Court of Appeal for Ontario
Date: September 11, 2025
Docket: C69508
Judges: Roberts, Miller and Rahman JJ.A.
Parties
Between
His Majesty the King Respondent
and
Chunqi Jiang Appellant
Counsel
Paul J.I. Alexander, for the appellant
Lisa Joyal and Amy Rose, for the respondent
Hearing
Heard: June 13, 2025
Background
On appeal from the conviction entered on July 15, 2019 by Justice Leonard Ricchetti of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury, and the sentence imposed on August 22, 2019, with reasons for decision on parole eligibility reported at 2019 ONSC 4944.
Decision
L.B. Roberts J.A.:
Introduction
[1] On July 15, 2019, following a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of second degree murder in relation to the death of his former girlfriend, Guang Hua Liu. On August 22, 2019, following his conviction, he was sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 18 years.
[2] This was the appellant's second trial. At his first trial, he was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with an 18-year period of parole ineligibility. He appealed both conviction and sentence. This court overturned his first conviction for second degree murder and ordered a new trial, not reaching his sentence appeal.
[3] The appellant appeals his conviction and the 18-year period of parole ineligibility of his sentence imposed at his second trial. He submits that the trial judge made several reversible errors in his instructions to the jury and in setting the period of parole ineligibility at 18 years.
[4] For the reasons that follow, I am not persuaded that there is any basis to intervene. I would dismiss the appellant's appeal from his conviction and sentence.
Factual Background
[5] From 2008 when they met until the time of her death in 2012, Ms. Liu and the appellant were involved in an on-again off-again intimate relationship. They lived together at Ms. Liu's residence between 2008 and 2011. The appellant moved out in 2011 when his mother, Fen Gen Zhang, arrived from China, and he began to live with his mother. Ms. Zhang did not approve of her son's relationship with Ms. Liu. She had accused Ms. Liu of stealing her jewelry, even reporting her to the police, although the police declined to lay charges.
[6] In April 2012, Ms. Liu started a romantic relationship with one of her massage salon clients (her "partner") who assisted her in setting up her own spa business. She moved in with him in June 2012. At the end of July, Ms. Liu broke up with her partner and briefly reunited with the appellant. The appellant told her to choose between him and her partner. When she cancelled dinner plans with the appellant on August 7, he secretly drove by Ms. Liu's home, suspecting that she had reconciled with her partner, and saw that her partner's car was in her driveway. Ms. Liu and her partner reconciled when he stayed with her between August 7 and 9. On August 10, she told her close girlfriend that she had decided to resume her relationship with her partner. Later, on August 10, Ms. Liu attended at the appellant's house.
[7] Ms. Liu's last text message was to her partner at around 6:16 p.m.; she did not respond to his further text messages sent up to 11:24 p.m. that day. Nor did she answer her close girlfriend's telephone calls made after 11:00 p.m. In response to her inquiries about Ms. Liu's whereabouts, the appellant lied to Ms. Liu's close girlfriend, saying that he had not seen Ms. Liu after he had dropped her off at her spa that afternoon, and did not know where she was. The appellant told police and testified at his trial that Ms. Liu's family - including her son - and friends repeatedly called him for information after her disappearance but that he did not tell them much or ignored their calls completely.
[8] Sometime after her arrival at the appellant's house on August 10, Ms. Liu was cornered in the basement of the appellant's home, killed and her body dismembered. Some of her remains were subsequently discovered in the West Highland Creek, near the vicinity where the appellant and Ms. Liu had resided, and the Credit River, where they had visited during their relationship. Forensic examination of Ms. Liu's recovered remains showed that she had suffered in excess of 31 stab wounds to her head caused by a broad knife like a cleaver or a hatchet. She also had 18 defensive wounds from this object. The murder weapon was never recovered. A cover for a hatchet that the appellant admitted purchasing in July 2012 was recovered from one of the gas station garbage bins where, after the killing, the appellant was captured on surveillance video disposing of various items.
[9] The appellant gave three police statements on August 15, 17 and 26, 2012. He lied to the police: he said he sustained the wound to his forehead while he was renovating his basement, when a piece of wood with a metal plate and nail attached fell and hit him; he said he had last seen Ms. Liu when he dropped her off at her spa at around 6:30 p.m. on the night she died; he cast suspicion on Ms. Liu's partner, telling the police that she had taken a large sum of money from a man whom she was meeting on the night of August 10; and he told the police that he and Ms. Liu wanted to be together. On August 26, 2012, the police arrested and charged the appellant with Ms. Liu's murder.
