Karen M. Weiler

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment regarding a debt and share pledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent's retention of shares did not extinguish the underlying debt, given his undertaking to return the shares once the principal debt was paid in full.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings regarding notice of a guarantee.

The self-represented appellant appealed a trial judgment following a jury verdict, arguing the trial judge erred in several evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of a video and Building Code extracts, the admission of a psychiatric report, and the redaction of an occupational therapist's report.

She also argued the jury verdict should have been set aside and that transcript errors infringed her right to a bilingual trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's discretionary evidentiary rulings, ample evidence to support the jury's verdict, and that the transcript errors did not affect the jury's appreciation of the evidence or deprive the appellant of any grounds of appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision regarding an estate and corporate accounting dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fact-driven appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's conclusion regarding the amount allowed for mortgage costs.

Costs of the appeal were agreed at $10,000.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding frailties in the complainant's eyewitness identification evidence and in permitting the Crown to cross-examine him on his prior criminal record if he testified.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions, read as a whole, adequately addressed the frailties of the identification evidence.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's Corbett ruling, noting she properly balanced probative value against prejudicial effect and appropriately sanitized the prior convictions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unauthorized possession of a firearm, careless handling of a firearm, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

During the execution of a search warrant at his residence, police observed a firearm being thrown out the window into an adjacent yard.

The trial judge declined to determine the validity of the search warrant, finding instead that the appellant had abandoned the firearm and had no reasonable expectation of privacy in it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that because the firearm was abandoned, section 8 of the Charter was not engaged, and the trial judge was not required to determine the legality of the search.

The applicant brought motions to re-open two appeals that had been dismissed as abandoned due to non-attendance and non-compliance.

The first motion related to a summary conviction appeal, which the court dismissed because it did not meet the test for leave to appeal.

The second motion related to a conviction appeal for failing to comply with a court order.

The court dismissed the second motion, finding that the explanation offered for the non-attendance and non-compliance was cast into serious doubt by information before the court, and it would not be in the interests of justice to re-open the appeal.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained his detention with privileges for supervised community accommodation.

The appellant argued the Board misapprehended evidence, failed to consider a conditional discharge, and erred by not ordering an independent psychiatric assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusions reasonable, noting that a conditional discharge was inappropriate given the need for supervised accommodation, and agreeing that an independent assessment was unnecessary.

The appellants were convicted of unlawful confinement and firearms offences following a home invasion.

During closing addresses, the Crown improperly suggested to the jury that the complainant's prior statements to police and at the preliminary inquiry, which were not in evidence, were consistent with her trial testimony and therefore proved she was telling the truth.

The trial judge refused a mistrial application and failed to provide a limiting instruction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the Crown's comments invited the jury to make erroneous use of the evidence and the trial judge's failure to correct the error was fatal.

The appellant appealed an order striking out his statement of defence for failing to pay $3,900 in interlocutory costs.

The motion judge had ruled that impecuniosity was not a valid excuse for failing to comply with costs orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider impecuniosity as a relevant factor.

Striking the defence and exposing the self-represented appellant to a judgment of over $180,000 was a disproportionate response.

The statement of defence was reinstated on the condition that the costs be paid within a year.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing for a long-term offender designation and a determinate sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's finding that the appellant's risk of sexually re-offending and committing domestic assaults could not be managed in the community, even as he aged.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after inflicting a life-threatening stab wound to the victim's neck and was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment, plus 7 months of pre-sentence custody credit.

She appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in stating he could not go lower.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the judge meant a lower sentence was inappropriate, not legally prohibited, and that the sentence was fit given the serious nature of the offence and the appellant's prior conviction for a similar offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted break and enter and possession of burglary tools.

He argued that the trial judge erred in his section 24(2) Charter analysis and that the finding of guilt was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to infer that the CPIC check, which led to the discovery of an arrest warrant and the subsequent lawful search incident to arrest, would have occurred regardless of an initial unlawful pat-down search.

The court also held the finding of guilt was reasonable given the eyewitness description, the appellant's proximity to the crime scene, and his possession of burglary tools.

The appellant, a youth sentenced as an adult, appealed his conviction for first degree murder arising from a stabbing on a city bus.

The appellant, who was the initial aggressor in an attempted robbery, argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave self-defence under ss. 34(2) and 35 of the Criminal Code to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the self-defence claims.

The court held it was unreasonable for the appellant to believe the victim's resistance was an unlawful assault under s. 34(2), and there was no evidence the appellant attempted to retreat as required by s. 35.

The appellant appealed an order striking its claim and dismissing its action.

The Court of Appeal had previously adjourned the appeal pending the outcome of related judicial review proceedings in the Divisional Court.

After the Divisional Court dismissed the judicial review application and leave to appeal was denied, the Court of Appeal dismissed this appeal, finding that the allegations in the appellant's pleadings were in substance the same as those rejected by the Divisional Court.

The court held that allowing the re-litigation of those allegations in a second proceeding would be an abuse of process.

The respondent sought costs for a previous motion where the appellant was ordered to pay $15,000 into court as security for costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs for the motion, despite the respondent's reference to a previous offer to settle.

No order as to costs was made.

The appellants appealed a decision confirming that the composition of the County Council should be reduced from 20 to 16 members due to a decline in the number of electors in four townships.

The Court of Appeal held that the municipal by-law governing representation implicitly required a reduction in representatives when a township's population fell below the specified threshold.

The Court also found no error in the application judge's decision to nullify the Striking by-law and remove the additional representatives mid-term, as they had no legal entitlement to hold office.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant corporation granted a guarantee and collateral mortgage to the respondent law firm to secure over $800,000 in unpaid legal fees owed by the appellant and related companies.

The appellant sought to rescind the guarantee, arguing its owner lacked authority and the law firm failed to recommend independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's dismissal, finding that while the law firm breached the Rules of Professional Conduct by not recommending independent legal advice, the security remained enforceable because the transaction was fair, the client was sophisticated, and no advantage was taken.

The appellant municipality appealed a trial judgment finding it 40 percent liable for a bicycle accident on a public trail that rendered the respondent a quadriplegic.

The appellant argued the trial judge conflated the standard of 'reckless disregard' under section 4 of the Occupiers' Liability Act with the ordinary standard of reasonable care under section 3(1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding the trial judge correctly applied section 4.

However, the Court allowed the appellant's appeal regarding costs, setting aside the trial judge's award of compound interest on expert fees.

The respondent brought a motion for security for costs pending the disposition of the appellant's appeal from an order dismissing her action for delay.

The Court of Appeal found good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious given the extensive history of delay and failure to comply with court orders.

Despite the appellant's claim of impecuniosity, the Court ordered her to post $15,000 as security for costs to balance the respondent's right to protection against the appellant's access to justice.

The appellant's private prosecution was stayed by the Attorney General prior to a pre-enquete hearing.

The appellant's application for mandamus was dismissed based on binding precedent.

Seeking to challenge that precedent, the appellant requested a five-judge panel, which was denied by the Associate Chief Justice.

A motion to review that denial was dismissed by a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant then moved to review and set aside the single judge's order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that there is no statutory authority or rule permitting an appeal or review of a decision by the Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice regarding the assignment of judicial duties, including the refusal to strike a five-judge panel.