Michael William Lacy

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual abuse against his step-daughter and biological daughter.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility by relying on improper cross-examination about motive to fabricate, failing to address inconsistencies, and improperly relying on the appellant's courtroom demeanour outside the witness box.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cross-examination was proper, the inconsistencies were minor, and the trial judge's modest reliance on courtroom demeanour did not cause a miscarriage of justice given the other cogent reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of his estranged wife.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in admitting gunshot residue (GSR) evidence found on his hands and clothing, claiming it was obtained following an unlawful arrest and arbitrary detention in violation of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

He also argued the GSR evidence's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, and that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the use of his post-arrest statements to police.

The Court of Appeal found that while the arrest was unlawful and the detention arbitrary, the GSR evidence was properly admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court also found no error in the admission of the GSR evidence on a probative value/prejudicial effect analysis, and concluded the jury instructions regarding the appellant's statements did not prejudice him.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought an application under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the appointment of counsel for his appeals against conviction and sentence for fraud over $5,000.

The court found insufficient merit in the conviction appeal to warrant the appointment of counsel, noting the applicant's admissions at trial and the discretionary nature of the trial judge's Rowbotham ruling.

However, the court found an arguable issue regarding the imposition of a fine in lieu of forfeiture on the sentence appeal.

The application was granted in part, with counsel appointed solely for the sentence appeal.

Five criminal appeals arising from a major gang investigation challenged informer-privilege procedures, wiretap authorizations, general warrants, covert searches, no-knock take-down warrants, a warrantless vehicle search, jury instructions, and expert opinion evidence.

The court held that an ex parte, in camera first-stage informer privilege hearing was proper, that Criminal Code ss. 186(1.1) and 487.01 were constitutionally valid, and that the wiretap authorizations and general warrants were lawfully issued and executed.

Although one warrantless vehicle search was conducted in an unreasonable manner and one aspect of the conspiracy jury charge was erroneous, the evidence was properly admitted under s. 24(2) and the charge error caused no substantial wrong.

All convictions were upheld and all appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 for his participation in a $4 million mortgage scheme and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and $250,000 in restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by conducting his own handwriting analysis, failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter following unlawful arrest and search, and imposing an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Grant framework to admit the evidence, reasonably assessed the handwriting, and correctly held that conditional sentences are inappropriate for large-scale fraud.

The appellant, a prolific child sex offender diagnosed as a psychopath, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge conflated risk reduction with risk elimination and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence suggesting psychopaths can be effectively treated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly applied the long-term offender criteria and correctly concluded the appellant's risk could not be safely managed in the community.

The fresh evidence application was also dismissed as it merely offered a concurring opinion to evidence already rejected at trial and lacked sufficient probative value to affect the outcome.

The appellant, who was 16 at the time of the offence, appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his adult sentence of life imprisonment without parole for seven years.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence that he suffered from Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD), arguing it affected his ability to foresee the consequences of stabbing the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the fresh evidence lacked the cogency to affect the verdict, as the expert could not conclude the FASD impacted the appellant's state of mind at the time.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the fresh evidence did not alter the appellant's moral blameworthiness or the appropriateness of the adult sentence.

In a joint murder appeal arising from a planned street robbery and fatal stabbing, the court held that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that they could treat a co-accused's explanatory statements as adoptive admissions by silence against the appellants.

The record did not establish the factual context necessary to support an inference that either appellant could reasonably have been expected to respond, particularly where the statements were non-accusatory and related primarily to the declarant's own state of mind.

The court further held that, even if the evidence were capable of supporting adoption by silence, the jury charge lacked the necessary caution and analytical guidance.

One appellant received a new trial on first degree murder, while the other had his conviction set aside and a manslaughter conviction substituted.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for second degree murder and aggravated assault arising from a fatal attack in a rest home, arguing that the jury unreasonably rejected his NCR defence based on schizophrenia and conflicting expert evidence.

The court held that, although the evidence could have supported an NCR finding, there was also evidence capable of supporting the jury’s conclusion that the appellant had not met his burden on a balance of probabilities.

The court further held that the jury charge adequately distinguished the NCR and mens rea inquiries, properly limited the use of protected assessment statements, and did not misdirect the jury on malingering or recall evidence.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter as a party to a robbery during which the victim was shot and killed.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on the evidence of the appellant's teacher, who testified the appellant confessed to being present but not the shooter.

