Michael William Lacy

The appellant, a police officer convicted of attempted murder, applied for release from custody pending his appeal.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the appellant would surrender into custody, but argued his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding that the merits of the appeal regarding inconsistent verdicts shifted the balance in favour of reviewability, and that a fully informed public would not find his release contrary to the public interest.

The appellants, two brothers, were involved in an altercation at a cottage party.

Jordan punched the victim in the eye, causing permanent blindness, and Ryan subsequently kicked and punched the victim while he was on the ground.

Jordan was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment, while Ryan was convicted of the included offence of common assault and received a suspended sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge reasonably rejected Jordan's self-defence claim and correctly treated Ryan's assault as part of the same transaction.

However, the Court allowed Jordan's sentence appeal, reducing his sentence to nine months' incarceration because the trial judge failed to apply the restraint principle for young first offenders.

The applicants, three police officers charged with sexual assault, sought to vary a sealing order to prohibit publication of information from an Information to Obtain (ITO) DNA warrants, arguing it was necessary to preserve trial fairness and prevent witness tainting and stigmatization.

The Crown supported the ban for consistency with a prior publication ban on conflict motion materials.

The media respondents opposed the ban.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicants failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet the Dagenais/Mentuck test for a publication ban, which requires demonstrating a serious risk to the proper administration of justice that cannot be prevented by alternative measures, and that the salutary effects outweigh the deleterious effects on freedom of expression and public right to know.

The court emphasized the presumptive openness of warrant materials and the public interest in the investigation of police officers.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple offences, including assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement against his former girlfriend, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge erred by mischaracterizing defence evidence as an alibi, applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and over-relying on similar fact and post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in characterizing certain evidence as an alibi, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the curative proviso applied.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, finding the trial judge reasonably assessed the psychiatric evidence and the appellant's risk to re-offend.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for robbery arising from a drug transaction where the complainant was stabbed multiple times.

At trial, there was conflicting evidence regarding who was buying and selling the drugs, and what type of drugs were involved.

The trial judge convicted the appellant but failed to make specific findings of fact regarding what was stolen, which was necessary as the Crown had particularized the charge as stealing money.

The Court of Appeal found that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because they did not address the charge as particularized.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, applied for the appointment of state-funded counsel for his appeal under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code after being denied Legal Aid.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet his burden of proving a lack of financial means.

The applicant had not been transparent in disclosing his financial circumstances to Legal Aid and had allowed a property to be foreclosed upon by a friend without contesting the proceedings, raising questions about his financial affairs.

In a criminal bribery prosecution, the appellant international financial organization challenged a third party production order and subpoenas issued in support of a Garofoli wiretap challenge.

The Court held that archival and personnel immunities under the Bretton Woods and Related Agreements Act applied to records and investigators of the organization’s integrity unit, and no waiver was established.

The Court further held that, in the Garofoli context, third party production requires a reasonable likelihood of probative value to the affiant-knowledge issues, not broad relevance to trial truth.

Because that threshold was not met, the production order was set aside.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a person under sixteen.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by misunderstanding the law of sexual assault, misapplying the law on corroboration, failing to properly apply the W.D. framework for credibility, and providing insufficient reasons.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the objective test for sexual assault, properly assessed the evidence, and provided adequate reasons for finding a reasonable doubt.

The accused brought an application for disclosure of Source Debriefing Reports and Handler's notes relating to a confidential informant.

During a pre-trial Charter application, it became apparent that the Crown had not disclosed certain relevant information about the informant's credibility and reliability.

The Crown argued that providing a summary of the undisclosed information was sufficient and that it would not rely on the undisclosed information.

The court rejected this argument, holding that relevance is not determined by what the Crown chooses to rely on.

Applying the principles from Stinchcombe and McKenzie, the court ordered the Crown to disclose the requested reports and notes, redacted to protect informant privilege, to ensure the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and assault following a brawl in a restaurant where he brandished a knife and a patron was stabbed.

The appellant testified he brandished the knife in self-defence and the stabbing was accidental.

The trial judge refused to leave self-defence to the jury, finding it incompatible with accident, and directed the jury that the first two elements of the weapons charge were proven.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge usurped the jury's fact-finding function, erred in finding self-defence and accident incompatible, and improperly directed a verdict on essential elements.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for his participation in a robbery where a co-assailant shot and killed the victim.

