Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed a firearm conviction and sentence arising from multiple firearm-related offences.

The court held that the evidentiary record did not establish knowledge that the firearm had been obtained by the commission of an offence, and therefore the conviction under s. 96(2) could not stand.

On sentence, the respondent conceded reassessment was required in light of appellate authority concerning firearm sentencing.

The court quashed the s. 96(2) conviction and reduced the firearm sentences, while imposing an eight-month consecutive sentence on the s. 117.01(3) count.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence, challenging the sentencing judge's approach to enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court granted leave but dismissed the sentence appeal.

It held that the sentencing judge did not err by considering that the appellant would not have been eligible for bail because of his criminal record, and properly took into account delay attributable to both the Crown and the defence.

The exercise of discretion in awarding significant enhanced credit warranted no appellate intervention.

The appellant sought to stay or dismiss an Ontario contract action on the basis of a prior default declaratory judgment obtained in Minnesota stating that nothing was owed under the parties' agreements.

The Court of Appeal held that even assuming the technical requirements of res judicata or issue estoppel were met, the motion judge properly exercised discretion not to apply those doctrines where doing so would be unjust.

The court emphasized the absence of any merits determination in the foreign proceeding, the tactical and defensive nature of the foreign declaratory action, and the fact that the compensation claim was integrally tied to Ontario under contracts governed and enforced by Ontario law.

Comity did not require a stay in the circumstances.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of an action advancing further employment-related claims against her former employer notwithstanding an earlier settlement and extensive prior litigation.

The Court of Appeal held that the action was properly dismissed on multiple independent grounds, including limitation period expiry, failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action, abuse of process, and exclusive labour-relations jurisdiction.

The court further held that the proceeding was an attempt to re-litigate issues that were or ought to have been raised in earlier proceedings and applied issue estoppel under Danyluk.

The appeal was dismissed with modest costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its action against a foreign state on sovereign immunity grounds.

The court held that the appellant failed to meet its burden under the State Immunity Act to show that the foreign state's alleged involvement in a state-owned airline's decision-making constituted commercial activity rather than sovereign oversight as shareholder and pursuit of governmental objectives.

The court rejected the submission that the motion should await discoveries, holding that sovereign immunity must be determined before the action proceeds.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs.

The appellant and her husband sold their farming business to their son and daughter-in-law.

The appellant sought rectification of the memorandum of agreement and the vendor take-back mortgage, arguing that the purchase price for the real property was incorrectly recorded due to a drafting error.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, holding that the appellant failed to meet the standard of 'convincing proof' and that the parties lacked a common intention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the ordinary civil standard of proof applies to rectification claims and that the trial judge erred by relying on the respondent's subjective belief rather than an objective assessment of the parties' common intention based on the totality of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose.

He argued the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to his evidence compared to the complainant's, and erred in drawing an adverse inference from his failure to call his father as a witness.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh medical evidence explaining his father's absence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to admit fresh evidence, finding it was a strategic decision at trial not to call the father.

The Court upheld the trial judge's credibility assessments and found no error in the limited adverse inference drawn regarding the missing witness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, a self-represented taxi driver, was convicted of failing to stop at a red light and fined $350.

His appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on three grounds: an unsworn interpreter, lack of disclosure, and the justice of the peace's failure to assist him as an unrepresented defendant.

The Court of Appeal refused leave on the interpreter issue but granted leave on the disclosure and duty to assist issues, finding conflicting authority on the obligations owed to self-represented defendants in provincial offences trials.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving, dangerous driving, and flight from police causing bodily harm after his car crashed.

At trial, the sole issue was whether the appellant was driving.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony that he was asleep in the back seat, partly because defence counsel failed to put this version of events to the other occupants of the car during cross-examination, breaching the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The trial judge also relied on a police officer's observations of the vehicle's erratic driving to confirm the reliability of the other occupants' testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn or his use of confirmatory evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a handgun, arguing that the trial judge erred in her correcting instruction to the jury.

During closing submissions, defence counsel improperly gave evidence by stating that if the appellant had touched the gun, his fingerprints would definitely be on it.

The trial judge corrected this by instructing the jury that there was no evidence on how often fingerprints are left on firearms, but went further to state that the jury could not reason that the absence of prints meant the appellant could not have handled the gun.

