Lene Madsen

The appellant pleaded guilty to firearms offences and was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by granting inadequate credit for strict pre-sentence bail conditions and by misapplying the framework for considering systemic anti-Black racism.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no error in principle in quantifying the bail credit and correctly applied the requirement to find 'some connection' between the appellant's experiences of racism and the offences.

The appellant appealed convictions for human trafficking, assault, and related offences following a jury trial.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting prior discreditable conduct evidence, creating procedural unfairness by prematurely sharing defence counsel's closing position summary, and improperly instructing the jury to disregard parts of the defence closing submissions due to a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, no severe procedural unfairness, and deference to the trial judge's remedial action for the Browne v. Dunn breach.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for careless storage of a firearm, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention at a mental health centre.

The appellant argued he no longer posed a significant risk to the public and sought an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by unchallenged psychiatric evidence that the appellant minimized his offence, refused to discuss concerning writings, and had an uncertain commitment to medication.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts of sexual interference against his two granddaughters.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on reasonable doubt concerning child witnesses and in his handling of similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury was properly instructed on the standard of proof and propensity reasoning, and the trial judge's similar fact ruling was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge failed to resolve reliability concerns regarding the complainant's testimony and misapprehended material evidence by confusing details between two separate sexual assault allegations.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole, adequately explained the differing verdicts for the two incidents, noting that the convicted offence was reported immediately unlike the acquitted offence which relied on a recovered memory.

The Court concluded that while the trial judge made a factual error regarding which incident involved an admission of embarrassment over a forgotten detail, this misapprehension did not play an essential part in the reasoning process leading to the conviction.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 6 years' imprisonment and a 16-year driving prohibition following guilty pleas to dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm.

He argued the sentence was demonstrably unfit and the sentencing judge erred in weighing mitigating and aggravating factors, including a psychological report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the egregious conduct, excessive speed, and legislative increases to maximum penalties for dangerous driving.

The appellant challenged a sexual assault conviction involving a child complainant on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and also sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court applied the governing ineffective assistance framework and held that the appellant failed to establish the factual foundation for the alleged deficiencies or any resulting miscarriage of justice, particularly in light of the trial judge’s strong credibility findings and the appellant’s unreliable fresh evidence.

On sentence, the Crown conceded an arithmetical error in the calculation of presentence custody credit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the sentence appeal was allowed only to add 13 days of Summers credit.

The appellant challenged an order holding that a dispute over vested options to acquire shares in a related corporate entity had to be resolved in Delaware rather than under the mediation-arbitration clause in his Ontario employment agreement.

The court held that the competence-competence principle did not require referral to an arbitrator because arbitral jurisdiction could be determined through a superficial review of the contractual record.

Reading the employment agreement, option agreement, and incorporated equityholders agreement together, the court held that the options dispute was not contemplated by or connected with the employment agreement and was instead governed by the Delaware forum selection clause.

The court also rejected the argument that the forum selection clause was unconscionable, finding no improvident bargain or evidence that the chosen forum placed a remedy out of reach.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and making sexually explicit material available to a child, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because they did not meaningfully address defence evidence from the appellant's mother.

The court held that appellate review of reasons is functional and contextual, and that the impugned defence evidence was largely hearsay and of limited probative value.

Even if accepted, that evidence could not materially support the defence theory or give rise to a reasonable doubt in light of the trial judge's credibility findings rejecting the appellant's account and accepting the complainant's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for multiple offences, including sexual assault and unlawful confinement, committed against his former partner.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and reasons sufficient.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply the principle of restraint for a youthful, first-time Indigenous offender.

The net sentence was reduced from seven years to five years.

The appellants received $96,000 by way of a second mortgage from the respondent, secured against residential property.

After defaulting on both the first and second mortgages, the respondent successfully moved for summary judgment for the outstanding indebtedness and possession of the property.

On appeal, the appellants — who had been self-represented below — argued that the motion judge failed to consider circumstances surrounding the execution of the second mortgage, including allegations of language barriers, conflict of interest on the part of their lawyer, and deficient legal advice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had executed an independent legal advice certificate, that an interpreter (their daughter) had been present at the relevant meetings, that the appellants had previously executed multiple mortgages on the same property, and that their post-execution attempts to settle the matter by entering into a third mortgage undermined their claim.

