Karen M. Weiler

The appellant mother appealed a contempt finding by the motion judge for withholding the children from the respondent father in violation of a parenting schedule.

The motion judge found the mother in contempt and imposed double make-up time as a penalty, which the mother subsequently complied with.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The appeal regarding the penalty was found to be moot as it had been completed.

The court also upheld the motion judge's continued jurisdiction over the matter in this high-conflict family law case, citing best practice principles.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a CCAA judge's decision dismissing their motion to reinstate other post-employment benefits (OPEBs) to retirees of U.S. Steel Canada Inc. The CCAA judge had dismissed the motion but ordered a one-time payment of $2.7 million towards benefits.

The Court of Appeal applied the stringent test for leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings and found no prima facie merit to the appeal.

The court emphasized the broad discretion of the CCAA judge and the fact-specific nature of the decision, which did not raise issues of significance to insolvency practice.

Leave to appeal was denied with costs fixed at $2,500.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order striking out their statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, permitting the appellants to amend their pleading.

This costs endorsement addresses the allocation of costs for both the appeal and the underlying motion.

The court found that the appellants' modest success on appeal did not warrant costs in their favour, as it represented a further indulgence to correct pleading deficiencies that multiple prior iterations and a case conference had failed to remedy.

The motion judge's costs order in favour of the respondents was varied downward by $5,000 to reflect the appellants' limited success.

The appellant wife appealed an order terminating her spousal support and life insurance obligations upon the respondent husband's retirement.

The respondent, a surgeon earning over $250,000 USD annually, sought to terminate support effective June 1, 2016, when he planned to retire with projected income of $35,000-$40,000 USD annually.

The application judge found a material change in circumstances and terminated the support.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in concluding the parties would be in financially similar circumstances post-retirement.

The court held that the support should be reduced rather than terminated, and remitted the matter for recalculation.

The appellants appealed the motion judge's decision to strike paragraph 25 of their statement of claim, which alleged that the respondent West Face distributed a defamatory report to unnamed third parties whose identities were known to West Face.

The appellants had already established a prima facie case of defamation by alleging publication to named persons at a specified time and place.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in striking the paragraph, finding that the appellants had demonstrated they were proceeding in good faith with a prima facie case and were not on a fishing expedition.

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the order striking paragraph 25.

The appellant appealed a final judgment in a divorce application following a 31-year marriage.

The trial judge awarded an equalization payment of $90,218.31, imputed income of $12,500 to the appellant for spousal support purposes, and ordered child support based on the respondent's income of $70,000.

After trial, the respondent declared personal bankruptcy, and the appellant successfully moved to have the respondent's RRSPs vested in her.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the equalization payment calculation, the imputed income for spousal support, the child support award, and sought an order for health and dental insurance coverage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis and noting that the equalization payment was eliminated by bankruptcy.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence for sexual assault and invitation to touching a person under the age of 14 for a sexual purpose.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and addressed all material issues.

The sentence appeal was allowed on the basis that the trial judge imposed a sentence exceeding the Crown's submissions without providing notice or opportunity for further submissions, constituting an error in principle.

The appellate court reassessed the sentence and imposed a global sentence of six years (44 months consecutive to the prior 28-month sentence) rather than the trial judge's six years and four months.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching.

He raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge interfered with defence counsel's cross-examination of the complainant, diverting counsel from relevant lines of inquiry; and second, that the trial judge's reasons were unbalanced, favoured the Crown, and failed to resolve material conflicts in evidence or meaningfully scrutinize the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding that the trial judge's interventions were appropriate and necessary to ensure fair treatment of the witness and clarity of evidence, and that her reasons were careful, detailed, and balanced.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order made by Justice Conway of the Superior Court of Justice regarding production of materials and privilege issues.

The appellant did not attend the motion before Conway J., although properly served.

The respondents did not object to the order.

The Court of Appeal found that the issues were best litigated before Conway J. in the context of the ongoing proceeding, as she was in a better position to tailor an order to the specific circumstances and issues relating to production orders and protection of privileges.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent estate trustee and the non-party respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from an attack on the victim in his bedroom.

The appellant was acquitted of attempted murder, unlawful confinement, and assault with a weapon.

The trial judge found the appellant was one of three assailants based on evidence including his association with known assailants before and after the attack, the presence of the victim's blood on the appellant's pants, and corroborating testimony.

The Court of Appeal rejected four grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of one count of break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence, two counts of break and enter and commit an indictable offence, and three counts of possession of break-in instruments, arising from three Subway restaurant break-ins in Sault Ste.

Marie over five days in July 2012.

The Crown relied on similar fact evidence to connect the appellant to all three incidents.

On appeal, the Court found that the trial judge erred in his use of the appellant's criminal record and made material misapprehensions of the evidence regarding DNA on a balaclava, the appellant's cast on his right arm, and glass particles on his clothing.

These errors were essential to the trial judge's reasoning process and undermined the fairness of the trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon (a lamp) entered by Justice Jane E. Kelly on May 15, 2012.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: misapprehension of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, and insufficiency of reasons/unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, no reversal of the burden of proof, and that the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the evidentiary concerns and met the functional requirements for appellate review.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal from a conviction for assault causing bodily harm and the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in the conviction.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and set aside the conviction for assault causing bodily harm, substituting in its place a conviction for common assault.

The sentence had already been served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, challenging the lawfulness of his warrantless arrest and subsequent search.

The appellant argued that police lacked sufficient grounds for arrest based on information from a confidential informant, contending there was insufficient information regarding the informant's source of knowledge and that inadequate corroboration was provided.

The appellant also alleged the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof on the Charter s. 8 voir dire.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the test from R. v. Debot and that the totality of circumstances supported reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.