Karen M. Weiler

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by relying on a previous incident of consensual sex, which violated s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The case was not fought on the issue of consent, as the respondent's position was that the alleged act of anal intercourse did not occur.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's conclusion that all essential terms of the 'clean break' scenario were settled by June 16, 2003.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000.

The appellant, a former lawyer, was convicted of six counts of fraud and one count of theft related to the misappropriation of client funds in a land development scheme.

He appealed his convictions and his sentence of 20 months' imprisonment and $164,000 in restitution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's dismissal of the appellant's Charter motion for unreasonable delay, and concluding that the verdicts were reasonable and the jury instructions were adequate.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence.

The appellants, environmental consultants, appealed a declaration that their insurers had no duty to defend them in an action alleging deceit, secret commissions, bid rigging, conspiracy, breach of contract, and negligence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that claims relating to certain properties were excluded by the Design/Build exclusion, as the policy did not cover actual remediation work.

The Court also agreed that the negligence claims were derivative of the intentional torts and thus excluded by the Fraudulent Act exclusion.

The appeal was dismissed, with a minor variation to the wording of the declaration.

The appellant appealed a ruling by Justice Archie G. Campbell.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court that the error in question was within jurisdiction and therefore not subject to certiorari.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the orders under appeal were interlocutory as they did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties.

Costs of $1,500 were awarded to the respondents, without prejudice to the appellants' right to seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellants appealed an order of the motions judge granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motions judge's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,500.

The appellant appealed an order awarding costs directly against the Minister of Finance in third party proceedings initiated by the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Court of Appeal found no error by the trial judge, noting that costs awarded against the Fund are paid by the Minister of Finance.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $7,500 awarded to each respondent.

The appellant was arrested in Nova Scotia and transported to Ontario, where he appeared before a justice of the peace.

The Crown conceded he should have been taken before a justice in Nova Scotia under s. 503(3) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant sought release via habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the arrest may have been illegal, subsequent valid proceedings justified his current detention, precluding release under habeas corpus.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court order that set aside decisions of its Discipline Committee and remitted the matter for a rehearing.

The Divisional Court had concluded that the Committee's refusal to grant an adjournment to the respondent physician raised fairness and natural justice concerns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Divisional Court's decision and noting that the public interest could be protected during an adjournment by imposing terms.

Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The father applied to reduce his child support obligations under s. 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines because the child was in his physical custody 50 per cent of the time.

The motion judge applied a strict formulaic set-off approach.

The Divisional Court allowed the mother's appeal, holding that the father had to adduce clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the Table amount was in the child's best interests.

The Court of Appeal allowed the father's appeal, holding that the Divisional Court erred in applying a presumption in favour of the Table amount to s. 9 cases.

The Court of Appeal also held that the motion judge erred in applying a strict formulaic approach, and instead set out a discretionary framework that considers the Table amounts, the increased costs of shared custody, and the conditions, means, needs, and other circumstances of each spouse and the child.

The father applied to reduce his child support obligation because his son was spending 50 per cent of the time with him.

The motion judge reduced the support from over $550 to $100 using a strict formulaic set-off approach.

The Divisional Court overturned this, ordering the Table amount of $688, holding there is a presumption in favour of the Table amount under s. 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The Court of Appeal allowed the father's appeal, holding that the presumption does not apply to s. 9.

The Court set out a structured discretionary approach to s. 9, starting with a simple set-off, applying a multiplier to reflect fixed costs, and adjusting for actual spending patterns.

The father was ordered to pay $399.61 monthly.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment declaring that the parties had entered into a binding and enforceable settlement agreement.

The agreement required the appellant to deliver a final version of a DVD in exchange for an additional $10,000 payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial, as the appellant's counsel had clearly and unequivocally accepted the offer via email.

The court also rejected arguments of economic duress and repudiation.

The appellant tenant appealed a motions judge's decision which found that his lease did not include the basement premises of the property.

The Court of Appeal held that the motions judge ignored relevant evidence, including a note on a schedule attached to the lease and an affidavit from the original landlord confirming the basement's inclusion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the motions judge's decision, and dismissed the respondent landlord's application, concluding that the basement was part of the demised premises.

The appellants appealed a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that an employee manual could not eliminate the respondent's entitlement to reasonable notice for the 10 years of employment preceding its introduction.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's objective assessment of repudiation and found no palpable and overriding error in the findings of fact regarding mitigation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, breach of probation, and breach of recognizance.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable because his DNA on a Coke bottle found at the scene did not prove he was present, and that the trial judge improperly used his failure to testify to convict him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences from the DNA evidence were logical and not speculative, and that the trial judge only noted the appellant's silence after already concluding the Crown had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant owner entered into a construction contract with the contractor, which included a performance bond issued by the respondent surety.

The contract contained a cost-sharing provision for savings achieved during construction.

The contractor ceased operations before paying the owner its share of the savings.

The owner completed the work and claimed the savings from the surety under the bond.

The trial judge found that while the bond covered the cost savings, the owner's claim failed because it did not promptly declare the contractor in default and notify the surety, causing prejudice to the surety.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, dismissing both the appeal and the surety's cross-appeal regarding the bond's coverage.

The appellant insurance company appealed a motions judge's decision that the plaintiff was not an 'occupant' of a motorcycle when she was struck by an uninsured motorist while standing near the parked vehicle.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, applying the 'objective observer' test to find that the plaintiff was a passenger and therefore an occupant under s. 224(1) of the Insurance Act.

As a result, the respondent insurer was solely liable for the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle collision at an intersection and alleged the accident was caused by overgrown brush obscuring a stop sign.

The intersection had been transferred from the Regional Municipality to the City 108 days prior to the accident.

The Region successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the transfer of jurisdiction completely extinguished its liability for non-repair.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the transfer of the road did not instantly absolve the Region of potential liability for prior negligence in maintaining the road, and that factual issues regarding the City's opportunity to inspect and repair required a trial.

The Crown appealed a sentence of 21 months' incarceration and a five-year driving prohibition imposed on the respondent for dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The respondent ran a red light at high speed, struck and killed a pedestrian, dragged her 190 meters, and fled the scene.

He had a lengthy record of driving offences.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit, emphasizing the need for general deterrence and protection of the public.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was increased to four years and three months (after credit for pre-trial custody) along with a lifetime driving prohibition.