Karen M. Weiler

The appellant was charged with robbery and using an imitation firearm.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant of robbery due to an error of law, but convicted him of the firearm offence.

A month later, at sentencing, the trial judge realized his error and changed the robbery acquittal to a conviction.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was functus officio on the robbery count and had no jurisdiction to change the verdict.

Furthermore, the firearm conviction could not stand without a conviction on the underlying robbery charge.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals entered on both counts.

The appellant was terminated from her employment of 15.5 years while dealing with medical issues.

The trial judge found the employer acted in bad faith and initially awarded 12 months' notice, which she later increased to 16 months after being informed of a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The appellant appealed the notice period and the dismissal of her claim for aggravated and punitive damages.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in increasing the notice period after learning of the settlement offer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the 16-month notice period was within a reasonable range and that a trial judge has broad discretion to alter a judgment before it is formally entered.

The appellant, acting in person, signed Minutes of Settlement to resolve a debt claim by the respondent bank.

Shortly after, she resiled from the settlement, alleging economic duress, fraud, and lack of independent legal advice.

The motions judge granted judgment enforcing the settlement under Rule 49.09.

On appeal, the majority of the Court of Appeal found that the motions judge failed to properly consider the appellant's lack of independent legal advice and the unresolved factual conflicts regarding economic duress.

The appeal was allowed, and the court exercised its discretion to direct that the proceeding continue as if there had been no accepted offer to settle.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after the victim was found killed in his garage.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, eyewitness identification of a man driving the victim's car, and expert evidence matching the appellant's barefoot impressions to blood-spattered boots found at the scene.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on eyewitness identification and in admitting the barefoot impression evidence.

The Court of Appeal held the eyewitness instructions were proper but found the trial judge erred in admitting the novel expert evidence regarding barefoot impressions, as its slight probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a lawyer, was convicted of fraud after acting as a solicitor in transactions that defrauded banks.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, and his sentence, arguing he should have received a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's own acts and declarations proved him guilty as a party to the frauds.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in principle in imposing a custodial sentence.

The Crown appealed an acquittal of the respondent on charges of sexual assault.

The trial judge had withdrawn the case from the jury and entered an acquittal because the Crown failed to explicitly ask the complainant where the incidents occurred, and the trial judge denied the Crown's application to re-open the case to establish territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the offences occurred in Ontario.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the Crown to re-open its case under the non-controversial exception, as there was no prejudice to the unrepresented accused.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conspiracy convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of the affiant and sub-affiants during an application to exclude wiretap evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied too strict a test, requiring a showing of fraud or misrepresentation, rather than the correct standard of showing a basis that cross-examination would elicit testimony tending to discredit a pre-condition to the authorization, such as investigative necessity.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving over eighty, dangerous driving, and impaired driving.

He argued that the police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by placing Centre of Forensic Sciences seals on vials of his blood, which had been drawn for medical purposes, prior to obtaining a search warrant.

He also argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the issue of bolus drinking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the brief sealing of the vials did not interfere with the appellant's spatial, physical, or informational privacy interests and thus did not constitute an unreasonable seizure.

The court also found the jury charge on the burden of proof regarding bolus drinking was sufficient.

The appellant Union appealed a Divisional Court decision quashing an arbitrator's award that allowed the Union to initiate individual teacher workload complaints before a Workload Resolution Arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal held that the arbitrator's decision was patently unreasonable because the collective agreement contained clear words limiting access to the arbitrator solely to individual teachers.

The agreement's specific provisions regarding the grievance process demonstrated that the parties did not intend for the Union to initiate complaints at the arbitration stage.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, ING Canada Inc., appealed a decision finding it breached warranties in a share purchase agreement regarding the funding of a pension plan.

ING had taken contribution holidays by relying on an actuarial surplus in a separate trust (the Halifax Trust) to offset deficits in the non-Halifax portion of the plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the clear terms of the Halifax Trust prohibited the diversion of its assets for the benefit of non-beneficiaries.

Consequently, ING was not entitled to use the Halifax Trust surplus to calculate its funding obligations for the rest of the plan.

The Crown appealed the blended sentences of 23 months (including a 17-month conditional sentence) imposed on the respondents for repeated sexual offences against their son over a 9-year period.

The Court of Appeal found the sentences manifestly unfit, noting that such profoundly exploitive breaches of trust require a penitentiary term.

The sentencing judge erred by relying on an inappropriately absolving report, treating the repetitive assaults as isolated incidents, and failing to give sufficient consideration to denunciation.

The appeal was allowed, and a sentence of 3 years' imprisonment was substituted.

The appellant commenced an action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and abuse of process against the respondents, including a lawyer who had allegedly urged police to arrest her.

The motions judge dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the police conducted their own independent investigation and made their own decision to arrest the appellant, meaning the action against the lawyer had no chance of success.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding reasonable doubt, the definition of assault, the theory of the defence, and the failure to give a limiting instruction on a prior consistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the charge substantially complied with the Lifchus standard for reasonable doubt and adequately stated the law on assault.

The Court also held that the trial judge adequately put the defence's position to the jury and that a limiting instruction on the prior consistent statement was unnecessary because the defence relied on it.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred in using evidence of prior trafficking and that the Crown's cross-examination was oppressive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the prior trafficking evidence was relevant to intention and the improper cross-examination did not render the trial unfair.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable doubt standard.

The Summary Conviction Appeal judge affirmed the conviction, finding the trial judge properly instructed himself to decide credibility in light of the entire evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no error by the trial judge or the Summary Conviction Appeal judge, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault and his total sentence of six years following a police chase.

He argued the trial judge applied an incorrect objective test for assault and that consecutive sentences were excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly inferred mens rea from the appellant driving his car directly at a police officer.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year total sentence was fit given the appellant's lengthy criminal record, driving under suspension, and the context of a police chase in a residential neighbourhood.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that a competing tender contained only minor irregularities that could be corrected within 48 hours under the municipal purchasing bylaw.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's determination.

The cross-appeal was withdrawn, and costs were awarded to the respondent municipality.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it to be fact-driven and concluding that the appellant had not overcome the high hurdle required to overturn a trial judge's findings of fact.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $5,000.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her medical malpractice action against her family physician.

She alleged a lack of informed consent when the physician prescribed birth control pills without adequately discussing the risk of blood clots, after which she developed deep vein thrombosis.

The trial judge found a lack of informed consent but concluded that a reasonable person in the appellant's position would have taken the pill anyway, meaning the lack of disclosure did not cause her injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the objective test for informed consent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing the trial judge failed to resolve inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and misused prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly scrutinized the evidence, resolved inconsistencies using a common sense approach, and correctly used the prior consistent statements to explain delayed disclosure and rebut a motive to fabricate.