Peter D. Lauwers

The appellant brought a motion to extend the time to perfect its appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the appellant had demonstrated a firm intent to appeal from the outset and that the delay was reasonably explained by the Superior Court's failure to issue and enter the judgment and the Court of Appeal's refusal to accept the filing without it.

The time to perfect the appeal was extended to two weeks after receipt of the issued and entered judgment.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 15 years.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for murder and the statutory defence of provocation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by instructing the jury that the narrow statutory definition of provocation applied when considering the impact of the deceased's conduct on the appellant's state of mind for the mens rea inquiry.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose.

He argued the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to his evidence compared to the complainant's, and erred in drawing an adverse inference from his failure to call his father as a witness.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh medical evidence explaining his father's absence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to admit fresh evidence, finding it was a strategic decision at trial not to call the father.

The Court upheld the trial judge's credibility assessments and found no error in the limited adverse inference drawn regarding the missing witness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of two provincial offences after failing to appear at his trial dates.

Under s. 9.1(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, he was deemed not to dispute the charges.

He appealed, arguing that s. 9.1 violates s. 11(d) of the Charter by denying him a fair hearing.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 9.1 does not violate the Charter, as the notices provided clear warnings of the consequences of failing to appear, allowing the court to infer a valid waiver of s. 11(d) rights.

However, the appeal was allowed and new trials ordered because the City of Toronto conceded the appellant did not receive a fair hearing on his initial appeals.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to examine a non-party treating physician.

The respondents raised a preliminary issue regarding whether the order was final or interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held that because discoveries were not yet complete and the information might still be obtained from the parties, the order was interlocutory.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction, with leave granted to seek an appeal at the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed orders declaring her a vexatious litigant, arguing she was denied natural justice because the motion judge concluded the hearing in the morning despite a full day being scheduled.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge provided the appellant ample opportunity to present her case, including adjourning to read her 94-page written submissions and allowing her to answer questions and make further submissions.

The court noted the appellant never indicated what further submissions she wished to make.

The appellant corporation appealed an order requiring moneys to be paid into court in the context of matrimonial proceedings.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, finding the order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the appellant's interest in the funds.

The appellant was granted an extension of time to seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a jury.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting the preliminary inquiry testimony of a co-accused who refused to testify at trial, failing to properly instruct the jury on the evidence, and improperly answering a jury question.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to properly exercise his discretion under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, failed to relate the evidence to the issues in his jury charge, and provided a procedurally and substantively flawed response to a jury question.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment that found a shotgun buy-sell offer valid and enforceable despite minor non-compliance with the partnership agreement.

The offer contained two alternatives, one compliant and one non-compliant.

The Court of Appeal held that strict compliance with a shotgun buy-sell provision is required, but strict compliance is not perfect compliance.

The inclusion of a non-compliant alternative did not render the offer unenforceable because a compliant alternative was also included.

The court upheld the motion judge's decision to enforce the compliant alternative and award damages for the non-compliant elements.

The minor plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident.

Her mother sued the driver and owner, who then issued a third-party claim against the plaintiff's parents for negligent supervision.

The parents' homeowners' insurer refused to defend the third-party claim, relying on an exclusion clause for bodily injury to any person residing in the household.

The application judge declared the insurer had a duty to defend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that the exclusion clause must be interpreted narrowly and only applies to direct claims between family members, not indirect third-party claims for contribution and indemnity.

The applicant, who suffered from an undisclosed serious mental illness, accumulated over $20,000 in fines from four convictions for driving without insurance.

He applied for an extension of time and leave to appeal after his motions in the provincial offences appeal court were dismissed.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding an arguable issue regarding the due administration of justice and the public interest in determining whether accommodations should be made for individuals with significant personal disabilities who lack the ability to pay draconian fines.

The appellant appealed an order, attempting to raise potential defences on the merits and challenging the provenance of documents filed below.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions that the appellant was properly served and had no defence on the merits based on the record.

The appellants appealed an order regarding whether the franchisor failed to provide a disclosure statement under section 6(2) of the Arthur Wishart Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that whether a disclosure statement was never provided must be determined by examining the deficiencies in the material actually delivered.

The court noted that compliance with sections 5(3) and 5(4) of the Act remains an open question for trial.

The appellants sought to appeal a motion judge's decision, arguing an appeal as of right under s. 193(a) and (b) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The respondent challenged the court's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found no appeal as of right because the motion judge did not make a finding that the respondent was a creditor.

The court also refused leave to appeal, finding the case failed all three components of the applicable test.

The appeal was quashed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant's proposed wind power project was cancelled by the Ontario government during an election campaign.

The appellant sued for damages, alleging misfeasance in public office, claiming the government acted in bad faith for electoral expediency and specifically targeted the appellant to cripple it financially.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the claim for misfeasance in public office to proceed, but only on the narrow basis that the government's conduct was specifically targeted to injure the appellant financially.

The court held that core policy decisions based on electoral expediency do not constitute bad faith for the purposes of misfeasance in public office.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for an assessment of a lawyer's accounts.

The accounts were paid by a court-appointed supervisor out of the appellants' funds.

The appellants did not receive copies of the accounts until two years later and brought the application shortly after.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in imputing the supervisor's knowledge to the appellants and in failing to consider discrepancies in the accounts.

The appeal was allowed, and an assessment was ordered based on special circumstances.

The appellant municipality appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for malicious prosecution and awarding $550,000 in punitive damages to the respondent estate.

The deceased had been wrongfully dismissed from his position as a building inspector, after which the municipality withheld exculpatory evidence from the police, leading to criminal charges of which he was ultimately acquitted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of malicious prosecution, concluding the municipality initiated the proceedings by withholding evidence.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on punitive damages in part, reducing the award to $450,000 because the trial judge failed to account for the punitive elements of the substantial compensatory damages and costs already awarded.

The parties separated after a 19-year marriage.

The wife brought a motion to strike the husband's pleadings, alleging he wilfully breached multiple court orders requiring financial disclosure.

The motion judge granted the motion, struck the husband's pleadings, and ordered an uncontested trial.

The husband appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors by characterizing the husband's disclosure as merely 'token' and ignoring evidence of substantial compliance.

The Court reaffirmed that striking pleadings is a drastic remedy of last resort in family law cases.

The appellant challenged summary judgment enforcing a disciplinary costs award made by a securities self-regulatory organization after professional misconduct proceedings.

The issue was whether the organization could sue a former member in breach of contract to recover the unpaid costs award, and whether s. 9 of the Recognition Order barred that remedy by treating costs like fines or settlements.

The court held that prior authority recognizing contractual enforcement of disciplinary sanctions applied equally to costs awards, and that the plain wording of s. 9 was limited to fines and settlements.

The appeal was dismissed and appeal costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant challenged an order dismissing his action as an abuse of process on the basis that it constituted a collateral attack on prior mortgage proceedings.

The Court of Appeal applied the deferential standard governing appellate review of discretionary process-control orders and held that no misdirection or clearly wrong result had been shown.

The court found the appellant's real complaint concerned alleged accounting and payment issues that could have been raised during the mortgage proceedings, and noted that a statutory assessment remedy under the Mortgages Act had been initiated but adjourned.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.