Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which found she continued to pose a significant threat to public safety and could not be managed by a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusions were reasonable and supported by evidence, particularly given the appellant's ongoing major mental illness, medication non-compliance, and lack of insight.

The appellant appealed his conviction and a forfeiture order, arguing that errors and omissions in the Information to Obtain (ITO) for search warrants invalidated them.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the drafting errors were innocent mistakes.

Even assuming negligence, the Court held that the warrants could have issued based on the totality of the circumstances, including post-tip surveillance and prior police knowledge, after excising erroneous information and including omitted details about the confidential informant.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following an appeal, the court received written costs submissions.

The appellant had made an assignment in bankruptcy.

Adopting the joint submissions of the respondent and the appellant's trustee in bankruptcy, the court ordered costs of $15,000 in favour of the respondent.

The appellant franchisor appealed a declaration that a clause in its franchise agreements requiring a general release as a condition of assignment was void and unenforceable under s. 11 of the Arthur Wishart Act.

The Court of Appeal held that while the clause was not void ab initio, it was unenforceable because it required a release of statutory claims.

The Court declined to apply notional severance to read down the clause to apply only to non-statutory claims, finding that doing so would subvert the protective purpose of the Act and invite franchisors to draft overly broad releases.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action for defamation and intentional interference with economic relations against the respondents under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The motion judge had found the pleadings lacked sufficient material facts to establish that the respondents acted in concert with the author of the defamatory emails.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that when the amended statement of claim was read generously alongside the particulars and the incorporated emails, sufficient material facts were pleaded to disclose reasonable causes of action.

The order dismissing the action was set aside, and the appellants were granted leave to amend their pleadings.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a property tax exemption for premises it leases in four buildings.

The appellant argued that section 10 of the YMCA Act, which exempts 'buildings, lands... of the said association', should be interpreted broadly to include leased premises.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a leasehold interest is not 'land' or 'property of' the association within the meaning of the Assessment Act and the YMCA Act.

The exemption requires an ownership interest, and the plain meaning of the statute does not extend to leased properties.

The appellants sued the respondent physicians for damages, including the difference between their actual legal fees and the costs awarded in prior proceedings regarding the withdrawal of life support, as well as damages for various torts based on a pre-litigation letter sent by the respondents' counsel.

The motion judge dismissed the action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the claim for legal fees was barred by issue estoppel and the tort claims were barred by the doctrine of absolute privilege, as the letter was intimately connected to contemplated judicial proceedings.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action for the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion after hospital staff improperly accessed patient records.

The defendants moved to strike the claim, arguing that the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) constitutes an exhaustive code that ousts the Superior Court's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that PHIPA does not create an exhaustive code.

The Act's language, its highly discretionary review procedure tailored for systemic issues, and its explicit contemplation of other proceedings indicate that the legislature did not intend to preclude common law claims for breach of privacy.

The Ministry of Community and Social Services and the Ontario Public Service Employees Union appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Information and Privacy Commissioner order.

The order required the Ministry to disclose records containing the full names of Family Responsibility Office (FRO) employees to a requester.

The appellants argued that disclosure posed a health and safety risk to the employees and conflicted with a prior Grievance Settlement Board order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Commissioner reasonably concluded that the evidence did not establish a reasonable expectation of harm to the employees, and that the disclosure order did not conflict with the prior grievance settlement.

The landlord appealed a decision declaring its Notice to Vacate void and granting a permanent injunction restraining it from re-entering the leased premises.

The landlord sought to demolish the building and argued the lease limited the tenant's remedies to damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the limitation clause did not apply to the landlord's arbitrary repudiation and trespass, and upheld the permanent injunction as an appropriate remedy to protect the tenant's property rights.

The appellant sought to appeal a judgment disposing of claims under the Land Titles Act to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction, as section 27 of the Land Titles Act directs such appeals to the Divisional Court.

The court transferred the appeal and the related motion for leave to appeal costs to the Divisional Court pursuant to section 110 of the Courts of Justice Act, with a request to expedite the hearing.

The appellant unsecured creditor appealed a decision dismissing an appeal from a Deputy Registrar's refusal to lift a stay of proceedings under s. 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Deputy Registrar had properly considered the equitable grounds to lift the stay and applied the correct test.

The appellant appealed a decision striking her statement of claim against counsel for the Public Guardian and Trustee, who acted as her litigation guardian in prior litigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the action was a collateral attack on the prior proceedings and an abuse of process.

The court also dismissed the appellant's motion to introduce fresh evidence and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The applicant, a Francophone, was convicted of driving without insurance after his paralegal pled guilty on his behalf in English.

He appealed to the Ontario Court of Justice, where he was assisted by an interpreter and indicated he wanted a bilingual appeal and had experienced communication issues with his paralegal.

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal after the applicant confirmed he had authorized the guilty plea.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing his language rights were violated.

The Court of Appeal granted leave, finding that whether a Francophone appellant is entitled to a bilingual appeal even if they did not request a bilingual trial raises an issue of public interest and the proper administration of justice.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and possession of child pornography relating to a young girl.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in restricting cross-examination under s. 276 of the Criminal Code, misapprehended evidence, and improperly used child pornography evidence.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence and appealed his six-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or factual findings.

The fresh evidence application was dismissed as it lacked sufficient probative value.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year global sentence was fit given the serious aggravating factors.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder after his three children tried to kill their mother.

At trial, the Crown theorized that the appellant used his religious beliefs to influence the children, and made inflammatory remarks during closing submissions comparing the appellant to notorious cult leaders and calling him a 'Jesus nut'.

The trial judge did not correct these remarks or instruct the jury on how to use the evidence of the appellant's religious beliefs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the Crown's improper comments and the trial judge's failure to intervene rendered the trial unfair and caused a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment in favour of the respondent bank for a credit card debt and the dismissal of his counterclaim.

The appellant argued that documents he sent to the bank constituted an accord and satisfaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant could not unilaterally dictate the terms of repayment and finding no procedural unfairness in the denial of cross-examination where no notice of examination was served.

The respondent pleaded guilty to trafficking in a substance held out to be cocaine and faced a mandatory minimum sentence of one year.

The sentencing judge imposed the mandatory minimum but illegally granted 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown appealed the illegal sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, correcting the pre-sentence custody credit to the maximum permitted 1.5:1 ratio.

However, considering the Crown's failure to raise the error at sentencing, the delay in the appeal, and the fact that the respondent had already served the imposed sentence, the Court permanently stayed the execution of the remaining balance.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failing to stop at the scene of an accident involving bodily harm and death.

He argued that he rebutted the presumption of intent to escape civil or criminal liability under s. 252(2) of the Criminal Code because he pulled over after the accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly concluded the appellant knew his vehicle had been struck, stopped only to assess the damage, and left to avoid liability because he was driving without the requisite licence.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for damages arising from a shareholder dispute.

A motion judge granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff for the defendants' breach of an interim agreement, ordering damages and costs.

When the defendants failed to pay, a second motion judge struck their statement of defence.

The defendants appealed both orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the summary judgment, finding the defendants had consented to the procedure and the evidence supported the breach.

However, the Court allowed the appeal of the order striking the defence, holding that such a severe sanction was disproportionate and should not be a remedy of first resort, particularly where the defendants were misled by their former counsel.