Lene Madsen

The appellant was committed to stand trial for aggravated assault following a preliminary inquiry where the sole identification evidence was a manifestly unreliable in-dock identification.

He brought an unsuccessful certiorari application to quash the committal, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to apply the Supreme Court's decision in Hay to discharge him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Hay did not overturn established authority prohibiting preliminary inquiry judges from weighing the reliability of direct evidence.

The Court further held that even if Hay created an exception for directed verdicts, it does not apply to preliminary inquiries.

The appellant commenced an action in Ontario for breach of a share purchase agreement.

The respondent successfully moved to stay the action in favour of an ongoing International Chamber of Commerce arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause in a subsequent agreement to which it was not a named party.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding an arbitration agreement existed between the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding an 'arguable case' that the respondent was an affiliate entitled to benefit from the arbitration clause, thereby engaging the competence-competence principle.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of intimidation by blocking or obstructing a highway under s. 423(1)(g) of the Criminal Code, arising from his leadership role in the 'Freedom Convoy' protests in Ottawa.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that the offence required proof of threats or violence and an intent to intimidate individuals when occurring in the context of a political protest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by reading in elements not found in the text of the provision and by treating the political protest context as a defence to otherwise criminal conduct.

The Court substituted a conviction, finding that the respondent's conduct in blocking highways to compel the government to change its COVID-19 policies satisfied all elements of the offence.

The appellant general contractor appealed a decision finding that the former Construction Lien Act, rather than the amended Construction Act, applied to its dispute with the respondent owners.

The application judge held that the procurement process commenced before July 1, 2018, triggering the transitional provision in s. 87.3(1)(b), even though the initial proposal contemplated a different property and the respondents did not own the final property at the time of the proposal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the proposal and the final contract related to the same improvement, and that a functional approach to ownership meant the respondents only needed to own the premises at the time of construction.

The appellant was convicted of firearm offences after an Instagram video showed him displaying what appeared to be a loaded handgun.

The physical weapon was never recovered.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's finding that the object was a real firearm was unreasonable, as the circumstantial evidence did not exclude the possibility it was an imitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude the firearm was real based on the video evidence, including the appellant's act of removing the magazine to display ammunition in response to a question about whether the gun was real.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that while the trial judge made minor errors in summarizing the collateral immigration consequences, these errors did not impact the fitness of the sentence imposed.

The appellant challenged an order striking his claim alleging a long-running campaign of defamation and economic harm connected to securities-regulatory proceedings.

The Court of Appeal held that the action was barred by the ultimate 15-year limitation period under s. 15 of the Limitations Act, 2002 because the pleadings showed that the appellant knew the material facts underlying his claims by no later than 2004.

The court interpreted s. 15(4)(c) as tolling the ultimate limitation period only where wilful concealment or misleading by the defendant prevented discovery of the claim, and found that requirement was not met on the pleaded facts.

Leave to cross-appeal costs was granted, the no-costs order was set aside as an error in principle, and partial indemnity costs of the motion and agreed appeal costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant mother appealed an order dismissing her motion to extend time to appeal a child protection disposition placing the child in the father's care and custody.

The court held that the motion judge correctly stated and applied the legal test for an extension of time in a child protection matter, accepted that the appellant had formed an intention to appeal within the relevant period, but found significant prejudice to the child and no merit in the proposed appeal.

No reviewable error of law or fact was shown.

The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The appellant challenged drug, proceeds, and firearm-related convictions arising from a search of a residence and a vehicle, arguing unreasonable verdict and misapprehension of evidence.

The court held that, on the circumstantial record, the trial judge could not reasonably infer constructive possession of the cash hidden behind a cabinet or the oxycodone found in plain view in a room occupied by four men, because knowledge and control specific to the appellant were not the only reasonable inferences.

In contrast, the appellant's observed operation of the vehicle, possession of its keys, the location of the hidden firearm and cocaine near the driver's seat, and the surrounding evidence of trafficking reasonably supported the vehicle-related convictions.

Acquittals were substituted on the residence-related counts, the balance of the appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and obstruction of justice, as well as her 14-month sentence.

