Lene Madsen

In a criminal appeal involving fraud convictions, the moving party sought additional non-privileged disclosure to support proposed fresh-evidence abuse-of-process claims.

Applying prior case-management directions and existing disclosure rulings, the court found no basis for further compelled production on the issues properly before it and dismissed the motion.

The appeal challenged the validity of a guilty plea to assault causing bodily harm.

Both parties acknowledged the plea did not reflect their agreement and resulted from mutual misapprehension.

The court allowed the appeal, substituted a conviction for common assault, and left sentence intact.

The appellant challenged multiple convictions as unreasonable, legally flawed, and affected by ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court found the evidentiary record supported the trial findings, identified no legal error, and held no miscarriage of justice was shown.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant condominium owner appealed a summary judgment ordering it to pay $495,888.39 in common expense arrears and granting vacant possession to the respondent condominium corporation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's use of enhanced fact-finding powers to resolve credibility issues and reject the appellant's claim of having paid in cash.

The Court also declined to entertain a new limitations defence raised for the first time on appeal.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the motion judge erred by using the oppression remedy to expand the respondent's registered condominium lien to cover unsecured arrears, as doing so could prejudice third-party creditors.

The self-represented appellant mother sought leave to appeal a costs order made following a lengthy family law trial in which the respondent father was largely successful.

The trial judge had awarded the father net costs of $20,000 after setting off support arrears, noting the father's reasonable offers to settle and the mother's bad faith conduct.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the costs award was not plainly wrong.

Leave to appeal the costs order was denied.

An appeal from a trial judge's order setting aside a separation agreement under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act and section 15.2 of the Divorce Act.

The trial judge had set aside the agreement in its entirety and recalculated spousal support.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge erred in setting aside the entire agreement under section 56(4), the spousal support terms did not comply with the objectives of the Divorce Act under the Miglin analysis.

The court allowed the appeal in part, maintaining the separation agreement but modifying the spousal support provisions to remove the cohabitation clause and make support indefinite, while preserving the original quantum of $28,800 annually.

This is a costs decision following a successful appeal by the mother in a family law matter involving the Hague Convention and refugee status.

The mother's appeal overturned the application judge's decision to return the child to the country of origin after Canada granted the child refugee status.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the mother as the wholly successful party, fixing costs at $50,000 for the application and $30,000 for the appeal, totalling $80,000, while reversing the application judge's award of $75,000 to the father.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference against his stepdaughter, contrary to sections 271 and 151(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's lack of embellishment as a credibility factor, contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reference to the complainant being a careful and cautious witness was a proper credibility assessment, and that the reasons, though brief, adequately explained the trial judge's findings when read in context and as a whole.

The Crown appealed from the respondent's acquittal on a charge of sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient under the legal standards established in R. v. R.E.M. and R. v. Sheppard.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's reasons, while brief and delivered orally, were sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

The trial judge clearly explained that she was left with a reasonable doubt because, faced with conflicting versions of events from the complainant and the respondent's text messages, she could not determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court emphasized that in credibility-based trials, a reasonable doubt can arise when the trial judge is unable to resolve conflicting evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for production of methamphetamine, possession for the purpose of trafficking of methamphetamine, and possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the pre-trial application judge erred in finding that the Crown had justified a no-knock entry to the appellant's home during the execution of a search warrant, and whether this constituted a violation of s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings, concluding that the no-knock entry was justified based on reasonable police concerns for safety, including the simultaneous execution of multiple search warrants, potential presence of weapons, the volatile nature of methamphetamine laboratories, and evidence preservation concerns.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a judgment awarding over one million dollars in damages to the respondents for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge discharged the jury after finding that defence counsel breached the rule in Browne v. Dunn by failing to cross-examine the plaintiff on a significant piece of evidence regarding fluid leaking from his ear, which was later introduced through expert witnesses.

The trial judge found the breach irreparably tainted the jury and proceeded with a bench trial, ultimately accepting the plaintiff's evidence and rejecting the defendant's malingering theory.