The Court of Appeal held that this final sentence improperly deprived the appellant of the ability to argue that the lack of fingerprint evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

Crown sentence appeal arising from a guilty plea to sexual interference involving repeated digital penetration and one act of unprotected intercourse with a 14-year-old who was a close friend of the offender's daughter.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge misapplied the Gladue framework by failing to connect the offender's Aboriginal background to his moral culpability or the commission of the offence, and by placing undue emphasis on background factors unsupported by the record.

The court further held that the sentence failed to reflect the gravity of repeated, exploitative sexual abuse of a vulnerable child by an adult in a position of trust, and inadequately emphasized denunciation and deterrence.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the sentence was increased from eight months to three years' imprisonment, less credit for post-conviction custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by considering a bathroom video as similar fact evidence and by curtailing his testimony based on the collateral facts rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the excluded testimony was solely to impeach credibility and thus barred by the collateral facts rule.

The Court also held the video evidence was properly considered as circumstantial evidence of identity rather than prohibited bad character evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his mother, as well as his sentence of life imprisonment with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge by failing to put forward the defence of intoxication, inadequately instructing on discreditable conduct, and failing to properly instruct on the requisite intent for murder and the elements of manslaughter.

He also appealed the period of parole ineligibility as harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no evidentiary foundation for an intoxication defence and no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 14-year parole ineligibility period was fit for a brutal second degree murder in a domestic context.

The appellant sought leave to appeal her sentence of six years for criminal negligence causing death and impaired driving causing death, plus one year consecutive for refusing to provide a breath sample.

The offences resulted in the death of a five-month-old baby and serious injuries to the mother.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's decision, noting the appellant's prior record for impaired driving and the severity of the consequences.

The appeal was dismissed, and the seven-year total sentence was upheld as fit and not offending the totality principle.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for sexual assault, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing his detention in a hospital.

The appellant argued he did not suffer from a mental illness and that the Board's reasons were insufficient to establish he posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of mental illness but agreed the Board's reasons were insufficient, particularly regarding its reliance on uncorroborated hearsay evidence and its failure to explain why the threat was deemed 'significant' despite contrary psychiatric evidence.

The matter was remitted to the Board for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction under ss. 153(3) and 160 of the Customs Act for defrauding Canada Customs by retaining rather than remitting duties and taxes.

He argued that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, applied the wrong burden of proof, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and clearly demonstrated the appellant's knowledge of the fraudulent activity as the directing mind of the company.

The court also found no error in the application of the burden of proof and concluded that the verdict was reasonable based on ample evidence.

The appellant challenged an order dismissing his action as an abuse of process on the basis that it constituted a collateral attack on prior mortgage proceedings.

The Court of Appeal applied the deferential standard governing appellate review of discretionary process-control orders and held that no misdirection or clearly wrong result had been shown.

The court found the appellant's real complaint concerned alleged accounting and payment issues that could have been raised during the mortgage proceedings, and noted that a statutory assessment remedy under the Mortgages Act had been initiated but adjourned.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The appellant challenged summary judgment enforcing a disciplinary costs award made by a securities self-regulatory organization after professional misconduct proceedings.

The issue was whether the organization could sue a former member in breach of contract to recover the unpaid costs award, and whether s. 9 of the Recognition Order barred that remedy by treating costs like fines or settlements.

The court held that prior authority recognizing contractual enforcement of disciplinary sanctions applied equally to costs awards, and that the plain wording of s. 9 was limited to fines and settlements.

The appeal was dismissed and appeal costs were awarded to the respondent.

In a brief appeal book endorsement, the court addressed only the disposition of the appeal and appellate costs.

Although counsel for the appellant had agreed to pay the bank $3,000 in costs, the court held that the bank was not entitled to any costs because the appellant would have been at least partially successful on appeal.

The court also held that another responding party was not entitled to costs because no relief had been sought against him and the settlement improved his position vis-à-vis the bank.

The appeal was dismissed on consent.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order regarding the ownership of assets.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion, based on pleadings, correspondence, and subsequent conduct, that the parties intended to hold the assets 50% for each other regardless of legal ownership.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $11,000.