Marc Guy Sauvé

The plaintiffs, Judy Faulkner and her real estate brokerage, brought an action against their landlord and property manager claiming approximately $2.2 million in damages allegedly caused by exposure to toxic mould in their leased office space.

The plaintiffs asserted that water leaks led to mould growth, causing Ms. Faulkner to suffer from cognitive symptoms and leading to the departure of key real estate agents.

The court accepted the evidence of the defendants' occupational medicine expert, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the office air contained harmful mould or that Ms. Faulkner's symptoms were caused by mould exposure.

Consequently, the court dismissed the claims for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of lease, awarding only $4,000 for a temporary rent reduction due to the inconvenience of a remediation containment area.

The plaintiffs sought a six-month extension to serve their statement of claim on the defendant surgeon, Dr. Sasha Carsen, to obtain an expert opinion before proceeding.

The motion was brought before the original service deadline.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that extensions should not generally be granted solely to investigate the merits of a claim when the defendant has no knowledge of the action, as this constitutes prejudice.

The court noted that the COVID-19 emergency order had already suspended time limits, providing the plaintiffs with an automatic extension.

The moving parties sought summary judgment in a shareholder oppression dispute involving a closely held home-building corporation, requesting dissolution, appointment of a receiver, and related declaratory relief.

The court held that the longstanding informal manner in which the corporation had operated formed part of the parties' reasonable expectations and that the impugned conduct, including deferred and retroactive salary payments, did not amount to oppression on the record before it.

The court found that one alleged director had not been validly elected, but that his conduct nevertheless did not constitute oppressive conduct.

Applying Rule 20 and the summary judgment framework, the court denied summary judgment, determined several factual and legal issues, remained seized, and directed further steps toward salary determinations, valuation, and a possible buyout or liquidation if no buyout occurred.

The plaintiffs brought a civil action in battery arising from a professional wrestling match in which the defendant intentionally cut the plaintiff with a razor blade immediately after cutting himself.

The court found that the defendant, who had Hepatitis‑C, transmitted the virus to the plaintiff through blood‑to‑blood contact.

As a result, the plaintiff lost a professional wrestling contract with a major wrestling organization and underwent painful medical treatments before ultimately being cured.

The court held the defendant liable for battery and awarded damages for pain and suffering, past income loss, and significant future income loss based on the lost opportunity to pursue a professional wrestling career.

Family members also received damages under the Family Law Act for loss of care, guidance, and companionship.

The moving party law firm brought a motion seeking to transfer the taxation of costs to Ottawa.

The court considered factors including where the legal work was performed, the residence of most witnesses, and the convenience and efficiency of conducting the taxation before bilingual certified assessors in Ottawa.

The court found that most relevant events and witnesses were located in Ottawa and that the law firm had suffered the alleged financial prejudice there.

Balancing these factors, the court held that transferring the taxation proceeding from London to Ottawa was in the interests of justice.

The responding parties were ordered to pay costs of the motion.

Following a multi‑day civil trial involving contractual disputes and a counterclaim, the successful defendants sought costs relying on multiple settlement offers made under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff argued the result was mixed and that each party should bear its own costs, emphasizing that the defendants’ counterclaim was ultimately found to be prescribed.

The court reviewed the governing costs factors under Rule 57 and the jurisprudence concerning settlement offers and proportionality.

The court held the defendants were the successful parties and that a reasonable settlement offer should have been accepted.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded against the plaintiff.

A financial advisor sued his former business associate and the associate’s corporation for breach of contract following termination of their business arrangement.

The defendants alleged that the advisor breached an exclusivity clause by selling investment products of a competing financial institution outside the agreed distribution structure and brought a counterclaim for damages.

The court found that the advisor had violated the contractual clause prohibiting the transfer of business outside the firm and had also breached fiduciary obligations.

The defendants were therefore entitled to terminate the contract.

However, the counterclaim was dismissed as statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because it was commenced outside the applicable limitation period.

The appellants challenged a municipal by-law requiring all new exterior commercial signs to be bilingual in French and English.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that one appellant lacked standing as he did not reside or operate a business in the municipality.

For the second appellant, the Court found the by-law was intra vires the municipality's power to pass by-laws respecting social well-being under the Municipal Act, 2001.

Although the by-law infringed the appellant's freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter by compelling the use of a language, the Court held the infringement was justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to protect and promote the equality of the French and English languages.

The appellant lawyer represented two clients in unsuccessful applications to quash a municipal by-law.

The application judge ordered the lawyer to personally pay 40 percent of the respondent municipality's costs under Rule 57.07(1), finding his conduct and lack of preparation caused unnecessary costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the lawyer's appeal and set aside the personal costs order, holding that the application judge erred in principle by failing to distinguish the lawyer's conduct from his clients' instructions, particularly where solicitor-client privilege was not waived, and by using hindsight to evaluate strategic decisions.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for malicious prosecution and wrongful dismissal.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, finding they clearly showed the pathway to the result.

However, the Court agreed with the appellants that the trial judge erred by duplicating the award of 'Wallace' or 'Honda' damages and aggravated damages for malicious prosecution, as the same factors were used to justify both.

The appeal was allowed in part to set aside the $15,000 'Wallace' damages award, but otherwise dismissed.