[10] The identity of the person who killed Ms. Liu was the only issue at trial. Only the appellant and his mother were present in the home when Ms. Liu was killed. At trial, the appellant testified. He admitted being present when Ms. Liu was killed on August 10. He also admitted sustaining a wound to his forehead. He admitted to assisting in the disposal of Ms. Liu's body and belongings and the clean up and remediation of his home to cover up the killing. He admitted lying to Ms. Liu's close girlfriend and the police. He testified to disposing some of Ms. Liu's remains in the West Highland Creek and the Credit River. His admitted actions of discarding some of Ms. Liu's belongings and other items, including the hatchet cover, were also caught on gas station surveillance video cameras.
[11] The appellant maintained in his testimony, however, that his mother, who died of atherosclerotic coronary artery disease on September 9, 2012, killed Ms. Liu with a cleaver during an angry confrontation when she saw Ms. Liu at their house on August 10. He testified that he sustained a wound to his forehead noted later by police when he tried to separate his mother and Ms. Liu. He said that his mother dismembered Ms. Liu's body, cleaned the area where she had been killed, and directed the appellant to dispose of Ms. Liu's remains and belongings. He deleted incriminating photos from his cellphone. He explained his lies to Ms. Liu's friends and family and the police as efforts to deflect suspicion away from his mother.
Issues
[12] The appellant submits that the trial judge committed the following reversible errors:
i. The trial judge erred by giving a hearsay caution to the jury on two key pieces of defence evidence – ante mortem oral and written statements by the appellant's mother – that were non-hearsay evidence.
ii. The trial judge erred by reimposing the 18-year period of parole ineligibility that the appellant had received following his first conviction.
Analysis
(1) Did the trial judge err in his jury instructions concerning Ms. Zhang's ante mortem oral and written statements?
[13] The appellant submits that the trial judge's hearsay instructions regarding Ms. Zhang's oral and written ante mortem statements were erroneous because the statements were not hearsay but constituted circumstantial evidence of Ms. Zhang's animus towards and motive for killing Ms. Liu. According to the appellant, the trial judge also reversed the burden of proof by instructing the jury that they could use the statements if they found as a fact that the statements were reliably reported. As a result, the appellant argues, the jury was effectively instructed to disregard Ms. Zhang's statements that informed the essential plank of the defence that it was Ms. Zhang and not the appellant who killed Ms. Liu.
[14] I do not accept the appellant's submissions.
[15] I start with the governing principles guiding appellate review of the trial judge's jury instructions. It is well-established that we must apply a functional approach, viewing the charge in its entirety and not divorced from the trial, keeping in mind that the right of an accused to a properly instructed jury does not equate with the right to a perfectly instructed jury: R. v. Jacquard, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 314, at paras. 32-33. The function of jury instructions is to equip the jury with the tools it needs as decision-maker to make an informed decision on the evidence adduced at trial: Jacquard, at para. 32; R. v. Alvarez, 2021 ONCA 851, 159 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 81. Absent reversible error, the trial judge's instructions are entitled to deference on appellate review: R. v. Zebedee, 81 O.R. (3d) 583, at para. 109.
[16] Ms. Zhang's ante mortem statements in question were as follows:
i. The appellant testified that his mother: a) said to him that Ms. Liu had stolen her jewelry; and b) was angry and spoke to Ms. Liu about her missing jewelry on the evening of August 10, 2012.
ii. The appellant identified the handwritten note, discovered by the police on August 26, 2012, in his main floor living room, as being in his mother's handwriting. He testified that he did not know when the note was written but that he had discussed it with his mother. The note indicated where Ms. Zhang had resided in Canada and indicated (in translation), among other things: "During this time there was a theft in my home, the person who committed the theft, Liu A. Hua, lives at [noting Ms. Liu's Scarborough address]"; this passage was followed by a list of jewelry, the date of discovery of the theft as May 27, ending with the statement, "…and found that everything have [sic] been stolen by Liu A. Hua (she is the only person who came to my house)." The note was not signed but bore the typewritten name "Fen Gen Zhang" as its author. The appellant testified that he and his mother went to the police to report the theft but that the police declined to press charges. He could not recall when they went to the police.
