Mohammed M. Rahman

The appellant commenced an action seeking damages, alleging the respondent lawyer received mortgage discharge funds on his behalf but took the funds without documenting a loan or repaying them.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's summary judgment motion due to conflicting evidence and credibility issues.

On a boomerang basis, the motion judge dismissed the action as statute-barred, finding the appellant knew of his claim by November 2, 2020, when his demand for payment or a signed loan commitment was refused, and the action was not commenced until 32 months later.

The Court of Appeal found no error, rejected the appellant's fraudulent concealment argument, and dismissed the appeal with costs of $8,000 to the respondent.

The appellant, a corporate officer and sole director, appealed a judgment finding him personally liable for civil fraud arising from his company's failure to deliver 3 million NIOSH certified N95 masks during the COVID-19 pandemic to a Quebec hospital network, after receiving over US$11 million in advance payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct threshold for recklessness in finding civil fraud and that the law clearly supports personal liability of officers and directors for fraudulent conduct, without needing to assess whether the conduct was "tortious in itself" or exhibited a "separate identity or interest."

The appellant was convicted of intimidation of a justice system participant, criminal harassment, uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, and two counts of breach of undertaking arising from a sustained campaign of social media posts, threats, and communications targeting an OPP officer.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge failed to address the mens rea for the specific intent offences of intimidation and criminal harassment and erred in convicting on one breach of undertaking count.

The Court of Appeal held that the requisite mens rea findings were implicit in the trial judge's meticulous description of the appellant's conduct, which gave rise to irresistible inferences of intent.

However, the court set aside the conviction on the breach of undertaking count alleging the appellant went where the complainant was known to be, finding the trial judge misdescribed the count and failed to make findings supporting the conviction.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for multiple violent offences including discharging an air pistol at a victim, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention at a forensic psychiatry program.

He sought an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's decision was reasonable, noting the seriousness and recency of the index offences, the appellant's limited insight into his illness, ongoing concerns about substance use and impulsivity, and the lack of suitable community accommodation.

The appeal was dismissed, though the court commended the appellant's significant progress.

The appellant commercial landlord appealed from the Divisional Court's order quashing a motion judge's production order that had found the respondent tenants had impliedly waived solicitor-client privilege over legal advice received when entering into a commercial lease.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding three errors by the Divisional Court: applying a correctness standard of review instead of palpable and overriding error, misreading the motion judge's reasons as based on the original rather than amended pleadings, and failing to recognize that even the amended defence still placed reliance on the respondents' understanding of their legal position.

The court clarified that deemed waiver of privilege does not require explicit reference to legal advice and provided a five-point summary of the applicable legal principles.

The appellant challenged convictions on three sexual assault counts and the custodial and ancillary sentencing orders.

The court held that the trial reasons adequately applied the reasonable doubt framework, addressed credibility and reliability concerns arising from complainant incapacity, and permitted meaningful appellate review.

It further held that the custodial term was fit, declined to admit fresh evidence concerning family caregiving circumstances, and upheld the 20-year SOIRA order as properly imposed under the governing statutory regime at sentencing.

A constitutional remedy request regarding registration obligations was left to a court of first instance due to an insufficient record.

Both conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed for loaded prohibited firearm possession and related offences after a collision, firearm discharge, flight, and disposal of the weapon in a residential area.

The court held the conditional sentence was demonstrably unfit and found a three-year penitentiary sentence would have been fit on the sentencing record, given denunciation and deterrence principles for serious public-safety firearm offending.

The court accepted significant mitigation, including youth, no prior record, rehabilitation, and a serious neurological condition that increased custodial hardship and treatment risk.

Fresh evidence established ongoing rehabilitation and unresolved worsening neurological concerns requiring continued monitoring.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence but declined reincarceration and directed continuation of the conditional sentence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and assault with a weapon against his stepdaughter and sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by treating the appellant's silence during a police interview as a "tacit admission" of guilt on the charges he did not explicitly deny.

This error was foundational, materially affecting the trial judge's assessment of both the appellant's and the complainant's credibility.

The court held that the right to silence, protected under s. 7 of the Charter, prohibits drawing an inference of guilt from an accused's choice to remain silent on some allegations while denying others.

The convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal order and restore their collection action to the trial list.

