Richard Litkowski

The appellant appealed her conviction for attempted fraud over $5,000 and public mischief arising from a false report that her vehicle had been stolen.

The trial judge found the appellant not credible based on numerous inconsistencies in her evidence, including discrepancies in purchase financing, vehicle registration mileage, timeline inconsistencies, and critically, key scan evidence showing the appellant's key had not been used to access the vehicle since April 20, 2010—eight months before she claimed to have purchased it.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no misapprehension of evidence and that the trial judge's conclusions were reasonably available on the evidence presented.

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of counseling to kidnap and one count of counseling to rob, as well as his sentence of nine months imprisonment.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's evidence and accepted the Crown's evidence, including testimony from an undercover officer supported by intercepted communications.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and concluded that the evidence established either intent or recklessness as to the risk inherent in counselling, meeting the test established in R. v. Hamilton.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

However, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to address defence counsel's submissions regarding pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The sentence was reduced from nine months to eight months to account for a 14-day credit for nine days of pre-trial custody and an additional two-week credit for over a year of restrictive bail conditions.

The accused challenged the voluntariness of audio and video statements made to police following his arrest for murder.

The court considered the cumulative effect of persistent police questioning despite multiple assertions of the right to silence, elements of the "Reid Technique" used in interrogation, and the accused's emotional state.

The court found that these factors, taken together, raised a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the statements, rendering them inadmissible.

The court also stated that it would have exercised its residual discretion to exclude the evidence due to its prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value.

This is an appeal from a conviction for uttering threats, criminal harassment, and breach of probation, and from the imposed sentence.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's judicial notice of text messaging mechanics, assessment of gaps in the Crown's case, and credibility findings regarding the complainant.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge erred in the extent of judicial notice taken regarding text message fabrication methods, this error did not affect the outcome.

The court upheld the trial judge's credibility findings and her determination that the Crown proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt despite evidentiary gaps.

The appeal against sentence, seeking a conditional discharge, was also dismissed, as the trial judge had considered mitigating factors and imposed a lenient sentence given the repeat nature of the domestic violence.

The appellant appealed a sentence of four years imposed for fraud offences.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing decision.

The court determined that the four-year sentence appropriately reflected the restraint principle given the quantum and duration of the fraud, the absence of genuine remorse, and the devastating impact on victims.

The court also found that the trial judge had properly assessed the mitigating evidence and was entitled to be unimpressed with much of the mitigation evidence presented.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon and his sentence of thirteen months' custody (less four months credit for pre-trial house arrest).

The trial judge had acquitted him of aggravated assault, uttering a threat to cause death, and possessing a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The appeal raised three grounds: (1) the verdict was unreasonable because the trial judge failed to find the requisite mens rea to threaten; (2) the conviction was inconsistent with the acquittal on the weapons charge; and (3) the trial judge failed to adequately scrutinize the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both conviction and sentence.

The accused appealed convictions arising from an armed bank robbery, arguing the circumstantial evidence did not reasonably establish identity.

The Court held that, applying Villaroman, the evidence as a whole reasonably excluded alternatives to guilt, including in light of DNA found on two key items connected to the robbery and getaway car.

The appeal was dismissed.

Jacek Mucha pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He was already serving a seven-year sentence for a related conspiracy to traffic cocaine in Halifax.

The Crown sought a two-year consecutive sentence, while the Defence sought a two-year concurrent sentence.

The court adopted a three-step process for sentencing, determining the appropriate length, then whether it should be consecutive or concurrent, and finally applying the totality principle if consecutive.

The court found a two-year sentence fit and ordered it to run concurrently with the existing Halifax sentence, citing a sufficiently close connection between the two offences due to overlapping locations, dates, substance, and police investigations.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime firearms prohibition, a Secondary DNA Order, and forfeiture of seized cash.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, use of an imitation firearm, and wearing a disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence arising from an attempted robbery on January 6, 2013.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal challenging the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of cell phone records, the denial of the motion for directed verdict on the robbery count, or the jury instruction on party liability.

The appellant appealed her conviction for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and failing to provide the necessaries of life, as well as her sentence.

The victim was her 20-month-old child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal on the criminal negligence count but set aside the conviction for failing to provide the necessaries of life and entered a conditional stay of proceedings, finding the offences were duplicitous under the Kienapple principle.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court finding no error in the trial judge's determination that the appellant and her co-accused had comparable culpability despite the co-accused perpetrating the actual assaults.