[17] The appellant challenges the following passages from the trial judge's jury charge, specifically the underlined portions:
Do not use what you conclude [the appellant] has not reliably reported. You should be cautious when you determine how much or little you will rely on this evidence of what you find Fen Gen Zhang said or wrote to decide this case. It may be less reliable than other evidence which has been given. At the time of making the statements you find were made by Fen Gen Zhang, she was not under oath or affirmation. She did not promise to tell the truth. You did not see or hear her testify. She could not be cross-examined here like the witnesses who testified before you. If you find [the appellant] has reliably reported any or all of what Fen Gen Zhang said to him, you may use those parts of his testimony to help you decide the case, but only as evidence of Fen Gen Zhang's state of mind at the time of the statement, and as evidence of the relationship between her and Ms. Liu at the time of the statement. You may not use it for any other purpose. Anything you find Fen Gen Zhang said directly to [the appellant] may only be used by you in the manner and for the purpose I have instructed.
The information in the Note…is hearsay evidence. [the appellant's] mother is not here to give evidence. She cannot be cross-examined on whether she wrote the note…as [the appellant] has testified. She cannot tell us when she wrote the Note…and if she did, whether the contents of the Note…were true or a fabrication. [Emphasis added.]
[18] There was no unfairness here. At trial, the trial judge and counsel treated and discussed the ante mortem statements as giving rise to potential hearsay dangers, which were then addressed in the jury instructions that were approved by counsel. Whether those dangers were relevant to the statements and needed to be addressed in the charge was of no moment and caused no prejudice to the appellant. This is because the jury instructions correctly guided the jury as to the proper uses it could make of the ante mortem statements proffered by the appellant, including that they could leave the jury with a reasonable doubt.
[19] The trial judge's instructions that the appellant now impugns are in keeping with defence counsel's closing submissions on this issue. Defence closing submissions focussed specifically on Ms. Zhang's handwritten note as evidence of her state of mind and her animus towards the complainant. Those submissions were alive to and addressed the possibility that the jury might not find the handwritten note to be reliable.
[20] The jury instructions further represent the culmination of the pre-charge discussions with counsel. In particular, I note that experienced defence counsel carefully reviewed the draft charge during the pre-charge conference and did not object then or later to the trial judge's instructions on the ante mortem statements. [1] Applicable here is this court's comment in R. v. Taylor, 2015 ONCA 448, 325 C.C.C. (3d) 413, at para. 119, that: "While want of objection is not fatal, it tells heavily against the claim later advanced, for the first time, that the instructions resulted in unfairness."
[21] The appellant does not dispute that the trial judge properly instructed the jury of the specific bases on which the statements could be considered by them, namely, as evidence of Ms. Zhang's animus towards and motive to kill Ms. Liu. In my view, the trial judge also correctly instructed them on the preconditions to the jury relying on the statements and the appellant's observations concerning his mother's anger towards the complainant. As with any other evidence, the jury had to determine whether the statements were made and accurately recounted.
[22] As earlier indicated, the trial judge's instructions on these specific statements must be considered in light of the whole of his charge. I disagree with the appellant's contention that the trial judge effectively instructed the jury to disregard this evidence. On the contrary, the trial judge expressly instructed the jury on the defence theory of Ms. Zhang's animus towards and motive to kill Ms. Liu. Importantly, he instructed the jury that they were entitled to consider whether any evidence that they rejected nevertheless left them with a reasonable doubt as to the appellant's guilt.
[23] There is no basis to intervene.
(2) Did the trial judge err by imposing an 18-year period of parole ineligibility?
[24] The appellant submits that the trial judge erred in his approach to parole ineligibility because he considered himself bound to reimpose the 18-year period of parole ineligibility from the first trial unless the appellant satisfied him that it was wrong. The appellant argues that these errors led the trial judge to impose a period of parole ineligibility that was outside the usual 15- to 17-year range set out in the governing jurisprudence.
[25] I am not persuaded that the trial judge erred in fixing 18 years as the period of parole ineligibility.
[26] First, I do not read the trial judge's reasons as demonstrating that he felt bound to reimpose the period of parole ineligibility from the first trial. Rather, when his reasons are read generously and functionally, as I am required to do, they demonstrate that the trial judge did not consider himself bound but correctly treated the 18-year period of parole ineligibility as an important precedent for his consideration, in keeping with the sentencing principle of parity.
[27] Specifically, the trial judge indicated that he should consider the fitness of the original sentence and, if that sentence was and remained a fit sentence, he "should give the prior sentence considerable weight as a factor (provided there are not new material facts or new material evidence before [the court] to warrant a reconsideration of the appropriateness of the prior sentence)". I underline the trial judge's use of the word "should", rather than "must", as it clearly indicates that he did not consider himself bound by the prior sentence.
