R. Clark

The applicant, Lenneil Shaw, sought to redact entries from a phone download report, arguing they constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked sufficient authentication to link certain phone calls to him.

The report associated a phone number with the contact name "Dozey," a nickname for Lenneil Shaw, and showed calls to a Crown witness's phone near the time of a homicide.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the report contained no implied assertion of who made the calls, but rather presented circumstantial facts relevant to linking the accused to the witness.

The court held that the evidence was admissible for the fact that calls were made, not their substance, and that it met the threshold for relevance, even if it admitted competing inferences.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application seeking a remedy for lost telecommunications records from Freedom Mobile Inc. The police failed to preserve these potentially exculpatory records due to unacceptable negligence, specifically an erroneous belief about Freedom Mobile's affiliation with Rogers and its data retention policy.

The court found a breach of the applicants' s. 7 Charter rights but determined that a stay of proceedings was not appropriate.

Instead, the court ordered a strong jury instruction (Bero instruction) as a sufficient remedy, acknowledging the high relevance of the lost evidence but its indeterminate utility.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion for a mistrial during their jury trial.

The application was based on two incidents: an altercation in the courthouse foyer where the deceased's mother verbally accosted the accused's mother in the jury's presence, and a prior CTV interview given by the deceased's mother.

The court dismissed the application, finding that neither incident created a "real danger of prejudice or a risk of a miscarriage of justice." The judge determined that the jury was intelligent and capable of impartiality, and that a strong judicial instruction would suffice to mitigate any potential impact.

Practical considerations regarding the difficulty and delay of selecting a new jury also factored into the decision.

The applicant, Shakiyl Shaw, on trial for first-degree murder, sought a directed verdict of acquittal on the murder charge at the close of the Crown's case, requesting the jury only deliberate on manslaughter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could infer that the applicant knew his co-accused were armed and intended to shoot someone, and that the murder was planned and deliberate, thereby making him liable as a secondary party to murder.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, sought to exclude a videotaped statement made to police, alleging a breach of her s. 10(b) Charter right to consult counsel without delay.

The court found a minor s. 10(b) breach due to a police officer's general practice of not facilitating counsel contact at the hospital.

However, the court determined that the subsequent statement was not obtained as a consequence of the breach, as there was a "fresh start" after the applicant consulted duty counsel, and the applicant would have spoken to the police regardless.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that the breach was minor, had no impact on the applicant's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in a trial on the merits favored inclusion.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The accused, a transgender woman charged with murder, sought to introduce expert sociological evidence regarding the prevalence of violence against transgender people to support her claim of self-defence.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence lacked logical relevance to the specific facts of the case, was unnecessary as the expected reactions to violence were not outside the normal experience of a jury, and carried a potential for prejudice that significantly outweighed its minimal probative value.

The applicants, Nicola Nero, Dean Wiwchar, and Martino Caputo, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of their right to a trial within a reasonable time.

This application followed their convictions for conspiracy to commit murder and first-degree murder.

The court analyzed the total delay, defence delay (considering it collectively for co-accused), and whether the delay was justified by exceptional circumstances (discrete events such as preliminary inquiry issues, counsel unavailability, interlocutory appeals, and extensive disclosure from multiple police forces) or case complexity.

The court found that after deducting periods attributable to defence delay, the net delay for each applicant was below the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

Furthermore, the court determined that the case's inherent complexity, the involvement of multiple defendants and prosecutions, voluminous disclosure from various police agencies, and an international aspect constituted exceptional circumstances justifying any delay beyond the ceiling.

The court also considered the case as transitional, noting the parties' reasonable reliance on the law as it existed prior to Jordan.

Consequently, the applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed, as no breach of the applicants' s. 11(b) rights was demonstrated.

The Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC) sought production of a file held by the respondent's former solicitor, Shahzad Siddiqui, contending that the respondent had waived solicitor-client privilege over all communications during the retainer.

The respondent resisted, arguing the waiver was limited to oral communications during a preliminary inquiry.

The court found that the explicit waiver referred only to oral communications and was limited in purpose.

The documents sought were deemed innocuous and would not mislead the court or opposing counsel.

The court dismissed the application for production, upholding the respondent's claim of solicitor-client privilege and ordering the sealed file to remain in court custody.

This pre-trial application addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on urban street gangs, evidence of prior violent incidents, and YouTube videos in a murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce this evidence to establish motive related to inter-gang rivalry.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and a cost/benefit analysis, ruling that expert evidence on general gang phenomena and specific incidents was admissible, but with limitations on ultimate issues and hearsay.

Initially, some videos were admitted, but this ruling was reversed after the accused made admissions regarding gang existence and membership, as the videos' probative value was then outweighed by their prejudice.

A subsequent application by the Crown to re-admit videos during cross-examination of an accused was also refused, upholding the principle against compelling an accused to put character in issue.

The Crown sought to admit expert testimony on urban street gang slang to interpret intercepted communications in a murder trial.

While the defence conceded the general admissibility criteria, the judge raised concerns about the expert opining on the precise meaning of communications, which could trench on the ultimate issue.

Despite conflicting authorities, the judge permitted the expert to interpret the communications directly, as all counsel uniformly preferred this approach over hypotheticals.

The applicant, Godday Dadzie, sought release via habeas corpus from immigration detention under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

He had been detained since 2014, primarily due to being a flight risk and issues with establishing his identity and country of origin, exacerbated by his lack of cooperation.

The court considered whether his detention was "very lengthy" and of "uncertain duration," factoring in the nature of the detention facility and the applicant's non-cooperation.

The court found that the applicant's detention was not exceptionally lengthy when accounting for his lack of cooperation, nor was its duration uncertain due to his own obstructionist tactics.