The Court of Appeal found two reviewable errors: the motion judge erred in principle by failing to consider the respondent's lackadaisical conduct in assessing prejudice, and made a palpable and overriding error in finding the appellants showed disinterest in the action despite evidence they had contacted their lawyer multiple times seeking updates.

Considering the matter afresh, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the dismissal order, and restored the action to the trial list.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded, chambered, prohibited handgun found in his one-bedroom condominium during the execution of a search warrant.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued misapprehension of evidence and unreasonable verdict, contending that his brother or a third party may have placed the firearm in the unit.

The Court of Appeal held these submissions amounted to speculative inferences unsupported by the evidentiary record and dismissed the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the court found no error in principle in the 20-month custodial sentence, holding it was restrained, consistent with parity, and appropriately reflected the aggravating circumstances of a loaded firearm in a residential building.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault causing bodily harm, break and enter, and two counts of threatening to use a weapon, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

He claimed trial counsel usurped his right to elect the mode of trial and his right to testify.

The Court of Appeal rejected the election claim, finding the appellant had not established the factual foundation and had not shown a reasonable probability he would have elected differently.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the right-to-testify ground, finding trial counsel failed to make clear that the decision to testify was the appellant's to make, failed to obtain written instructions, and that the police interview was not a functional equivalent of in-court testimony.

A new trial by judge and jury was ordered.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellants challenged dismissal of their action as an abuse of process.

The court agreed the claim repeated issues from prior mortgage litigation and also dismissed the fresh-evidence motion.

An appellant found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision refusing his transfer from the Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre back to Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences.

The appellant, aged 69 with schizoaffective disorder, pedophilic disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning, had been under the Board's jurisdiction since 1998.

After transferring to the Royal Ottawa in November 2024, he faced significantly enhanced liberty restrictions, including confinement to his ward and a pureed food diet due to choking risk.

The Board refused the transfer request, citing the brief duration of his stay and concerns about therapeutic alliance.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's decision unreasonable, holding that it improperly focused on the appellant's best interests rather than the statutory "least onerous and least restrictive" standard.

The court ordered the transfer to Ontario Shores.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and sexual exploitation of his daughter.

The trial judge was Justice Fletcher Dawson, sitting with a jury.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the trial judge erred in permitting cross-examination of the complainant's mother and sisters regarding uncharged abusive conduct; (2) that the trial judge made a section 276 error regarding evidence of the complainant's sexual activity; and (3) that the trial judge made a Browne v. Dunn error by failing to ensure that contradictory evidence was put to the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) verdict entered on February 24, 2017, following a psychiatric assessment that concluded the appellant did not know his actions were wrong due to untreated schizophrenia.

The appeal was based on serious procedural defects at the hearing, including failure to arraign the appellant, failure to take a plea, failure to make elections on four of five charges, failure to read facts into the record, absence of viva voce evidence, and failure to address the appellant or allow him to speak.

The Crown conceded the procedural flaws warranted setting aside the verdict.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the NCRMD verdict, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, a property developer, purchased contaminated land in 1990 and commenced an action in January 2004 seeking damages for soil contamination.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding the action was statute-barred because the appellant had actual knowledge of the contamination by April 1991, triggering a six-year limitation period that had expired long before the action was commenced.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in principle, made palpable and overriding errors of fact, and failed to consider whether its continuing nuisance claim was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's knowledge of contamination in 1991, albeit to an uncertain extent, was sufficient to trigger the limitation period, and the appellant was not required to know the full extent of the contamination for the period to begin running.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement between the respondent mortgagee and the appellants regarding mortgage enforcement proceedings.

The appellants argued the settlement agreement was unenforceable because the mortgagee failed to comply with notice requirements under section 244(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act before enforcing its mortgage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the appellants had voluntarily relinquished any claim based on section 244 when they entered into the settlement agreement with full knowledge of that claim, having previously raised it in their statement of defence.

The court found no basis for appellate intervention and dismissed the appeal with costs.

This is a costs decision following the respondent's successful appeal of orders certifying an action as a class proceeding and granting leave to proceed under the Securities Act.

The respondent sought $120,000 in total costs ($20,000 for the Divisional Court leave to appeal motion and $50,000 for each of two appeals to the Court of Appeal).

The court awarded $70,000 in total costs ($20,000 for the leave to appeal and $50,000 for the appeals), finding that while there were technically two separate appeals, the issues and arguments were inextricably bound together in substance.