[28] The trial judge's approach adverted to and followed the approach set out in the governing authorities. After a re-trial, the sentencing judge should take into account the fitness of the original sentence as an important consideration or precedent but is not bound to follow it: R. v. B.(L.), 35 O.R. (3d) 35, at p. 66; R. v. Harriott, 58 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 52, aff'd 2003 SCC 5, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 39; R. v. Precup, 2016 ONCA 669, at paras. 3-4; Fournier c. R., 2023 QCCA 611, at paras. 33-34, 36-38.
[29] The appellant highlights the trial judge's references to language in some of the above decisions that "the imposition of a sentence imposed after a re-trial should not be regarded as a matter entirely de novo": Harriott, at para. 52; Precup, at para. 3, citing to Harriott, at para. 52 (emphasis added). He argues that the reference to the statement that the sentencing hearing was not "entirely de novo" indicates that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the previous sentence and did not conduct a fresh sentencing hearing, as he was required to do.
[30] To understand the meaning of not "entirely de novo", it is important to look at the referenced statement in the context of the above cited cases and in B.(L.), on which both rely. Unlike the sentencing situation here where the appellant is seeking a lower period of parole eligibility, those three cases involved the Crown's request on the re-trial, following the accused's successful appeal, to increase the period of parole eligibility beyond that imposed at the first trial. Those cases did not involve a Crown appeal of the sentence or a situation, like here, where the accused was asking for a reduction of the sentence. This court in those decisions concluded that it would be unfair to the appellant, who sought to rely on the previous period of parole ineligibility, to be subject to a potentially higher period of ineligibility. It was therefore in response to those circumstances that this court stated that the sentencing on the retrial was not really de novo where nothing else had changed. Absent a Crown appeal and different circumstances, the Crown could not seek to retry the issue of the period of parole ineligibility.
[31] This distinction was highlighted by this court in R. v. Kitaitchik, 166 C.C.C. (3d) 14. In that case, the appellant submitted that on the re-trial, the trial judge erred by imposing a twelve-year parole ineligibility period when the appellant had received a ten-year period of parole ineligibility at the first trial. Relying on Harriott, the appellant submitted that as the evidence was no different on the second trial, the trial judge should have imposed the same sentence as was imposed at the first trial.
[32] In rejecting the appellant's submissions and dismissing the sentence appeal in Kitaitchik, this court distinguished the approach in Harriott, that a re-trial should not be regarded as a matter entirely de novo, at paras. 52-53, as follows:
The present appeal is different from R. v. Harriott, supra, in one important way. In R. v. Harriott, supra, the Crown did not appeal the sentence imposed at the first trial. The Crown did appeal the parole ineligibility period imposed on the appellant at his first trial. The merits of the Crown appeal were not reached because the court allowed the conviction appeal. The Crown has consistently taken the position that there should be some increase in the parole ineligibility period. At this trial, the Crown took the same position on sentence that it took at the first trial.
In these circumstances, the appellant cannot suggest that a higher sentence on his second trial could reasonably be seen as "punishment" for having successfully appealed his conviction. While the sentence imposed at the first trial remains a relevant consideration it carries less weight than in a case like R. v. Harriott, supra. [Emphasis added.]
[33] The Quebec Court of Appeal has recently confirmed the necessity for a new hearing in circumstances similar to the present case. In Fournier, the appellant was convicted again following a re-trial and received the same sentence as that imposed at the first trial. The appellant sought a lower sentence at his second sentencing. One of his grounds of appeal from his sentence was the same as urged here: the sentencing judge erred by considering himself bound to reimpose the same sentence imposed at his first trial.
[34] The court in Fournier agreed that it would have been an error if the sentencing judge on the re-trial had concluded that he had to impose the same sentence as the first sentencing judge: at paras. 33, 43. The court instructed at para. 37 that following a re-trial: « [L]e juge doit faire sa propre analyse et il n'est pas tenu de suivre la première décision dans tous les cas.»
[35] The court also confirmed the principle that the sentencing judge following a re-trial is free to determine the appropriate sentence, subject to the important exception where the sentencing court wishes to impose a more severe sentence. As in the decisions referenced from this court, the court in Fournier noted the limit on a sentencing judge's freedom to increase the sentence absent new facts or a determination that the original sentence was demonstrably unfit: at paras. 35, 37-41.