She argued the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework regarding her alibi evidence and failed to consider Gladue factors on sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge misstated the second branch of the W.(D.) test, the error had no impact because the trial judge completely rejected the appellant's exculpatory evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge appropriately considered the appellant's difficult upbringing despite being unable to formally substantiate her Indigenous ancestry for Gladue purposes.

The mother wrongfully retained the parties' 9-year-old child in Ontario following a holiday visit, breaching a California final consent order.

The father successfully applied under the Hague Convention for the child's immediate return to California.

The mother appealed the return order and brought an urgent motion to stay the order pending appeal, citing the child's strong objections to returning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, applying the RJR-MacDonald test and finding that a stay was not in the child's best interests, as the appeal had a low chance of success and continuing the unlawful separation perpetuated harm to the father-child relationship.

The appellant appealed a summary trial judgment finding him jointly and severally liable for a corporate loan he personally guaranteed.

The appellant argued there was a failure of consideration because the guarantee was signed after the initial loan agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that consideration existed because the bank retained the ability to change the terms of the demand loan, the appellant understood he was signing a guarantee to obtain credit, and funds were only advanced after the guarantee was signed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order waiving his participation in his child's passport application and his consent to her travel.

He argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction because the parties had a parenting coordinator with arbitral authority over these issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge appropriately exercised his authority under rule 32.1(2) of the Family Law Rules to enforce a prior award made by the parenting coordinator requiring the appellant to take steps to obtain the passport.

The appellants challenged a municipal by-law regulating short-term rental accommodations (STRs) in the Township of Tiny, arguing it was ultra vires the municipality's business licensing powers and effectively prohibited STRs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the by-law was a valid exercise of the Township's broad statutory authority to license businesses and regulate matters affecting the economic, social, and environmental well-being of the municipality.

The court held that the by-law's restrictions, including a cap on the number of licenses and the total days an STR could be rented, were rationally connected to legitimate municipal objectives and did not amount to an outright prohibition.

The appellant wife appealed an order setting aside a separation agreement under s. 56(4)(b) of the Family Law Act.

The hearing judge had set aside the agreement based on a theory he raised himself, finding the wife engaged in trickery by altering the agreement without the husband's knowledge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the hearing judge's finding of trickery was procedurally unfair as it was never pleaded or put to the wife in cross-examination.

Absent this finding, there was no basis to conclude the sophisticated husband, who chose not to obtain independent legal advice, failed to understand the nature or consequences of the agreement.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and weapons offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found breaches of ss. 8 and 9 because the arresting officer's subjective belief for the arrest was not objectively reasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's Grant analysis that would displace the deference owed to such determinations.

The appellant, a driving instructor, appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting a student during a lesson.

He argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny, misapprehended evidence, and improperly relied on social norms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessment and noting that the trial judge properly applied common sense and human experience.

The Crown appealed a verdict finding the respondent not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for first-degree murder and other offences.

The respondent had killed his brother-in-law and assaulted his mother and sister while experiencing command delusions.

The Crown argued the trial judge misapplied the legal test for expert evidence and failed to properly assess the respondent's capacity to know his actions were morally wrong.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly weighed the expert evidence and correctly concluded the respondent's major mental illness rendered him incapable of appreciating the moral wrongfulness of his actions.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking after police found drugs in the trunk of a vehicle he had rented and was driving.

On appeal, he argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence was circumstantial and did not conclusively tie him to the drugs, and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the absence of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's control over the rental vehicle and the location of the drugs supported a reasonable inference of constructive possession.

The Court also held that the jury charge, read as a whole, adequately instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against children, which arose from guilty pleas.

He argued the pleas were involuntary due to pressure after his trial counsel was released and his adjournment request was denied, leaving him to face self-representation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to overcome the strong presumption that guilty pleas made in open court are voluntary.

The court held that emotional pressure and fear of self-representation did not impair his ability to make a conscious volitional choice.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible, appealed a Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention at a secure forensic psychiatric unit.

The appellant argued that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety and that the detention order was not the least onerous disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by evidence from a psychological risk assessment and the treating psychiatrist, which indicated a continued moderate-to-high risk of violent recidivism and a need for a gradual transition into the community.