The application was dismissed, as the court concluded that the detention was for a valid immigration purpose, not arbitrary, and consistent with fundamental justice principles.

The applicant, Trevor Franklin, sought to restore his appeal of a simple assault conviction, which had been dismissed as abandoned due to his repeated non-attendance and failure to perfect the appeal.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court reviewed the applicant's history of non-compliance and the previous refusals to grant adjournments.

The court also considered the merits of the underlying appeal, finding the grounds unmeritorious.

The application to restore the appeal was dismissed, as the applicant failed to demonstrate the exceptional circumstances required and it was not in the interests of justice to reinstate the appeal.

The applicant, Marshall Kazman, a disbarred lawyer charged with multiple counts of fraud, possession of proceeds of crime, and committing an offence for the benefit of a criminal organization, sought a Rowbotham order for state-funded legal counsel.

The Crown resisted the application.

The court applied the three-part test for a Rowbotham order: (1) ineligibility for or refusal of legal aid, (2) indigence, and (3) material compromise of the right to a fair trial without counsel.

The court found that Kazman was responsible for Legal Aid Ontario's refusal due to non-cooperation, failed to convincingly demonstrate indigence by providing insufficient financial evidence and making conscious choices to prioritize other debts over legal fees, and was capable of self-representation despite the case's complexity and his health claims (heart attack, ADHD).

The application for a Rowbotham order was dismissed.

Following conviction after trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the offender was sentenced for arranging to purchase a large quantity of cocaine through an RCMP reverse sting operation.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the scale of the intended transaction, the offender’s criminal record, and evidence that he was armed and prepared to use violence to protect the drugs.

The court rejected arguments that delay between the offence and sentencing should substantially mitigate the sentence and declined to apply the totality principle based on earlier convictions arising from the same investigation.

Credit of 1.5:1 was applied for 511 days of pre-sentence custody.

A lengthy penitentiary term was imposed along with firearms prohibition, DNA order, and delayed parole eligibility.

Accused persons charged following a large police investigation sought disclosure of source materials underlying wiretap authorizations to support anticipated Garofoli and Dawson applications.

The defence argued that all investigative materials, including pre‑Part VI materials referenced or relied upon by the affiant, were presumptively relevant and disclosable under Stinchcombe principles.

The Attorney General of Ontario argued that disclosure should be limited to materials relevant to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence at trial unless the defence first demonstrated a reasonable possibility that additional materials would assist in challenging the authorization.

The court acknowledged conceptual difficulties with the Crown’s narrower approach but held that existing authorities required an accused to meet a minimal relevance threshold before obtaining additional disclosure beyond what was before the authorizing judge.

Applying principles of judicial comity and following prior decisions adopting that approach, the court dismissed the disclosure applications.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking arising from an RCMP reverse‑sting operation.

Before arraignment, the accused sought stays of proceedings alleging violations of s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to delay and s. 7 based on abuse of process, including allegations that police misled superiors in obtaining authorization and intentionally withheld disclosure.

The court conducted an extensive analysis of the delay from arrest in 1997 through retrial in 2014, finding that most delay was attributable to the accused, inherent time requirements, or periods when the accused was outside the jurisdiction.

The court rejected allegations that police misconduct or nondisclosure amounted to an abuse of process and concluded the reverse‑sting operation was properly authorized and executed.

Both Charter applications were dismissed and the accused was convicted.

The accused, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought applications to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiants of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a wiretap authorization, and a Garofoli application to exclude the intercepted communications.

The applicants argued that the ITO relied heavily on confidential informants and lacked sufficient detail to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

The court dismissed the application to cross-examine, finding no evidentiary basis to suggest it would elicit testimony discrediting the statutory preconditions.

The court also dismissed the Garofoli application, concluding that the redacted ITO and judicial summary provided sufficient evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the interceptions would afford evidence of the offences.

The accused was tried for multiple offences relating to the possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and Ketamine found in a vehicle he was driving.

The accused argued he had no knowledge of the contraband, and a passenger testified that the items belonged to him.

The court rejected the passenger's evidence as not credible and found that the accused, as the principal driver, had constructive possession of the items.

Alternatively, the court found the accused was wilfully blind to the presence of the firearm.

The accused was found guilty on all remaining counts.

In a pre-trial voir dire in a murder prosecution, the Crown sought to prove the voluntariness of an utterance allegedly made by the accused to police during a brief encounter in an apartment building.

The defence argued the statement should be excluded on the basis that it was not proven to have been made by the accused and that it was obtained during an arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the Charter, seeking exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court held that the statement was voluntary and that circumstantial evidence, including self-identification, physical description, and a distinctive tattoo, established on a balance of probabilities that the speaker was the accused.

Applying the framework from Grant, the court further concluded that the encounter did not constitute a detention, as it was brief, non-coercive, and part of general police patrol activity.

The accused’s application to exclude the statement was dismissed and the Crown’s application was granted.

The accused applied for an order requiring YouTube to remove approximately 75 videos associated with a street gang until the completion of a murder trial, arguing that jurors might view the material online despite judicial instructions and thereby jeopardize the fairness of the trial.

The court refused leave to bring the application due to failure to comply with the Criminal Proceedings Rules for the Superior Court of Justice, including the absence of proper notice and evidentiary foundation.

The court further held that the application had no reasonable prospect of success because it relied on an incorrect statutory provision, lacked evidence of a real and substantial risk to trial fairness, failed to consider alternative measures, and sought an order affecting third‑party Charter expression rights without notice.

The judge also raised concerns about territorial jurisdiction given that YouTube operated outside Canada.

Leave was denied and the application summarily dismissed.