Second degree murder

The applicant sought severance from her co-accused on the basis that a joint trial would result in significant prejudice and an unfair trial.

The applicant faces a charge of first degree murder while her co-accused faces second degree murder, despite the Crown alleging the same conduct of planning and deliberation against both.

The applicant argued that the differential charges would improperly lead the jury to conclude she is more culpable.

The Crown opposed severance, arguing that any prejudice would be eliminated through proper jury instructions.

The court dismissed the severance application, finding that the presumption of joint trial applies with particular force where co-accused are blaming each other, that the evidence is the same against both, and that jury instructions would adequately protect against any risk of prejudicial reasoning.

Appeal from a conviction for second-degree murder.

The appellant admitted to being the shooter and guilty of manslaughter but contended that his intoxicated state and the suddenness of events should have created reasonable doubt as to whether he possessed the requisite mens rea for murder.

The trial judge provided a rolled-up instruction to the jury on the cumulative effect of evidence regarding intoxication on the mental element for murder.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately describe evidence of his intoxication from a bartender and evidence of a brewing altercation inside the bar.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach and upheld the conviction, applying the curative proviso based on the overwhelming Crown case.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his former girlfriend and the 18-year parole ineligibility period imposed at his second trial.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on hearsay regarding statements by the appellant's deceased mother and that the trial judge erred in imposing the 18-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and determining that the 18-year period was a fit sentence given the horrific nature of the crime, the appellant's high moral culpability, and the absence of remorse.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness of a statement given by the accused, who was charged with second-degree murder.

The accused was arrested on December 23, 2022, and gave a statement to police approximately 10 hours later.

The defence challenged the voluntariness of the statement, arguing that oppressive circumstances, including fentanyl withdrawal symptoms, lack of proper caution, and police trickery, rendered the statement involuntary.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary and admissible in evidence.

The offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder of his former domestic partner.

The victim was killed in her home in a brutal attack involving multiple stab wounds and near-decapitation.

The offender had a documented history of violence and threats toward the victim, breached court-ordered no-contact conditions, and committed the murder while the victim's young child was present in the home.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility of 18 years, reduced from 20 years due to Charter violations arising from the offender's mistreatment during an Institutional Crisis Intervention Team deployment at Maplehurst Correctional Centre.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon following a fatal stabbing at a gathering.

The appellant claimed self-defence, asserting he acted to protect himself and a vulnerable woman from an angry group.

The trial judge instructed the jury to assess the reasonableness of the appellant's response separately for each victim, fragmenting the evidence into isolated incidents.

The jury also asked whether a group could constitute "force" under the self-defence analysis, and the trial judge's response suggested that a group alone could not constitute force without specific action.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions inadequately equipped the jury to evaluate the appellant's self-defence claim by failing to address the group dynamic as a unified threat and by artificially compartmentalizing the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder in the death of his girlfriend.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant killed her in a dispute about his drug abuse and theft of money to acquire drugs.

The appellant claimed he witnessed a drug dealer kill the victim.

The appeal addressed three grounds: (1) admissibility of a police statement taken in hospital; (2) jury direction regarding prior inconsistent statements as evidence of consciousness of guilt; and (3) rulings on third-party suspect evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The accused, Shou Chen, was convicted of second-degree murder.

This decision concerns the sentencing, specifically the parole ineligibility period.

The court considered the character of the offender, the nature of the offence, and jury recommendations, as required by the Criminal Code.

Despite the Crown seeking a 12-year parole ineligibility period, the court found a compelling causal link between the accused's late-onset schizophrenia and the offence.

This mental disorder, combined with the accused's lack of prior record and the jury's recommendation for the minimum, led the court to impose the mandatory minimum 10-year parole ineligibility period.

Ancillary orders for a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA databank submission were also made.

In a second-degree murder trial, the Crown applied to admit three graphic autopsy photographs of the deceased.

The defence opposed, citing prejudicial effect and proposing alternatives such as limiting the number of photographs or presenting them in black and white.

The court applied the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect, finding the photographs highly relevant to central issues including intent, self-defence, and a potential third-party suspect theory.

The court emphasized that modern juries are capable of dispassionate evaluation and concluded that the significant probative value of the photographs strongly outweighed any potential prejudicial effect.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to limit the photographs, as doing so would undermine their evidentiary purpose.

The Crown's application was granted, allowing the introduction of all three full-colour autopsy photographs.

The accused, Abdirizaq Yabarow, was charged with second-degree murder.

The Crown brought an application to determine the voluntariness and admissibility of two statements made by the accused.

The first statement was made to paramedics and police on October 4, 2017, when the accused was perceived as a victim seeking help for injuries.

The second statement was made to homicide detectives on October 6, 2017, following his arrest for murder.

The court found that the paramedics were not persons in authority and that the first statement was voluntary and admissible.

Regarding the second statement, the court determined it was voluntary and admissible up to the point where the accused expressed confusion and requested a rest, but any statements made thereafter were inadmissible as police questioning should have ceased at that juncture.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to exclude the voluntary portions of either statement.

T.F.D., a young person, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.

