Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed his convictions for three sexual offences against a 15-year-old complainant.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty on two independent bases: he had sexual relations with a minor without taking reasonable steps to ascertain her age, and he had sexual relations without her consent.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusions or her use of similar fact evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after participating in the beating death of a drug dealer.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting a witness's videotaped out-of-court statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule after the witness claimed no memory of the conversation at trial.

The appellant also challenged the jury instructions regarding the use of the hearsay statement, the effect of intoxication on the intent for murder, and the use of post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the admission of the hearsay evidence or the jury instructions.

The appellants appealed an order recognizing and enforcing in Ontario a German arbitral verdict.

They argued for the first time on appeal that a certified copy of the arbitral record was not before the application judge and that the enforcement order should not have been made.

The court held that the supporting affidavit attached a true copy of the duly certified translation of the arbitral verdict, together with the original verdict and translator’s affidavit, and that it was open to the application judge to accept that evidence as meeting article 35(2) of the International Commercial Arbitration Act.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs to the respondent.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 for his participation in a $4 million mortgage scheme and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and $250,000 in restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by conducting his own handwriting analysis, failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter following unlawful arrest and search, and imposing an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Grant framework to admit the evidence, reasonably assessed the handwriting, and correctly held that conditional sentences are inappropriate for large-scale fraud.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking, arguing that the trial judge failed to warn the jury about the dangers of in-dock identification evidence.

The Crown conceded this error for two of the counts, but the appellant further argued that the verdicts were unreasonable and acquittals should be entered.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and ordered a new trial on the two counts, but rejected the argument that the verdicts were unreasonable or that the conviction on the remaining count should be overturned.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for forcible confinement and assault, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in the Secure Forensic Unit of CAMH.

The appellant argued the Board erred in its placement decision, failed to consider a less restrictive unit, and unfairly limited cross-examination of his treating psychiatrist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable given the appellant's lack of insight, refusal of treatment, and the significant threat he posed to the public.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving.

Following his arrest, he was subjected to a routine strip search before being lodged in cells, which the Crown conceded violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The trial judge refused to grant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1), finding that the search did not impact trial fairness and that police had reasonable and probable grounds to conduct the search due to safety concerns.

The summary appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's application of the objective standard for strip searches.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge failed to comply with s. 16.1(6) of the Canada Evidence Act by not explicitly asking the child complainant to promise to tell the truth.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that no particular words are required to comply with the provision, and the complainant's agreement after the trial judge explained the importance of telling the truth was sufficient.

The appellants appealed a summary dismissal of their claim that the respondent condominium corporation wrongfully registered liens against their units for unpaid common expenses.

The motion judge dismissed the wrongful registration claim but ordered a trial on the respondent's claim for legal fees related to the liens.

The appellants argued the dismissal might foreclose their ability to contest the legal fees at trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to clarify the order, ensuring the appellants can argue both entitlement and amount of the legal fees at trial.

The motion judge's costs order was set aside and reserved to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a municipal by-law that restricted the operating hours of licensed body rub parlours.

The appellant argued the City acted unreasonably and lacked sufficient evidence connecting the nuisance to licensed operations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that under section 213 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, the by-law is not reviewable on the ground of reasonableness, and finding no palpable or overriding error in the application judge's evidentiary findings.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's reasons, noting that the appellants essentially reargued the motion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

Following an appeal and cross-appeal, the court determined the quantum of trial costs payable to the cross-appellant, a lawyer who represented himself at trial.

The cross-appellant sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $49,600, while the respondent suggested $1,000.

Applying the principle that self-represented lawyers are entitled to costs for work ordinarily done by retained counsel that results in an opportunity cost, the court fixed the cross-appellant's trial costs at $15,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant owned a family camp property.

The respondent, her former son-in-law, had occupied, maintained, and improved the camp for over 20 years.

When the respondent refused to allow his son to use the camp, the appellant attempted to revoke his licence to occupy it.

The trial judge found that the respondent had an equitable right to use the camp during his lifetime based on proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment, and granted an exclusive licence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the trial judge's application of equitable principles or his choice of remedy.

The appellant, a milk farmer, provided unpasteurized milk to individuals through a 'cow share agreement' and was convicted of selling and distributing unpasteurized milk contrary to the Health Protection and Promotion Act and operating an unlicensed milk plant contrary to the Milk Act.

On appeal, he argued the legislation did not apply to his private arrangement and violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cow-share program was a public marketing scheme caught by the legislation.

The court also held that the prohibition on unpasteurized milk did not violate the right to life, liberty, or security of the person, and was not arbitrary or overbroad given the scientific evidence of public health risks.

A dispute arose from the administration and eventual sale of a rental property held in trust where one party held legal title as trustee for himself and another beneficiary.

The trustees failed to maintain financial records over a 13‑year period, leading both sides to rely on competing accounting experts to reconstruct profits.

The trial judge accepted the respondent’s expert report and awarded damages for breach of trust, aggravated damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in relying on the respondent’s expert because the assumptions about rental income were inconsistent with the evidence.

The court reassessed damages directly on the record, reducing the award and costs, while upholding aggravated damages and allowing the cross‑appeal of the solicitor on the basis that no duty of care or fiduciary duty was owed to the beneficiary.

The Crown appealed the 90-day intermittent sentence and three years' probation imposed on a first-time offender for possession of a loaded firearm and possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number.

The sentencing judge had erroneously concluded that a conditional sentence was statutorily unavailable for both counts and imposed a single global sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while a conditional sentence was unavailable for the loaded firearm count, it was available for the defaced serial number count.

The court substituted individual sentences totaling two years less a day, allowing the offender to serve the majority of the sentence in the community to continue her rehabilitation.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that ordered a new hearing regarding a firearms prohibition and forfeiture order under s. 117.05 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal judge had found that the hearing judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the Crown failed to raise a question of law of public importance or demonstrate a clear error of law requiring leave for the due administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and resolving inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the W.D. formula or her reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence over the appellant's.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for discharging a firearm with intent to wound and aggravated assault following a jury trial.

He argued that the trial judge impermissibly bolstered the complainant’s evidence in the jury charge by referring to a prior consistent statement after admitted perjury, and that the acquittals on attempted murder and robbery rendered the verdicts inconsistent.

The court rejected both grounds, holding that the impugned instruction was merely an example of inconsistent statements and would not have bolstered the complainant’s testimony.

The court also held that the different mens rea requirements and factual findings available to the jury made the verdicts logically reconcilable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for first degree murder and conceded that a conviction for second degree murder was inevitable.

The appeal challenged the jury charge on planning and deliberation, including whether post-offence conduct could be considered and whether psychiatric evidence was properly left with the jury.

The court held that it was open to the jury to consider the appellant's actions after the killing in response to the defence theory of impulsive and disorganized conduct.

The court further held that the psychiatric evidence was primarily relevant to provocation, which lacked an air of reality, and that any remaining relevance to planning and deliberation was adequately addressed.

The appeal was dismissed.