The appellant appealed her conviction for aggravated assault of her sometimes girlfriend.

The trial judge found that the appellant caused the complainant's multiple serious wounds, rejecting the appellant's position that the injuries were self-inflicted.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of matters requiring expert evidence, specifically regarding the cause of bruising and blood stain evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly drew inferences from the evidence using common sense and human experience, without improperly taking judicial notice of matters requiring expertise.

The defendant, John White, charged with murder, brought three pre-trial applications: for a change of venue from Napanee, to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pre-trial publicity, and to question prospective jurors on their occupation.

The court dismissed all three applications, finding no sufficient evidence of community prejudice or extensive, prejudicial pre-trial publicity to warrant a change of venue or challenge for cause.

The request to question jurors on occupation was deemed academic after the challenge for cause was dismissed, and not a standalone ground for challenge.

The appellant was convicted after a two-week jury trial of possession of a prohibited firearm without a license, possession of an over-capacity magazine, possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He was sentenced to nine years and three months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in failing to provide limiting instructions to the jury regarding photographs of a firearm found on the appellant's cell phone, and in failing to provide a W.(D.) instruction regarding the testimony of the appellant's brother.

The Court set aside the convictions on the firearm-related counts and ordered a new trial on those counts, while upholding the drug and proceeds convictions.

Sentencing of four offenders convicted of multiple counts of fraud over $5,000, money laundering, and committing offences for a criminal organization.

The offenders orchestrated a sophisticated, multi-million dollar fraud scheme targeting the Canada Small Business Financing Program and several major banks using sham construction companies.

The court imposed penitentiary sentences ranging from 14 months to 8 years, along with significant restitution orders and fines in lieu of forfeiture.

The appellant was convicted of administering a noxious substance on April 17, 2014, and acquitted of administering a stupefying substance for the purpose of sexual assault and sexual assault.

He was sentenced to nine months in custody plus two years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both the conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no inconsistency between the conviction and acquittals, and rejected arguments based on circumstantial evidence principles.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's rejection of a conditional sentence and no basis to interfere with the nine-month custodial sentence imposed.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm following an altercation in a correctional facility where he punched the complainant 25 to 30 times in the head.

The sole defence at trial was self-defence.

The trial judge found that the Crown had disproved self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that the appellant had launched a pre-emptive attack to maintain his status as the "heavy" rather than in genuine self-defence.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the prison context and the "inmate's code." The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the prison setting must be considered as a contextual factor, it does not override the Criminal Code's legal definition of self-defence.

The appellant was convicted of bank robbery and related offences following a trial by judge alone.

The main issue at trial was the identity of the robber, with evidence being circumstantial.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on DNA evidence linking him to a pocket knife left at the crime scene and a t-shirt found in the getaway vehicle.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the reasonableness of the verdict.

The majority upheld the conviction, finding that the cumulative circumstantial evidence excluded any reasonable alternative to guilt.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, finding that the DNA evidence lacked a temporal connection to the robbery and that alternative explanations remained reasonable.

The accused was convicted of two separate murders and faced a potential order under s. 745.51 of the Criminal Code that his parole ineligibility periods be served consecutively, totaling 41 years.

The accused challenged the constitutional validity of s. 745.51, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter by permitting life-long sentences without hope of release.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the discretionary power to impose consecutive parole ineligibility periods for multiple murders does not require or permit grossly disproportionate sentences.

The court also noted that the royal prerogative of mercy provides a realistic hope of eventual release.

The appellant was convicted by jury of robbery, disguise with intent, dangerous driving, and failure to stop arising from a bank robbery.

The sole issue at trial was identity—whether the appellant or his brother committed the robbery.

A police officer identified the appellant from a photo lineup.

The trial judge designated the appellant a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on three grounds regarding the conviction: eyewitness identification instructions, police officer reliability, and Crown opening address prejudice.

On sentence, the appellant challenged the dangerous offender designation and the indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that dismissed his appeal from convictions for assault and sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by confusing the distinction between a proved absence of motive to lie and the absence of evidence of a motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that the legal principle was well-settled and the merits of the appeal were not strong.

The trial judge's statement that she did not find a motivation to fabricate was a rejection of the defence submission rather than a positive finding that no motive existed.