The trial judge admitted two photographs of the appellant taken at the time of his arrest to show his appearance at the time of the offence, as his appearance had changed significantly by trial.

The Court of Appeal held that while the photographs were admissible, the trial judge's jury instruction on their use was confusing and effectively invited the jury to treat an in-court, single photo lineup as circumstantial evidence of identity.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, convicted of first degree murder, sought an order under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code assigning counsel for his appeal.

He had previously obtained a Legal Aid certificate but had a falling out with his appellate counsel over communication and strategy, leading to counsel's removal from the record.

Legal Aid refused to fund a change of counsel, finding no exceptional circumstances.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that while the appellant acted unreasonably in his demands of prior counsel, there was no evidence he intentionally precipitated the breakdown for an improper purpose or to abuse the public funding process.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that he did not receive a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge improperly curtailed defence counsel's cross-examination of the complainant regarding her previous lies about her age, admitted highly prejudicial hearsay evidence, and failed to adequately instruct the jury on the mistake of age defence under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The cumulative effect of these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought to elicit from its witness in chief that she had given a previous inconsistent statement because she was afraid of the accused.

The defence objected, arguing this constituted impermissible oath-helping.

The court ruled that eliciting the fact of a previous inconsistent statement in chief does not constitute oath-helping, as it detracts from rather than bolsters the witness's truthfulness.

However, the court held that the explanation for the previous statement should generally wait for cross-examination and re-examination.

The Crown was permitted to elicit the fact of the previous statements and the timing of the witness's change of heart.

The appellant was convicted of drug-related offences based on evidence obtained through wiretap authorizations.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in refusing leave to cross-examine the affiant of the supportive affidavits, that he was improperly named as a 'known' person in the authorizations, and that the authorizations required live monitoring at all locations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had abandoned his application to cross-examine the affiant at trial, that the standard for naming a 'known' person under s. 185(1)(e) of the Criminal Code was met, and that the live monitoring requirement was properly restricted to specific locations.

In a murder prosecution, the court considered a voir dire on the voluntariness of several statements given by the accused to police in 2002.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary due to lack of a proper caution, deceptive investigative tactics, and the police use of evidence previously obtained in breach of the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights.

The court held that the absence of a caution and police deception did not undermine voluntariness, as the accused understood her right to silence and demonstrated sophistication during the interviews.

However, fairness concerns arose where police referenced material seized unconstitutionally from a gun locker.

The court ruled the statements voluntary but ordered that portions referring to that material be excised.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder following a jury trial.

During deliberations, the jury reported an impasse three times.

On the third occasion, the trial judge delivered an exhortation that singled out one juror, stating she had an incorrect understanding of reasonable doubt and instructing the other jurors to disabuse her of this error.

The appellants appealed, arguing the exhortation was improper.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge misconceived the juror's understanding of the law and improperly pitted the majority against the minority.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations by a child complainant at a family cottage gathering.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge misapprehended photographic evidence and improperly admitted narrative evidence from a family witness, holding that the impugned evidence was either innocuous or properly confined against prejudicial use.

Although the appellant was improperly excluded from the courtroom during a portion of cross-examination contrary to s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code, the court found no prejudice and applied the s. 686(1)(b)(iv) proviso.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of aggravated assault following a jury trial.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in dismissing a motion for a stay based on unreasonable delay, allowing the preliminary hearing testimony of a key witness who was out of the country to be read in under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and providing incomplete written instructions to the jury during deliberations.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the delay analysis but held the trial judge erred in admitting the preliminary hearing evidence without considering technological alternatives like videoconferencing.

The Court also found the trial judge's written jury instructions were unbalanced and compromised trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, having been convicted of fraud and having had his conviction appeal dismissed by the Court of Appeal, applied for bail pending his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court found that while the applicant would surrender into custody and his leave application was assumed not to be frivolous, his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court held that at this stage of the proceedings, the principle of enforceability of the sentence takes precedence over the principle of reviewability, especially given the tenuous nature of a leave application to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The appellants, former executives of Livent, appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale commercial frauds involving the falsification of financial statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the verdicts were reasonable, and the trial judge properly assessed the credibility of unsavoury accomplice witnesses.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the penitentiary terms because the Crown failed to prove the actual amount of financial loss or that the company's bankruptcy was caused solely by the fraud.