Michael William Lacy

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder after the Crown alleged the wife hired her co-accused to kill her husband.

On appeal, the wife argued the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to cross-examine its own witness at large after declaring her adverse under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act, without instructing the jury that the witness's lack of credibility could not be used to infer the accused were not credible or guilty.

The co-accused argued the trial judge erred in refusing to sever his trial, exposing him to highly prejudicial hearsay evidence admissible only against the wife.

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals, finding the lack of a limiting instruction regarding the adverse witness amounted to misdirection, and the refusal to sever the trial resulted in an injustice.

Separate new trials were ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting three complainants and administering a stupefying drug to one of them.

The complainants alleged they felt ill after drinking wine provided by the appellant.

At trial, the Crown relied on expert evidence that GHB was found in one of the wine bottles.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence showing that GHB occurs naturally in all red wine, including the specific brand and vintage seized.

The Court of Appeal applied the Palmer test and admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably be expected to have affected the jury's assessment of the complainants' credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for fraud related to shareholder loans.

He argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons by failing to explain why his testimony was disbelieved and failing to identify confirmatory evidence for Vetrovec witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant knew of his company's dire financial condition implicitly rejected his denials, which was supported by forensic and witness evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

The appellant and an accomplice went to a drug dealer's home to purchase marijuana, both armed with handguns.

During a struggle, the dealer was fatally shot.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding party liability under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, the recklessness component of murder under s. 229(a)(ii), and the failure to give a W. (D.) instruction.

The appellant also argued his absence from a preliminary pre-charge conference in the judge's chambers violated his right to be present at his trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions and concluding that the procedural error of the appellant's absence from the chambers discussion was cured by s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a decision granting certiorari and mandamus, which had quashed a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to commit the appellant for trial on second degree murder rather than first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the reviewing justice erred by turning jurisdictional error into a sufficiency review.

The preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the Arcuri test and was entitled to conclude that the evidence was insufficient for a committal on first degree murder.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on the complainant's prior consistent statements to bolster her credibility.

The summary conviction appeal judge found an error but applied the curative proviso on his own initiative to dismiss the appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that while the appeal judge erred in applying the proviso without submissions, there was no underlying error by the trial judge, who properly used the statements as narrative and to explain inconsistencies.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, Gavra and Karl Largie, were convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter, respectively, following a joint trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on private communications intercepted with the consent of an informant under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that s. 184.2 violates s. 8 of the Charter because it does not require the state to demonstrate investigative necessity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that s. 184.2 satisfies the minimum constitutional requirements of s. 8 and is not unconstitutional despite the absence of an investigative necessity requirement.

The Court also dismissed several grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and breach of probation, arguing the trial judge erred in using certain evidence to confirm the complainant's testimony, allowed improper cross-examination by the Crown, and misapplied the W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge misapprehended one entry in a medical report, there was ample other confirmatory evidence.

The Court also held that improper Crown questioning did not taint the trial judge's reasoning and that the W.(D.) principles were correctly applied.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of multiple counts of fraud and laundering proceeds of crime arising from a large-scale advance fee scheme operated out of a condominium.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of evidence obtained from a search of the condominium, arguing breaches of section 8 of the Charter based on information provided to police by building management following a flood.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information and no state agency by the building staff.

The sentence appeals were also dismissed, upholding the penitentiary sentences as appropriate for large-scale fraud.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault on the basis that the trial judge met privately with counsel during the complainant's cross-examination while the appellant was absent and no record was made.

The Court of Appeal held that the in-chambers discussion formed part of the trial because the judge expressed views on witness credibility and raised the effect of the accused testifying, matters engaging the accused's vital interests.

The appellant's absence affected his ability to make full answer and defence because the discussion influenced the decision not to testify.

The court declined to apply the proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iv), holding that the procedure also had the potential to undermine public confidence in the administration of criminal justice.

The young person appealed his sentence of 24 months' custody and supervision and 18 months' probation for aggravated assault and breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the total sentence of 42 months exceeded the three-year maximum permitted under section 42(15) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court also found the sentencing judge erred by failing to give full credit for the seven months and one week spent in pre-sentence custody.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing the probation period to 12 months and adjusting the pre-sentence custody credit, while upholding the remainder of the sentence as fit.

The appellant appealed his sentence after the trial judge rejected a joint submission of two years plus three years' probation, instead imposing a sentence of four and a half years.

The trial judge found the joint submission fell well below the minimum appropriate sentence, noting aggravating factors including domestic assault with a knife, forced entry, being on probation for offences against the same victim, and a record of over fifty convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed the joint submission was too low but held the trial judge should have imposed a sentence at the bottom of the appropriate range.

The Court varied the sentence on the break and enter count to two and a half years, resulting in a total effective global sentence of four years.

The appellant's criminal charges were stayed on the eve of trial due to delay and disclosure issues, and the trial judge awarded costs against the Crown under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal judge set aside the costs award.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the setting aside of the costs award, finding that while the 16-month delay triggered a s. 11(b) inquiry, the Crown's conduct did not amount to the marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards required to justify a costs award.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, reversed the onus of proof, misapprehended evidence, and resulted in an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge laid out a clear evidentiary path to the verdict based on identification evidence linking the appellant to the assault.

The court concluded there was no misapprehension of evidence or reversal of the burden of proof.

Although the Crown's case was not overwhelming, the verdict was not unreasonable.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge misapprehended evidence regarding his continued abuse of a victim after being released from jail for a similar offence.

The appellant also argued the judge failed to give proper weight to an expert report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the sentencing judge erred as alleged, the overall sentence imposed was fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding the Crown's late disclosure that a co-occupant of the searched premises was incarcerated at the time of the search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that defence counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to challenge the search warrant based on the information available, and the late disclosure did not affect trial fairness.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the trial judge's use of documentary evidence and an error regarding unanalyzed drug residue, concluding the verdict was not unreasonable.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person charged with robbery.

The trial judge excluded the young person's statement to the police because the officer failed to explain that any statement was required to be made in the presence of a consulted third party, as mandated by section 146(2)(b)(iv) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there is a significant difference between a young person's right to have a third party present and the requirement that a statement be taken in their presence.

The failure to provide this information was not a mere technical irregularity under section 146(6).

Le demandeur, inculpé de fraude et d'entrave à la justice aux États-Unis pour avoir enlevé des cartons de documents, demande l'autorisation d'interjeter appel d'une ordonnance d'obtention rendue en vertu de la Loi sur l'entraide juridique en matière criminelle.

La Cour d'appel applique le critère de l'arrêt Ross et conclut que l'ordonnance d'obtention n'est qu'une étape préliminaire visant à préserver les documents avant l'audition de la requête en transmission.

La demande d'autorisation d'appel et la requête en suspension sont rejetées.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment against his former common-law partner and sentenced to thirty days in custody plus three years of probation.

One of the probation conditions required him to leave the province of Ontario within two weeks of his release.

The appellant appealed both the conviction and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, holding that banishment from an entire province is an extreme measure that cannot be justified as a reasonable condition under section 732.1(3)(h) of the Criminal Code.

The court struck down the banishment condition and substituted it with prohibitions on communicating with the victim, coming within 500 metres of her, and living in her community.

The appellant appealed his convictions for second degree murder and attempted murder, as well as his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

He argued the trial judge failed to provide a special instruction regarding identification evidence from neighbours who had picked out photos of other persons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the standard instructions were adequate and noting no objection was made at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 15-year parole ineligibility period was within the appropriate range given the brutal nature of the attack, the home invasion, and the finding that the appellant killed the deceased to eliminate a witness.