The Crown applied for an adult sentence under s. 64(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), arguing that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted and a youth sentence would be insufficient for accountability.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that T.F.D.'s actions, though horrendous, were those of an impulsive, immature, and troubled adolescent whose judgment was further impaired by substance use, thus the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was not rebutted.

The court determined that the maximum youth sentence of 7 years, including 4 years of intensive rehabilitative custody and 3 years of conditional supervision under an Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) Order, was appropriate and sufficient for accountability and public protection through rehabilitation, especially given T.F.D.'s acceptance into the IRCS Program.

Simeon Harty was found guilty by a jury of second-degree murder and discharging a firearm with intent.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, the offender's criminal record, and being on judicial interim release in violation of conditions.

Mitigating factors included his youth, pro-social behavior, community contributions, positive conduct in detention, and rehabilitation prospects.

The jury recommended 10 years parole ineligibility.

The court, comparing the case to R. v. Grant, imposed a life sentence with 14 years of parole ineligibility for murder and a concurrent 10-year sentence (7 years 7 months after pre-sentence custody credit) for discharging a firearm with intent.

Ancillary orders for DNA, weapons prohibition, and no-contact were also made.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, sought to exclude a videotaped statement made to police, alleging a breach of her s. 10(b) Charter right to consult counsel without delay.

The court found a minor s. 10(b) breach due to a police officer's general practice of not facilitating counsel contact at the hospital.

However, the court determined that the subsequent statement was not obtained as a consequence of the breach, as there was a "fresh start" after the applicant consulted duty counsel, and the applicant would have spoken to the police regardless.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that the breach was minor, had no impact on the applicant's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in a trial on the merits favored inclusion.

The statement was ruled admissible.

This decision addresses two applications within a second-degree murder trial.

First, the defence sought an order compelling the Crown to call a witness, Malique Kamara, whose statements were inconsistent and whose latest account radically contradicted previous versions.

The court dismissed this application, affirming the Crown's prosecutorial discretion and the absence of a duty to call a witness it deems unreliable, even if previously indicated.

Second, the defence applied to have the partial defence of provocation left to the jury.

The court granted this application, finding that there was an "air of reality" to the subjective elements of suddenness and loss of control, and a "real doubt" regarding whether an ordinary person subjected to the assault would form the intention to commit murder and act upon it, thus warranting the defence to be considered by the jury.

The accused, Reshane Hayles-Wilson, was convicted of second-degree murder after a jury trial.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility, which is mandatory life imprisonment with a discretion between 10 and 25 years.

Considering aggravating factors such as the planned nature of the murder, the use of a loaded handgun in a public place, the danger to the public, and the accused's association with a criminal gang, alongside mitigating factors like his young age, lack of prior criminal record, family support, and remorse, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 15 years.

Wesley Guzylak pleaded guilty to second-degree murder for the stabbing death of his romantic partner, Cotie Weekley, after she ended their relationship.

The murder occurred after Guzylak broke into Weekley's home and waited for her, then stabbed her multiple times in front of her seven-year-old daughter.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 14 years and 9 months, which the court accepted.

The court considered aggravating factors including planning, breach of trust, the horrific nature of the attack, the offender's violent history, and the profound trauma inflicted on the victim's daughter.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, which spared the child from testifying, and the offender's difficult childhood and efforts towards rehabilitation.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a period of parole ineligibility of 17 years.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no prejudicial error in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the fault element in murder, ante-mortem statements of the deceased, or the overall balance of the charge.

The court also dismissed the appeal from sentence, finding the 17-year period of parole ineligibility to be proportionate given the serious breach of trust involved in the killing of the appellant's benefactor.

The Crown sought committal on first-degree murder under section 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code based on constructive murder arising from unlawful confinement.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder in the stabbing death of the victim.

The Crown argued that the victim was unlawfully confined in his bedroom following the stabbing in the living room, and that the confinement and murder formed part of the same transaction.

The defence argued that the confinement occurred after the victim was stabbed and that the victim managed to escape the apartment.

The court found insufficient evidence that the accused exploited a position of dominance over the victim through confinement to justify committal on first-degree murder.

The accused was committed to stand trial on second-degree murder only.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for shooting the victim through the heart in a bus shelter in broad daylight.

The appellant claimed self-defence under former s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, asserting that the victim had unlawfully assaulted him.

The jury rejected this claim and found him guilty.

The trial judge imposed a parole ineligibility period of 14 years.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds regarding the jury instructions on self-defence and challenged the parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal from conviction and the appeal from sentence, finding no error in principle or misdirection by the trial judge.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish sufficient evidence to commit two accused to stand trial for second degree murder in the death of Trey Theriault, who sustained eight stab wounds during an altercation.

The accused admitted presence and participation in a physical fight but argued insufficient evidence of intent to kill.

The court applied the Sheppard/Arcuri test for committal, examining whether a reasonable jury could infer guilt from the evidence.

The court found sufficient evidence on all essential elements of second degree murder: causation (stab wounds to vital organs), unlawful act (armed assault without justification), and intent (inferred from the nature and number of wounds).

Both accused were committed to stand trial.