.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; although the two-year sentence was at the high end of the range, it was justified by the appellant's egregious record for assaulting women.

The purchasers entered into an agreement to buy land, but it was later discovered the vendor owned 12% less land than described.

The purchasers sought specific performance with an abatement of the purchase price.

The trial judge dismissed the claim for an abatement and allowed the vendor's counterclaim for delay damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that a purchaser is generally entitled to specific performance with an abatement where the vendor cannot convey the whole property, and the trial judge erred in his application of equitable principles.

The appeal was allowed, the abatement granted, and the counterclaim dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for kidnapping, sexual assault, and criminal harassment of his former partner, as well as his 54-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to admit evidence of prior sexual activity with the complainant, by allowing evidence of his prior discreditable conduct to show motive, and by failing to leave the defence of mistaken belief in consent to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the procedural requirements for admitting prior sexual history, properly instructed the jury on the highly probative discreditable conduct evidence, and correctly concluded there was no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision granting partial summary judgment to the respondent municipalities.

The motion judge had dismissed the appellants' claim that the expropriation of their mall lands for a new Toyota plant was illegal per se.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that genuine issues for trial existed regarding whether the expropriation price was below fair market value (constituting an illegal bonus under the Municipal Act), whether the expropriation conformed to the official plan under the Planning Act, and whether the municipality acted in bad faith.

The Union filed a policy grievance regarding the employer's use of non-bargaining unit agency personnel to perform bargaining unit work.

The arbitrator found that the arrangement constituted 'contracting in' rather than 'contracting out', and that the collective agreement contained an implied term prohibiting the use of agency workers in this manner for longer than two weeks.

The Divisional Court set aside the award on judicial review, finding it patently unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Union's appeal, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction and that his interpretation of the collective agreement was not patently unreasonable.

The respondent patient suffered a bowel obstruction caused by a volvulus, resulting in the loss of five feet of her small intestine.

The trial judge found the appellant surgeon breached the standard of care by delaying surgery and that this delay caused the loss of the bowel.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding of a breach of the standard of care but allowed the appeal on causation.

The Court found there was no medical or other evidentiary basis to conclude that, but for the delay in operating, the section of the bowel would likely have been saved.

The judgment was set aside and the claim dismissed.

The minor appellant was severely injured in a motor vehicle accident in 1999.

No action had been commenced on her behalf.

The respondent insurer brought a motion under s. 9 of the new Limitations Act, 2002 to appoint a litigation guardian, which would cause the limitation period to begin running immediately.

The motion judge granted the order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the transition provisions in s. 24 of the new Act applied.

Because the former limitation period (which did not begin to run until the minor reached the age of majority) had not expired before the new Act came into force, the former limitation period continued to apply.

Therefore, s. 9 of the new Act was not available to the respondents.

The Court set aside the order but declined to seal the motion documents.

The appellant was pulled over for driving without illuminated tail lights and subsequently arrested for attempting to mislead police about his identity.

Upon arrest, police discovered he was wearing two bulletproof vests and searched his vehicle, finding a semi-automatic pistol and a revolver.

The trial judge found the search violated section 8 of the Charter but admitted the firearms under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in finding a section 8 breach, concluding the search was a valid search incident to arrest.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of an appeal regarding a receiver's decision to permit a corporation in receivership to plead guilty in an American criminal trial, the respondents sought costs.

The appellants argued no costs should be awarded as the issues were novel and complex.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding the appeal involved a standard review of a Commercial List judge's discretion.

The Court awarded costs to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the amounts at a fair and reasonable level rather than actual costs incurred, payable by Lord Black and Conrad Black Capital Corporation.

The appellants were plaintiffs in a proposed class action arising from a factory fire.

The motion judge certified the class action but limited the class to those evacuated, effectively excluding the appellants.

The appellants appealed to the Divisional Court as of right under s. 30(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, arguing the order was a refusal to certify as to them.

The Divisional Court held that because the order certified a proceeding, an appeal lies only with leave under s. 30(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that an order redefining a class is still a certification order, and the statutory appeal routes do not rely on the final/interlocutory distinction.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment.

Although the appellants had an arguable defence on the merits, the motion judge found their explanation for the default unsatisfactory, as they had deliberately ignored the statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal.

Sunrise REIT initiated an auction process to sell its assets, requiring interested parties, including Ventas and HCPI, to sign confidentiality and standstill agreements.

Ventas submitted the winning bid, and Sunrise signed a purchase agreement containing a 'fiduciary out' clause allowing it to consider superior unsolicited proposals, but also requiring it to enforce existing standstill agreements.

HCPI subsequently submitted a higher bid.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's ruling that the purchase agreement obliged Sunrise to enforce HCPI's standstill agreement, thereby precluding Sunrise from considering HCPI's bid, as it was not a 'bona fide' proposal due to the breach of the standstill agreement.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for misfeasance in public office against the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario.

The appellants argued the trial judge applied the wrong test and failed to find recklessness or wilful blindness in the respondents' handling of a licence transfer application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the test for misfeasance in public office and his factual findings negating malice and recklessness were supported by the record.

The respondents' cross-appeal on damages and trial costs was also dismissed.

The parties formed a partnership in 1972 to purchase and develop land.

In 1981, the partnership was dissolved when the plaintiff walked away and the property was transferred to the defendant's company.

The plaintiff waited 18 years before demanding an accounting of profits.

The trial judge awarded the plaintiff a share of the profits as of the 1981 dissolution date.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in finding that the doctrine of laches did not apply.

The plaintiff's extraordinary and unreasonable delay in seeking redress, while the defendant bore all the risk and expense of development, rendered the prosecution of the action unjust.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The Crown appealed a disposition for a breach of a conditional sentence order where the judge imposed an intermittent sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an intermittent sentence under section 732 of the Criminal Code is not an available option for a breach of a conditional sentence under section 742.6(9).

The term 'intermittent' was deleted from the disposition.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown should not have been permitted to cross-examine the appellant on statements that had not been proven voluntary, as there was no clear waiver of a voir dire.

The trial judge had relied on these statements to impugn the appellant's credibility.

Furthermore, the court found the verdict unreasonable regarding 24 bills found in another person's home, as there was insufficient evidence of control.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were set aside.

Given that the appellant had already served over a year of his sentence, a stay of proceedings was entered.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the Crown's appeal from an order quashing search warrants obtained under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding the appeal was moot because the Crown had made a deliberate choice not to execute the impugned warrants to keep the trial process moving.

The court also held that the ancillary costs order could not sustain the moot appeal.

The appeal was quashed in its entirety.