Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable.

The appellant had admitted his involvement in the robbery to a witness with a criminal record, but the balance of the evidence confirmed the admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was in the best position to assess credibility and the verdict was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that based on the trial judge's treatment of the complainant's credibility on other charges resulting in acquittals, the confirmatory evidence needed to implicate the appellant in the crime alleged.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law and noting the appellant's concession that confirmatory evidence generally does not have to implicate the accused in the criminal aspect of the offences charged.

The appellant was convicted of assault with a weapon after striking the complainant in the face with a broken beer bottle outside a bar.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the conviction appeal but varied the sentence.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's threats and the appellant's state of mind, and misstated the burden of proof under the W. (D.) test.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's apportionment of liability, assessment of damages, and costs awards arising from a tragic apartment fire that caused severe smoke inhalation injuries to the respondents.

The trial judge had apportioned liability 10% to the tenant who started the fire, 20% to the City for failing to enforce building codes regarding self-closing doors, and 70% to the building owners/managers.

The Court of Appeal reapportioned liability to 20% for the tenant, 35% for the City, and 45% for the owners, finding the trial judge underestimated the tenant's and City's roles.

The Court upheld the general damages and future loss of income awards, as well as the future care costs based on the injured respondent's choice to live independently.

The Court also largely upheld the substantial indemnity costs award and premium against the owners due to their failure to admit liability, but varied the costs related to a separate medical malpractice action and an inquest.

The plaintiffs suffered severe injuries from smoke inhalation during an apartment fire.

The trial judge found the tenant who started the fire, the building owner, and the City liable, apportioning fault at 10%, 70%, and 20% respectively.

The trial judge also awarded substantial damages and substantial indemnity costs with a premium.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reapportioned liability to 20% for the tenant, 45% for the owner, and 35% for the City, finding the trial judge underestimated the tenant's and City's roles.

The damage awards were upheld as reasonable.

The costs award was largely upheld, except for costs related to a separate medical malpractice action and an inquest.

The appellants sold their shares in a trailer park to the respondents, taking back a promissory note bearing 10 percent interest annually until maturity.

The note did not specify a post-maturity interest rate.

After the respondents defaulted, the trial judge held that the post-maturity interest rate was 5 percent pursuant to section 3 of the Interest Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the prejudgment interest provisions of the Courts of Justice Act ousted section 3 of the Interest Act.

The Court exercised its discretion to fix the post-maturity interest rate at 10 percent, matching the pre-maturity rate, to reflect commercial reality and prevent the respondents from benefiting from their default.

The plaintiffs in a class action brought motions to quash the defendants' appeals from orders dismissing their Rule 20 and Rule 21 motions.

The plaintiffs argued the orders were interlocutory, not final.

The Court of Appeal held that the orders, which dismissed the motions on a question of law and bound the court to a specific interpretation of the Insurance Act, gave rise to res judicata and were therefore final orders.

The motions to quash were dismissed.

The plaintiff appealed a Divisional Court decision setting aside a motion judge's order that appointed judges and judicial officers as referees to determine individual class members' claims under the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a court cannot appoint a judge or judicial officer to conduct a reference under s. 25(1)(b) of the Class Proceedings Act without first obtaining the authorization of the Chief Justice or her designate under s. 14(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The consent of individual judicial officers is not an adequate substitute for the Chief Justice's overarching responsibility for judicial assignments.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action against the respondent.

The trial judge found no breach of contract, as the appellant purchased the property on an 'as is where is' basis and the respondent fulfilled his obligation to deliver two reports without promising the property was contamination-free.

The trial judge also found no negligent misrepresentation, as there was no duty of care owed.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a long-term employee of an insurance brokerage, was constructively dismissed when her new employer unilaterally transferred her to an office an hour away and impugned her work quality when she objected.

The trial judge awarded damages for constructive dismissal, finding an implied term that she would work in her original location.

The Divisional Court overturned this decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judge's decision, holding that it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the location of the workplace was an essential term of the employment contract.

The Crown appealed a 9-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for possession and distribution of child pornography.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a conditional sentence was inappropriate and that a substantial reformatory sentence was called for, given the gravity of the offence and the volume of images involved.

However, because the respondent had already served seven and a half months of the conditional sentence and had recently obtained psychiatric counseling, the Court declined to interfere and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a judgment in favour of the respondent on a claim and the dismissal of their counterclaim.

They argued the matter should have proceeded under the ordinary rules rather than the simplified rules.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the ordinary rules applied, the outcome would have been the same as the appellants raised no defence to the claim and the counterclaim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The moving party sought leave to re-argue a Charter issue that was not addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada when it reversed the Court of Appeal's earlier decision based on the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the moving party was seeking relief not originally sought and had an alternative route to raise the issue by appealing a recent decision of the class action motion judge.

The appellant appealed an order of the motion judge who declined to enforce a settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was ample evidence to support the motion judge's findings of fact and exercise of discretion.

The respondent operated a body rub parlour in the City of Brantford.

The City had passed an omnibus zoning by-law under the Planning Act that prohibited all uses except permitted ones, effectively requiring a site-specific amendment to operate a body rub parlour.

The respondent was charged with violating the by-law.

The justice of the peace and the appeal judge held the by-law was invalid as being prohibitory.

The Court of Appeal allowed the City's appeal, holding that a by-law prohibiting all uses except permitted ones is not prohibitory but a valid exercise of municipal zoning power under the Planning Act.

The respondent was convicted.

The appellant appealed an award made by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that it was open to the trial judge to make the findings she did and that there was no basis to interfere with the award.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $1,000.

The Crown appealed a costs order made against it by a bail review judge.

The bail review judge had awarded costs due to the Crown and police's failure to bring a victim's statement to court, which was characterized as sloppy conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order, finding no Charter breach and that the conduct did not reach the level warranting costs against the Crown, as the respondent suffered no prejudice.

Armstrong J.A. dissented, finding the police conduct went beyond mere sloppiness and justified the costs order.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the order under appeal was interlocutory rather than final, and that the result of the motion would have inevitably been the same whether brought in Kingston or Toronto.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in handling the complainant's delayed disclosure and in treating a witness's testimony as corroborative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered whether the witness's evidence was confirmatory of the complainant's evidence under the Vetrovec standard.

The court also held that the trial judge adequately addressed the delay in disclosure and inconsistencies in the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and the admissibility of evidence seized pursuant to a wiretap authorization and search warrants.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reasonably applied the Morin framework to find no s. 11(b) violation.

The Court also upheld the wiretap authorization, finding that jailhouse telephones are not places ordinarily used by solicitors under s. 186(2) of the Criminal Code, and that investigative necessity was established.

Finally, the Court held that the police inspection of the appellant's personal belongings held by jail authorities did not violate his reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 of the Charter.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.