Robert A. Blair

The appellant appealed an order for retroactive spousal support.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the issue was not properly raised before the motion judge, the motion judge failed to consider relevant factors for retroactive support, and there were palpable and overriding errors regarding the parties' incomes.

The order for retroactive spousal support was set aside and the issue was remitted to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion for production of documents from non-parties.

The motion judge found that the respondent had no ownership interest or authority over the non-party corporation, the documents were not germane to the litigation, and it would not be unfair to proceed to trial without them.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of the test or exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict finding them liable for damages arising from an incident involving allegations of dangerous driving and 'gay bashing'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's jury instructions on reasonable and probable grounds, no unreasonableness in the damages award for income loss, and no error in the award of substantial indemnity costs due to late disclosure and the jury's acceptance of the 'gay bashing' element.

A cross-appeal regarding aggravated damages was also dismissed.

The appellant bank sued several financial institutions and insurers for approximately $100 million arising from a massive equipment leasing fraud involving forged endorsements.

The respondent financial institutions successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the appellant's claims for negligence, unjust enrichment, and money had and received.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the summary judgment, finding that the motion judge committed two fundamental errors: reversing the onus by requiring the responding party to establish a genuine issue for trial, and deciding the motions on the assumed fact that the endorsements were forged.

The Court ordered the entire action to proceed to trial, noting that novel claims should be decided on a full evidentiary record.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his trial counsel provided inadequate representation due to a conflict of interest and by entering an agreed statement of facts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice, conflict, or inadequate representation, and noting that the agreed statement of facts was a valid strategic decision to protect the appellant from cross-examination.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's rejection of a conditional sentence.

The appellant husband, an extraordinarily wealthy man, structured his affairs using nominee corporations to hide his assets and avoid paying spousal and child support.

The trial judge pierced the corporate veil, finding the husband was the beneficial owner of the lands held by the corporations, and ordered the lands vested in the respondent wife to satisfy over $11 million in support and other monetary awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the court's broad discretion to grant vesting orders in family law cases where a spouse demonstrates a clear intention to evade support obligations.

The intended plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action obtained an order for pre-action discovery of certain documents from the hospital and doctor.

The defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit pre-action discovery, and the intended plaintiffs had ample information to plead their case without a Straka order.

The Court also held that a report from the College of Physicians and Surgeons was inadmissible under the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The plaintiff suffered a major depressive disorder and phobia after seeing a dead fly in an unopened bottle of water supplied by the defendant.

The trial judge awarded damages for psychiatric injury, finding the plaintiff's extreme reaction was due to his particular cultural background and sensibilities.

The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant's appeal and dismissed the action.

The Court held that in tort, psychiatric harm must be reasonably foreseeable in a person of normal fortitude and robustness.

The plaintiff's highly unusual reaction did not meet this objective test.

The Court also dismissed the contract claim, finding that psychiatric harm was not in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was formed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm and being disguised with intent to commit an indictable offence following a home invasion.

He was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding that the sentencing range for home invasions had increased from five to eight years to seven to eleven years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that sentencing ranges are flexible guidelines that have evolved to reflect the gravity of home invasions.

The eight-year sentence was found to be fit given the terrorizing nature of the offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant union appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding two arbitral awards.

The arbitrators had dismissed grievances alleging that the employer was required to reimburse employees for the new Ontario Health Premium under the collective agreements.

The Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court correctly applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review to the arbitrators' interpretation of the collective agreements.

The Court further held that the arbitrators' conclusion—that the new premium was an add-on rather than a reversion to the pre-1990 individually paid premium system—was not patently unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The employer appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an arbitrator's award that required the employer to reimburse employees for the Ontario Health Premium under the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the standard of review for the arbitrator's decision is patent unreasonableness.

The Court found the arbitrator's interpretation that the Ontario Health Premium was reasonably and materially similar to the former OHIP premium was not patently unreasonable, and rejected the argument that arbitral inconsistency warrants judicial intervention.

The appellant employer appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an arbitral award.

The arbitrator found that the employer was required under the collective agreement to pay the Ontario Health Premium on behalf of its employees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the standard of review was patent unreasonableness and that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was reasonable.

The court held that the reference to 'cost' in the agreement embraced the Ontario Health Premium, regardless of whether it represented 100 per cent of the cost of medicare.

The employer appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an arbitral award that required the employer to reimburse employees for the Ontario Health Premium under the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court correctly applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review and that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement and relevant statutes was not patently unreasonable.

The appellant employer appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review of an arbitral award.

The arbitrator had ruled that the employer was obligated under the collective agreement to reimburse employees for the newly enacted Ontario Health Premium.

The Court of Appeal held that the standard of review for the arbitrator's decision was patent unreasonableness, even though the arbitrator interpreted a statute of general application, because the statutory interpretation was secondary to interpreting the collective agreement.

The Court found the arbitrator's award was not patently unreasonable and dismissed the appeal.

The moving party, the first wife of the respondent husband, sought leave to intervene in an appeal regarding a vesting order made in favour of the husband's second wife.

The trial judge had ordered the husband's beneficial interest in certain corporate properties vested in the second wife to satisfy substantial support arrears.

The moving party, who also held foreign judgments for support arrears against the husband, sought to intervene to protect her interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the intervention was instigated by the husband to frustrate the second wife's recovery, and that allowing it at this late stage would unduly delay and prejudice the second wife's rights.

The appellant, convicted of drug-related offences, brought a motion for production of records relating to pending criminal and disciplinary charges against the arresting officer.

The appellant sought these records to develop a fresh evidence application on appeal, arguing the officer had an ulterior motive for the arrest and challenging his credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that on a motion for production of third-party records on appeal, the applicant must first satisfy the Trotta relevancy threshold before the O'Connor test for privacy interests is engaged.

The Court found that certain records relating to the officer's alleged drug use and related misconduct met the threshold.

The Court ordered the Provincial Crown to disclose relevant portions of its criminal investigation records, finding they were not employment records subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, but requested further submissions regarding records held by the Barrie Police Service.

The appellants appealed a decision denying them defence cost coverage under a Professional Liability Insurance Policy provided by LawPro.

The motion judge found that the appellant acted as an intermediary between the parties in arranging mortgage transactions, triggering the mortgage broker exclusion.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the appellant's actions as a middleman in arranging the mortgages meant the claim fell within the exclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a certiorari application to quash his committal for trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant and his co-accused were engaged in a joint venture to cultivate and traffic in marijuana and to possess firearms in furtherance of that enterprise, justifying the committal for trial.

The appellants appealed a decision fixing the membership of three charitable corporations and ordering a meeting to elect new directors.

The Court of Appeal found that no proper procedure was taken to change the members in accordance with the Corporations Act, and the proper directors and members remained the original applicants for the letters patent.

The appeal was allowed, and the court ordered meetings of the original members to be held within 30 days.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to discharge a previous contempt order, finding him in contempt for a third time, and sentencing him to a further 15 months of incarceration.

The underlying class action involved a multi-million dollar fraud.

The appellant had repeatedly failed to produce documents and attend examinations for discovery, resulting in multiple contempt findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the discretionary orders of contempt given the serious, wilful, and deliberate nature of the appellant's conduct.