[36] Finally, the Quebec Court of Appeal highlighted, at para. 36, the function of the previous sentencing decision as an important precedent to be considered on sentencing following the re-trial:
Une première décision sur la peine demeure un précédent pertinent. Après tout, l'exercice de détermination de la peine fait intervenir un principe d'harmonisation et les parties tentent généralement de trouver des causes pertinentes en jurisprudence. Or, une première décision dans le même dossier est certainement pertinente et doit être considérée avec attention. D'autant plus si les faits qui la sous-tendent se sont toujours avérés au moment de prononcer la peine une seconde fois.
[37] Applying these governing principles to the present case, I cannot conclude that the trial judge failed to conduct his own analysis on sentencing or otherwise considered himself bound to reimpose the initial sentence. He made no error in treating the first sentence as an important precedent, particularly in light of the absence of any material new facts. Importantly, while he agreed with the fitness of the previous period of parole ineligibility, he reviewed but did not follow all the first sentencing judge's findings, for example, concerning the question of the appellant's rehabilitation prospects, but considered the issue afresh. He made his own findings and was entitled to agree with the sentencing judge's findings from the first trial that matched his own.
[38] The appellant argues further that even if he looked at the issue afresh, the trial judge's reasoning was permeated by two significant errors. First, he rejected that the appellant had good rehabilitative prospects, notwithstanding the finding made by the sentencing judge at the first trial that he had good prospects and treated it as a mitigating factor. Second, he listed in his aggravating factors the fact that the appellant had lied and blamed his mother for Ms. Liu's murder. Relying on R. v. Kozy, 74 O.R. (2d) 545, the appellant argues that it was an error in principle to use the manner in which the appellant conducted his defence as an aggravating factor on sentence.
[39] I am not persuaded by these submissions.
[40] As earlier indicated, the trial judge was not bound by the sentencing decision from the first trial. He was entitled to come to a different conclusion regarding the appellant's rehabilitative prospects. As he indicated, even if he were sentencing the appellant without regard to the first sentencing decision, he would have imposed an 18-year period of parole ineligibility.
[41] As for the trial judge's analysis of the offence, it would have been an error had he treated the manner of the appellant's defence as an aggravating factor on sentence. However, I do not interpret his reasons in that way. Rather, in his consideration of the appropriate period of parole ineligibility, the trial judge was assessing the relevant criteria under s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code in accordance with the general principles of sentencing: R. v. Shropshire, 1995 SCC 47, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227. These criteria include: "the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission" and the jury recommendation, if any.
[42] The appellant's complaint relates to the trial judge's treatment of the nature and circumstances of the offence. As part of his review of those factors, the trial judge highlighted, as one of ten points, that the appellant had blamed his mother, testifying that "his dead mother had murdered Ms. Liu, testimony completely rejected by the jury". I read this point as being one in a series of four points that the trial judge described as the appellant's various after the fact attempts to cover up and deflect from his responsibility for Ms. Liu's murder. These attempts included: the appellant's cover up of the murder scene; his misleading and lying to the police and Ms. Liu's family and friends; his efforts to frame Ms. Liu's partner, an innocent person, as the person who killed Ms. Liu; and finally, his endeavour to frame his mother as Ms. Liu's murderer. I see no error in the trial judge's treatment of these facts.
[43] The trial judge's consideration of the appellant's efforts to cover up and blame others, including his evidence at trial that was consistent with his position throughout, was appropriate. He did not commit the sentencing judge's error in R. v. Kozy by increasing the sentence because of the appellant's perjury at trial or the manner of his defence. Rather, as he was entitled to do, he considered the nature and circumstances of the offence with the view of assessing whether there was any "explanation for [the appellant's] actions or reason[s] which might mitigate why and what occurred on August 10, 2012" and warrant a reduction in the period of parole ineligibility from the 18-year period that the trial judge had found was fit in the circumstances of this case.
[44] In any event, the 18-year period of parole ineligibility was a fit sentence in the circumstances of this case.
[45] I note first that the 18-year period was below the periods recommended by the majority of jurors who responded to the trial judge's inquiry as to whether they wished to make any recommendation with respect to the number of years that the appellant had to serve before he was eligible for release on parole: 3 jurors made no recommendation; 2 jurors recommended 20 years before eligibility; and 6 jurors recommended 25 years before eligibility.
