Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed a contempt order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

The respondent did not appear to contest the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the contempt order based on the filed materials, explicitly noting that it was not ruling on or approving the parties' Minutes of Settlement.

The appellant, acting in person, appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider his third party suspect defence and in giving a mid-trial instruction that all evidence pointed to the accused and away from the third party suspect.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the third party suspect defence as there was no admissible evidence linking the third party to the murder.

The Court also held that the trial judge's mid-trial instruction, provoked by the appellant's defiance of court orders, did not amount to a directed verdict and occasioned no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The Pikangikum First Nation appealed the dismissal of its claim for misfeasance in public office against the former Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

The First Nation alleged the Minister unlawfully withheld infrastructure funding to force the withdrawal of an application for judicial review regarding the imposition of third-party management.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the Minister's actions were not motivated by an improper purpose or vindictive desire to harm, but were a reasonable response to the ongoing dispute and the need to ensure proper management of public funds.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The plaintiff, injured at age 15 in 2002, commenced an action against the property owners in 2006.

The defendants added two other individuals as third parties.

In 2009, the plaintiff moved to add the third parties as defendants.

The master and Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the claim was not discovered before January 1, 2004, and that a minor could not be deemed to have discovered a claim under s. 5(1)(b) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that actual knowledge does not require knowledge of legal consequences, and that the lower courts erred in law by failing to consider whether the claim was discoverable by a reasonable person with the minor's abilities and circumstances.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding child and spousal support, arguing the trial judge erred by not imputing income to the respondent for the period between February 2008 and August 2009.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the respondent had failed to pursue available income sources such as CPP, long-term disability, and RRSP withdrawals during that time.

The Court imputed an annual income of $30,000 to the respondent for that period and ordered a recalculation of support.

The appeal regarding the tax treatment of the spousal support set-off was dismissed.

The appellant appealed three convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in her credibility findings, that parts of the trial transcript were missing, and that the assault by gesture charge was not made out.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully considered the evidence and made findings open to her.

The court also held that the missing transcript portions did not affect the grounds of appeal and that the assault by gesture charge was supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and choking to assist in the commission of an indictable offence.

He argued the trial judge applied differing levels of scrutiny to the evidence and erred in drawing an adverse inference regarding the late disclosure of an extortion letter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully analyzed the evidence, sufficiently explained her credibility findings, and had already concluded the appellant was not believable before addressing the extortion letter.

The appellant insurer sought indemnification from the respondent insurer under the loss transfer provisions of the Insurance Act for the costs of insurer-generated medical assessments.

The respondent conceded its insured was 100 per cent at fault but refused to indemnify the costs of the medical assessments, arguing they were not payments 'in relation to' statutory benefits paid.

The arbitrator and the Superior Court judge ruled in favour of the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the expense of insurer-generated medical assessments is not recoverable under s. 275(1) of the Insurance Act as payments 'in relation to such benefits paid'.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy sought to appeal a Superior Court decision that found no operational conflict between the Highway 407 Act's vehicle permit denial provisions and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act's discharge provisions.

The Superintendent had not been a party to the lower court proceedings. 407 ETR moved to quash the appeal for lack of standing.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Superintendent does not have an automatic right to appeal as a non-party, the court has jurisdiction under s. 193(e) of the BIA to grant leave to appeal in exceptional circumstances.

Finding that the Superintendent was deprived of notice below and raised issues of systemic importance, the Court granted an extension of time and leave to appeal.

Following a decision on a special case in favour of the plaintiff, the parties reached a consensus on costs.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs of $15,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements payable forthwith by Canada to the plaintiff.

The appellant, General Electric Canada Company, sought a declaration that its insurers had a duty to defend it regarding a request by the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) to delineate the source of TCE contamination on its former property.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the MOE letter was a request for voluntary action and the costs incurred were compliance costs, not defence costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, applying the pleadings rule and concluding that the MOE letter did not constitute a claim that triggered the insurers' duty to defend.

The respondent was convicted of seven counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after a high-speed collision.

The trial judge suspended the passing of sentence and imposed two years' probation and a two-year driving prohibition, relying heavily on the parity principle due to the lenient sentence received by the other driver involved.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the parity principle and failed to adequately reflect general deterrence and denunciation.

A nine-month custodial sentence and a five-year driving prohibition were substituted.

The plaintiff brought a class action against the Attorney General of Canada alleging Health Canada was negligent in regulating temporomandibular joint implants.

The defendant moved to decertify the action, arguing the pleadings did not establish a private law duty of care.

On a special case stated to the Court of Appeal, the court held that while a regulator's public statements alone do not create proximity, the plaintiff's allegations that Health Canada repeatedly misrepresented the safety of the implants and failed to correct the misrepresentation despite knowing the risks could arguably establish a prima facie duty of care.

The motion was granted, allowing the claim to proceed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and firearms offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the validity of the search warrant and the trial judge's findings regarding possession of the drugs and the capability of the ammunition.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court held that possession of an unloaded firearm with readily accessible ammunition is not an included offence of possession of a loaded firearm, and since the Crown particularized a loaded firearm but proved an unloaded one with accessible ammunition, the conviction could not stand.

The respondent applied for a police records check and discovered it included a withdrawn assault charge.

After the police service refused to remove the reference, the respondent successfully brought an application before the Superior Court under Rule 14.05 to have the reference removed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the police service's appeal, holding that the application judge lacked jurisdiction.

The court found that the police service's decision was an administrative decision subject to the Judicial Review Procedure Act, and therefore the challenge had to be brought by way of an application for judicial review to the Divisional Court, not via a Rule 14.05 application.

The appellant lawyer represented two clients in unsuccessful applications to quash a municipal by-law.

The application judge ordered the lawyer to personally pay 40 percent of the respondent municipality's costs under Rule 57.07(1), finding his conduct and lack of preparation caused unnecessary costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the lawyer's appeal and set aside the personal costs order, holding that the application judge erred in principle by failing to distinguish the lawyer's conduct from his clients' instructions, particularly where solicitor-client privilege was not waived, and by using hindsight to evaluate strategic decisions.

The appellants challenged a municipal by-law requiring all new exterior commercial signs to be bilingual in French and English.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that one appellant lacked standing as he did not reside or operate a business in the municipality.

For the second appellant, the Court found the by-law was intra vires the municipality's power to pass by-laws respecting social well-being under the Municipal Act, 2001.

Although the by-law infringed the appellant's freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter by compelling the use of a language, the Court held the infringement was justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to protect and promote the equality of the French and English languages.

The appellant broke into the 76-year-old complainant's apartment, sexually assaulted her, and stabbed her multiple times.

He was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, attempted murder, and other offences, and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Crown had withdrawn its dangerous offender application after the appellant refused a psychiatric assessment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the life sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge made no error in principle and that the egregious circumstances of the offences and the need to protect the public justified the maximum sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for distributing and possessing child pornography, arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached and three statements to police should have been excluded.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the first and third statements.

The court found the appellant was not detained during the first statement, and the third statement was not tainted by any potential breach during the second statement, as the appellant repeatedly declined to contact counsel before the third interview.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for a declaration that a release in a settlement agreement with her former employer did not bar her claim for long-term disability benefits against the insurer.

She argued the release violated the Employment Standards Act by effectively waiving her right to benefit coverage during the statutory notice period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the employer had maintained coverage as required by the Act, and the appellant was free to compromise her claim for benefits.

The Court also upheld the finding that the insurer, as a third-party beneficiary, could enforce the release.