The Court of Appeal upheld all aspects of the trial judge's decision, including the finding of a Browne v. Dunn breach, the discharge of the jury, the qualification of a treating physician as an expert witness, and the damages award.

Appeal from a trial decision addressing all issues arising from the separation of the parties, including parenting arrangements, imputation of income, child support (including section 7 expenses and retroactivity), spousal support, the validity of a marriage contract, and equalization.

The appellant father challenged nearly every aspect of the trial judgment, alleging 42 errors.

The appellate court upheld the trial judge's findings on parenting arrangements, income imputation, section 7 expenses, spousal support, and the validity of the marriage contract, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The motion for fresh evidence was dismissed, as was the appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

This is the third appeal brought by the respondent in a family law proceeding concerning equalization payments and the sale of the matrimonial home.

The appellant sought to appeal an order of eviction from the matrimonial home and a power of sale granted by the trial judge due to the appellant's intransigence in the sale process.

The appellant also appealed a costs award of $36,000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the eviction and power of sale order as an abuse of process, noting it was an attempt to circumvent two previous appeals that had been dismissed for delay.

The appeal was also found to be moot as the matrimonial home had already been sold.

The costs appeal was dismissed as the trial judge committed no reviewable error in awarding substantial indemnity costs based on the appellant's unreasonable conduct.

An appeal concerning the correct appellate jurisdiction and the discretionary transfer of an appeal.

The parties had a divorce order made in Texas that included parenting terms.

The Ontario Court of Justice found jurisdiction to address parenting issues.

The mother appealed to the Superior Court of Justice, which dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, finding that the appeal properly lay to the Court of Appeal for Ontario under section 73(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The mother requested a transfer to the Court of Appeal late in oral submissions, which the Superior Court judge declined.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Superior Court judge's characterization of the order and her discretionary decision not to transfer.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing its application for a declaration of rights respecting an easement held by the respondent over a portion of the appellant's lands.

The appellant argued that the application judge made a palpable and overriding error regarding the extent of the easement, claiming it extended from the shoreline into the channel.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The respondent mother sought to stay the Court of Appeal's order requiring the return of a five-year-old child to the United Kingdom pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, pending her application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The father had successfully appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed his application for the child's return, on the basis that the father had consented to or acquiesced in the child's retention in Canada.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in conflating consent to relocation with consent to retention.

The motion judge dismissed the mother's stay motion, finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the child's return to the jurisdiction of habitual residence.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing a motion.

The respondent CIBC conceded that the appellant was not provided with the opportunity to make submissions in response to CIBC's Rule 2.1.01 motion.

The Court of Appeal granted the appeal, set aside the order, and remitted the motion to the Superior Court to be heard by another judge.

The Court made no determination as to the merits of the other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant, allowing the appellant to renew those arguments before the judge hearing the motion.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, two counts of assault, and threatening death committed against his 12-13 year-old step-daughter, as well as his indeterminate sentence as a designated dangerous offender.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant and argued the trial judge erred in principle by misapprehending expert evidence regarding age-related attenuation of violence and reoffending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning or application of the law.

A wrongfully retained child was ordered returned to her country of origin after Canada granted her refugee status.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in failing to apply the rebuttable presumption against the return of a refugee child and in dismissing the child's objection to return.

The court held that when a child has been recognized as a Convention refugee by the Immigration and Refugee Board, a rebuttable presumption arises that there is a risk of persecution on return.

The application judge improperly questioned the refugee determination process and reweighed evidence without oral testimony or cross-examination.

Additionally, the child's clear and repeated objection to return, based on fear of violence by the father, was not given proper weight.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for determination of parenting and decision-making authority under section 23 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition maintaining a detention order for a not criminally responsible accused.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2016 for threats and assault involving an airsoft rifle, had been conditionally discharged in 2020 but returned to detention in 2023.

The Board maintained the detention order based on the appellant's chronic cannabis addiction and the treating psychiatrist's opinion that continued use would create a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable and that it failed to meaningfully consider less restrictive dispositions.

The court ordered a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.