Michael William Lacy

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for arson.

She argued the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence expert's evidence and that the finding of exclusive opportunity to start the fire was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly evaluated the expert evidence and that there was ample evidence to support the finding that the fire started when the appellant was alone in the house.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not improperly use lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and the sentence fell within the acceptable range.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of heroin, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that she was improperly cross-examined on a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict was open to the trial judge based on the evidence.

Although the cross-examination on the conditional discharge was improper, the court concluded it played no role in the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's incredible evidence.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

On consent of both the Crown and the appellant, the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to time served plus a 15-month period of probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder of his ex-wife.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on motive, eyewitness identification, DNA evidence under the victim's fingernails, and after-the-fact conduct including flight.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on eyewitness identification, hearsay evidence of the victim's statements, discreditable conduct, collateral evidence, consciousness of innocence, and the admission of autopsy photographs.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors, noting the trial judge's charge was fair and balanced, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed her conviction for counselling to commit murder, arguing for a new trial based on proposed fresh evidence.

At trial, her defence of duress was rejected, and the trial judge found she had fabricated some journal entries.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from her trial counsel to show the continuity of her journal entries and the post-sentence criminal conduct of her former boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion and the appeal, concluding that the fresh evidence could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result, as her behaviour with undercover officers was inconsistent with acting under duress.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that he was unlawfully detained prior to a consent search that revealed crack cocaine, and that he was prejudiced by improper cross-examination and jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings precluded a finding of detention, and that any potential prejudice from the Crown's improper cross-examination was sufficiently offset by the jury charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give a W. (D.) instruction regarding his exculpatory statements and a witness's sighting of the victim, admitting evidence without a limiting instruction, and failing to give adequate Vetrovec warnings for two witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no obligation to give the requested W. (D.) instructions, no prejudice from the admitted evidence, and that the trial judge's instructions regarding the unsavoury witnesses were adequate or within his discretion.

The appellant appealed his sentence for crack-cocaine trafficking and failure to comply with recognizance.

He argued the sentence was outside the appropriate range and that the trial judge failed to consider his medical condition and the impact of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding the sentence was within the appropriate range given the nature of the offence and the appellant's role.

However, the court varied the sentences for failure to comply with recognizance to time served, as the original sentences exceeded the maximum available.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon and obstruction of justice after failing to properly investigate and secure a knife found at his son's school.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the accused on both counts, finding no evidence that the knife handle was made of metal.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari, but the Court of Appeal restored the discharge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a preliminary inquiry judge commits a jurisdictional error reviewable on certiorari if they fail to consider the whole of the evidence as required by section 548(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement and assault following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge's decision relied heavily on credibility assessments, ultimately rejecting the appellant's exculpatory evidence.

In doing so, the trial judge misapprehended a crucial piece of the appellant's testimony regarding the complainant's emotional state.

The Court of Appeal applied the test from R. v. Morrissey, finding that the misapprehended evidence played an essential part in the trial judge's reasoning process and adverse credibility finding.

Consequently, the conviction was not based exclusively on the evidence, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The young person appealed their convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching of a person under the age of fourteen.

The convictions were based on the complainant's testimony regarding an incident during a sleepover.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in failing to consider the reliability of the complainant's testimony, noting inconsistencies in her statements and her initial belief that another child was the assailant.

The Court concluded the convictions were unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered acquittals.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder.

At trial, he claimed to have suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and amnesia, rendering him unable to remember the events.

The defence introduced statements the appellant made during a court-ordered psychiatric assessment, which the Crown then cross-examined him on.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to caution the jury against using disbelief of his amnesia as circumstantial evidence of guilt, by allowing cross-examination on protected statements under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code, and by failing to instruct the jury not to rely on third-party opinions of his truthfulness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and holding that the appellant waived the protection of s. 672.21 by introducing the statements himself.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to repeat a re-instruction on subjective intent in response to a jury question, inadequately reviewing defence evidence, and failing to give a W.(D.) instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury was adequately instructed on the requirement for subjective intent, the review of evidence was sufficient, and a W.(D.) instruction was not mandatory given the circumstantial evidence instruction provided.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possessing ammunition while subject to a prohibition order under s. 100(2) of the Criminal Code.

He argued the original order was invalid because it failed to specify a reasonable period for surrendering ammunition as required by s. 100(13).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that challenging the validity of the original order constituted an impermissible collateral attack.

The court also found the actus reus was proven, as possessing ammunition three years after the order exceeded any reasonable time limit, and dismissed a motion to introduce fresh evidence.

The appellant was convicted of uttering a threat to cause death to his former partner.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

On further appeal, he argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of the complainant's father, which affected the core of the reasoning process.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge did misapprehend a portion of the father's testimony, the error did not affect the core of the reasoning.

The trial judge had already accepted the complainant's evidence and rejected the appellant's version based on credibility findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of extortion after demanding money and a vehicle from a family member who had sexually abused the appellant's children.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury on his alcohol consumption.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the intoxication defence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the sentencing judge erred in finding the appellant was unemployed.

Given the appellant's role as the sole financial provider and caregiver for his family, the custodial sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his wife and appealed his conviction.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior discreditable conduct with his wife and similar fact evidence from his former common law wife.

The Court of Appeal held the prior discreditable conduct was admissible to provide context, show motive, and explain the complainant's delay in reporting.

While the trial judge erred in the basis for admitting the similar fact evidence, the Court applied the Handy framework and found the evidence was properly admissible as its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for eight robberies of financial institutions committed while on parole for the same offence.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's lengthy record and the circumstances of the offences.

A post-sentence report did not alter the fitness of the sentence, as much of the information was already before the trial judge.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility or the use of a conversation with a third party.

The court also held that the sentence was fit, even if the trial judge improperly used the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The Crown appealed a two-year sentence imposed on the respondent for multiple serious and sophisticated frauds committed while on parole for similar offences.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by discounting specific deterrence and held the original sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The appeal was allowed, and a fit sentence of five years was substituted, reduced to 43 months after accounting for pre-trial custody.