The stay of execution was lifted and costs of $10,000 all inclusive were awarded to the respondent.

A hired dog walker sustained significant injuries when the respondents' dog attacked her while she was attempting to put booties on the animal in the respondents' home.

The appellant brought an action under the Dog Owners' Liability Act claiming the respondents, as dog owners, were strictly liable.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the appellant herself qualified as an "owner" under the Act and could not recover from fellow owners.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, applying the definition of "possesses" from Wilk v. Arbour and confirming that a person in physical possession and control of a dog just before an attack is an "owner" regardless of whether she was acting under the instructions of the registrant owners, and regardless of whether the attack occurred in another owner's home.

The self-represented moving party sought review of a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to extend time to appeal a Superior Court order that had itself declined to extend time for him to appeal a default order in a support enforcement proceeding.

The panel applied the deferential standard requiring an error in law or misapprehension of material evidence before intervening.

Finding no such error, the panel upheld the motion judge's refusal of the extension, which was based on the proposed appeal being manifestly without merit and an abuse of process.

The panel noted that concerns regarding incarceration, support payment history, and arrears calculation had been previously decided and upheld on appeal, and could not be addressed through the proposed appeal in the context of a support enforcement proceeding.

The appellant appealed his five-year penitentiary sentence for offences including break and enter, criminal harassment, and firearms violations committed against his former spouse.

The trial judge treated the conduct as an escalating pattern of intimate partner violence and prioritized denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, holding that the trial judge properly characterized the offences as intimate partner violence and appropriately weighed the aggravating factors, including the appellant's extensive record of breaching court orders.

The sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and weapons offences following a stabbing at a bar.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application by improperly deducting pandemic-related delay, and in admitting a police officer's recognition evidence identifying him from video surveillance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's attribution of delay to the pandemic or in the application of the prior acquaintance test for the recognition evidence.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of procuring a person to provide sexual services and receiving a material benefit from sexual services.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the essential elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the jury was not properly instructed that exercising control, direction, or influence over a person's movements generally requires proof of more than an isolated act and involves an assessment of the power dynamic in the relationship.

The misdirection on the procuring counts also undermined the material benefit convictions.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeals, and ordered new trials.

Following a successful appeal in which the appellants had the summary judgment motion dismissed (2026 ONCA 121), the court addressed costs of the motion below.

The appellants sought substantial indemnity costs of $96,158.17 based on two pre-hearing offers to settle, or alternatively partial indemnity costs of $66,575.44.

The court found neither offer met the criteria under rule 49.10(1) because both expired before the motion hearing, and declined substantial indemnity costs on a discretionary basis.

The court reduced the fees to $40,000 plus HST on a partial indemnity basis, finding the associates' hours excessive and factoring in the appellants' failure to raise the partial summary judgment issue at scheduling.

Costs of $51,600 inclusive of disbursements and HST were awarded with post-judgment interest from the date of the motion decision.

The appellants sought to place a political advertisement on City-owned transit shelters defining a woman as an 'adult female'.

The City rejected the advertisement, concluding it posed a tangible risk to its statutory objective of providing a safe and welcoming transit system, particularly for transgender individuals.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellants' application for judicial review.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding that the City's process was procedurally fair and its decision was reasonable under the Doré/Loyola framework, as it appropriately balanced the appellants' freedom of expression with the City's statutory objectives.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearms offences after police discovered a loaded handgun during a warrantless search of a rental car under s. 12(3) of the Cannabis Control Act, 2017.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached when officers failed to advise him of his rights before conducting the CCA search, consistent with the court's intervening decision in R. v. McGowan-Morris, 2025 ONCA 349.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the vehicle search did not breach s. 8 but allowed the appeal on the s. 10(b) ground, setting aside convictions and ordering a new trial where the admissibility of the appellant's flight evidence and his racial profiling claim could be properly assessed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility.

Specifically, the appellant contended the trial judge impermissibly relied on the complainant's religious beliefs to reject the defence theory that she had a motive to fabricate the allegations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that evidence of religious motives was admissible to explain the timing of disclosure and rebut the fabrication theory.

The court found no error in the trial judge's treatment of demeanour evidence or his assessment of investigative gaps.