ONCA 2025

Five organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of provincial legislation that required the removal of bicycle lanes in Toronto.

The underlying judgment found the legislation violated section 7 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to all five proposed interveners, but limited the scope of their interventions to specific issues such as the positive/negative rights dichotomy, the interpretation of recent section 7 jurisprudence, and the application of equality and child-interest principles to the gross disproportionality analysis.

The interveners were restricted to 10-page factums and brief oral submissions.

The moving parties sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their appeal for delay.

The underlying appeal concerned a permanent injunction requiring them to clean up their property in compliance with a municipal property standards by-law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the delay was inadequately explained, the proposed appeal was frivolous and without merit, and the ongoing delay prejudiced the municipality and the public interest.

Ten groups brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning whether a municipal by-law prohibiting individuals from erecting tents or living in public parks violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to seven groups, finding they would provide unique and helpful perspectives on issues such as Charter damages, international human rights standards, and the social context of homelessness.

Leave was denied to three groups whose proposed submissions either expanded the scope of the appeal or duplicated arguments already raised by the parties.

The appellants sought a stay pending appeal from an order striking their statement of defence for non-compliance with documentary disclosure obligations and a prior peremptory order.

The motion judge held the proposed appeal was weak, found no irreparable harm, and concluded the balance of convenience and justice of the case favoured refusal of a stay.

The appellant, acting as estate trustee, transferred $400,000 to herself from her late stepfather's estate, claiming it was an inter vivos gift.

The respondent successfully challenged the transfer at first instance.

On appeal, the appellant argued the application judge erred by excluding the stepfather's investment advisor's notes as hearsay and by finding the gift was incomplete.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the exclusion of the notes as double hearsay under the Evidence Act and affirming the finding that the stepfather lacked a continuing intention to make the specific gift.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her application to remove a construction lien registered by the respondent for sewage backup remediation work.

Prior to the hearing, the Court of Appeal raised the issue of whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal or if it should have been brought to the Divisional Court under s. 71(1) of the Construction Act.

The parties agreed that the Divisional Court had jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that decisions made in reliance on the Construction Act, including orders discharging or refusing to discharge a lien, must be appealed to the Divisional Court.

The appeal was transferred accordingly.

The appellants challenged summary judgment enforcing a $2.1 million promissory note, arguing procedural unfairness, evidentiary error, and lack of consideration.

The court rejected all grounds and upheld enforceability against both appellants.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his detention in a Secure Forensic Unit and retaining an electronics supervision clause.

The appellant argued the disposition was not the least onerous and restrictive option and that the Board improperly rejected a joint submission to remove the electronics clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding the Board's decisions reasonable given the appellant's recent elopements and worsening auditory hallucinations.

However, the appeal was allowed in part to reinstate clauses for indirectly supervised and accompanied privileges, which the Board had mistakenly removed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside a 2014 consent dismissal and underlying settlement of a personal injury action.

The settlement was negotiated by their former lawyer, who misappropriated the funds and failed to obtain court approval under Rule 7.08 for the injured plaintiff, who was a party under disability.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding she correctly applied the Book factors.

The insurer had acted in good faith without knowledge of the disability, and the settlement itself was not unreasonable.

The court held that the lawyer's fraud did not impugn the reasonableness of the settlement from the perspective of the tort claim.

The moving parties sought a panel review of a motion judge's order requiring them to pay $19,365.37 in costs for their abandoned appeal.

They argued the motion judge erred by refusing an adjournment to cross-examine the respondent's affiant and by fixing an unreasonable amount.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result in the motion judge's discretionary decisions regarding cross-examination and costs.

The appellants, private practice oral surgeons, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application for judicial review of a hospital board's decision to cancel their operating room access and hospital privileges.

The board made the decision without a hearing, relying on s. 44 of the Public Hospitals Act, which allows a hospital to revoke privileges when ceasing to provide a service.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the board's interpretation of s. 44 was reasonable, that the termination of the specific operating room access constituted ceasing a 'service', and that the board was not required to hold a hearing or consider the appellants' affidavits.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a resident of a group home who had Down syndrome.

At trial, the Crown successfully applied to admit the complainant's hearsay statements to personal support workers without calling the complainant to testify, and without expert evidence that testifying would cause trauma.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in concluding the hearsay evidence was necessary without first hearing directly from the complainant or receiving expert evidence regarding potential trauma.

The court upheld vacating a certificate of pending litigation and findings that the mortgagee had taken vacant peaceable possession before sale.

It also dismissed the respondent’s motion to quash, holding the appeal was not manifestly abusive.

The court found the motion judge erred by treating oppression-based personal liability too narrowly and set aside dismissal of claims against the personal respondents.

It declined to grant summary judgment for the appellants due to pleading and evidentiary gaps.

The appellant challenged admission of drug evidence after a found s. 10(b) breach, arguing exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court found no reviewable error in the trial judge’s Grant analysis and dismissed the appeal.

After guilty pleas to two counts of possessing loaded prohibited firearms, the appellant sought sentence reduction and Downes credit.

The court granted leave but upheld the seven-year global sentence and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant challenged dangerous-driving-causing-death conviction and a four-year sentence.

The court rejected alleged legal and evidentiary errors, dismissing both appeals except to correct wording of the driving prohibition to six years backdated.

The mother appealed parenting-time and child-support rulings from a family change motion after prior child-abduction findings.

The court upheld supervised parenting and child-support determinations, with only a minor variation to one paragraph of the order.

The appellant sought leave to challenge a three-year sentence for breaching a long-term supervision order, arguing enhanced pre-sentence credit should have been granted.

Leave was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged dismissal of their action as an abuse of process.

The court agreed the claim repeated issues from prior mortgage litigation and also dismissed the fresh-evidence motion.