The trial judge sentenced him to eight years' imprisonment, treating the use of a firearm as an aggravating factor despite the mandatory minimum under s. 236(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence of the appellant's rehabilitation and held that his failure to cooperate with police was not an aggravating factor.

The court reduced the sentence to six years' imprisonment, balancing the aggravating circumstances of the robbery with the appellant's strong mitigating factors and rehabilitative efforts.

The appellants were acquitted of first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder.

They appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred during jury selection by unilaterally ordering the use of static triers for challenges for cause, despite the appellants' requests for rotating triers and the absence of an application under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the improper use of static triers deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers, rendering the court improperly constituted to try them.

The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) could not apply.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in failing to answer a jury question regarding closing arguments.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered for second degree murder.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision imposing a $10,000 fine on a defendant convicted of dealing in mortgages without a licence under the Mortgage Brokerages, Lenders and Administrators Act, 2006.

The defendant, a former licensed mortgage broker whose licence had been revoked, continued to conduct mortgage brokering activities through a separate company while unlicensed, generating $48,967.20 in commissions over 14 transactions.

The Crown sought a fine of $100,000 at trial and $75,000 on appeal, arguing the sentence failed to give appropriate weight to general deterrence.

The appellate court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered deterrence and other relevant sentencing principles, and that the $10,000 fine was fit and appropriate given the circumstances of the offender and the nature of the strict liability offence.

The appellant, convicted of manslaughter in the drowning death of his wife and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending his conviction and sentence appeals.

The Crown conceded the appellant was not a flight risk or a danger to the public, but argued the appeals were frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal found that the conviction appeal raised an arguable issue regarding the trial judge's response to a jury question, which introduced a new route to liability based on failing to provide the necessaries of life.

Concluding the appeal was not frivolous and the principle of reviewability outweighed enforceability, the Court granted release pending appeal.

The Crown appealed a suspended sentence and three years' probation imposed on a 20-year-old offender who pleaded guilty to intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to a dwelling house.

The offender set fire to a carport over a drug debt, which spread to an attached home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly inferred a causal link between the offender's mental health issues and the offence, and correctly weighed mitigating factors including his youth, guilty plea, and rehabilitation prospects.

The appellant was convicted of a multi-million dollar fraud arising from an investment scheme.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that a forensic accountant employed by the OSC should have been disqualified from testifying due to bias, and that his pre-trial Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel was improperly dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's evidence was primarily factual tracing and his prior involvement did not automatically disqualify him.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the Rowbotham application, as the appellant had failed to be transparent about his financial resources.

Five police officers appealed their convictions for attempting to obstruct justice and perjury arising from a warrantless search of a drug suspect's apartment and subsequent efforts to conceal it.

The officers argued various trial errors, including Charter violations regarding the use of their preliminary inquiry testimony, improper jury instructions, and abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors.

The Crown cross-appealed the 45-day conditional sentences.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, finding the sentences demonstrably unfit for police officers committing perjury and obstruction of justice, and substituted 3-year custodial sentences, but stayed their operation due to the passage of time.

The appellants appealed their convictions for first and second degree murder arising from a firebombing that killed two children.

The Crown's theory was that the primary appellant orchestrated the arson to silence the children's mother, who had accused him of sexual assault, and hired the other appellants to execute the plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's admission of bad character evidence, Vetrovec caution regarding an unsavoury witness, instructions on unlawful object murder, or instructions on post-offence conduct.

The court also upheld the 23-year parole ineligibility period for the appellant convicted of second degree murder.

The applicant sought to revisit an earlier unsuccessful s. 11(b) Charter application after a mistrial in a fraud prosecution arising from the operation of a non-profit international adoption agency.

The court held that s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code creates a presumption that pre-mistrial Charter rulings remain binding unless the interests of justice require re-litigation.

Although the mistrial was attributable to investigative shortcomings by police and therefore to the Crown, only a limited additional period counted as institutional delay, leaving total Crown or institutional delay below the Morin lower range.

A fresh balancing of inferred prejudice against the significant societal interest in trying the allegations on the merits favoured continuation of the prosecution.

The appellant appealed her sentence for careless driving resulting in the death of a pedestrian.

The trial judge imposed a 20-day intermittent jail sentence and a 24-month driving suspension.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred in principle by sentencing the appellant based on facts not admitted or proven, specifically that she was using a hand-held device at the time of the collision.

The appellant had only admitted to holding the device, not using it.

The appeal court allowed the appeal and substituted a $2,000 fine and 18-month driving suspension.