[46] I reject the argument that 18 years was out of the usual "range" for this kind of offence. Although some of the decisions, such as R. v. French, 2017 ONCA 460, at para. 31, generally reference a "range" up to 17 years of parole ineligibility for the murder of a domestic partner where there are no mitigating factors or remorse, that reference to a range does not purport to carve out an upper limit and does not serve to limit a sentencing judge's discretion to impose a period of parole ineligibility up to the statutory maximum of 25 years.
[47] I say this for several reasons.
[48] First, as the Supreme Court has clearly instructed, sentencing ranges are meant to provide guidance to sentencing judges but are not straightjackets or hard and fast rules and departure from or failure to refer to a range of sentence is not an error in principle: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at paras. 57, 60; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at paras. 36-37.
[49] Further, as the trial judge here noted, there is a very broad range for parole ineligibility in domestic murders. This sliding scale reflects the general fact that "within second degree murder there is both a range of seriousness and varying degrees of moral culpability": Shropshire, at para. 31; R. v. Wesley Guzylak, 2018 ONSC 4705, at pp. 1-2. Appellate courts have upheld or imposed parole ineligibility periods beyond 17 years in domestic murder cases: see, for example, R. v. Hindessa, 2011 ONCA 477 (18 years); R. v. Sarao, 80 O.A.C. 236 (22 years following a guilty plea); R. v. Johnson, 2004 NSCA 91, 188 C.C.C. (3d) 214 (21 years); R. v. Purdy, 2012 BCCA 272, 291 C.C.C. (3d) 309 (19 years); R. v. Ching, 2022 ONCA 183 (21 years); R. v. Emmanuel Owusu-Ansah, 2024 ONCA 192, 170 O.R. (3d) 673 (22 years).
[50] As the above sampling of decisions demonstrates, the imposition of a period of parole ineligibility beyond 17 years for domestic murders is not new. It reflects societal repugnance for these crimes against intimate partners. As Speyer J. recently and rightly observed in R. v. Nicholas Baig, 2019 ONSC 2713, at para. 45, aff'd 2022 ONCA 692, "[d]enunciation and general deterrence are particularly important in setting the parole ineligibility period for an offender who murders a spouse or partner."
[51] Parliament and the Supreme Court have signalled that exemplary sentences are required. They are in keeping with Criminal Code provisions, such as s. 718.2(a)(ii) which establishes that intimate partner violence stands as an aggravating factor at sentencing. They also follow the instructions by appellate courts that sentences for domestic violence must shift upwards. As this court explained in R. v. Cunningham, 2023 ONCA 36, 166 O.R. (3d) 147, at para. 52:
Thus, the intention of Parliament clearly supports enhanced penalties for perpetrators of domestic violence and denunciation and deterrence as the primary sentencing objectives. It also supports changes in sentencing ranges to reflect societal awareness and knowledge of the damage to society, as well as victims, caused by domestic violence.
See also, for example: R. v. Wood, 2022 MBCA 46, at para. 49.
[52] This recommended upward shift is in keeping with the following instructions from Friesen, at para. 108:
Courts can and sometimes need to depart from prior precedents and sentencing ranges in order to impose a proportionate sentence. Sentencing ranges are not "straitjackets" but are instead "historical portraits" (Lacasse, at para. 57). Accordingly, as this Court recognized in Lacasse, sentences can and should depart from prior sentencing ranges when Parliament raises the maximum sentence for an offence and when society's understanding of the severity of the harm arising from that offence increases.
[53] With respect to the fitness of the 18-year period of parole ineligibility, this was a horrific murder of tremendous violence and cruelty. Ms. Liu's remains were subjected to unspeakable indignities. The appellant's moral culpability was very high – he killed Ms. Liu because she chose to leave their relationship and then attempted to cover up the murder, even trying to place blame on innocent persons. As Fuerst J. eloquently prefaced her sentencing reasons in Guzylak, at para. 1: "[T]his is yet another tragic case of an obsessive, angry and jealous man taking the life of his romantic partner, when she determined that the relationship was at an end." He showed no remorse, not even disclosing where all of Ms. Liu's remains could be located to provide closure to her partner, friends and family. The impact on them has been understandably devastating.
[54] Taken together, all these considerations justify the 18-year period of parole ineligibility imposed by the trial judge.
Disposition
[55] For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal from conviction and sentence.
Released: September 11, 2025
"L.B. Roberts J.A."
"I agree. B.W. Miller J.A."
"I agree. M. Rahman J.A."
Footnote
[1] The final charge in issue was similar to the mid-trial instruction given by the trial judge in the course of the appellant's testimony concerning the handwritten note. Defence counsel had no issue with the mid-trial instruction.