Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and sentence.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Johnson, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the dangerous offender designation, and referred the matter back for a new sentencing hearing, finding this was not a rare case where the curative proviso could be applied.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 5.5 months' imprisonment for assault causing bodily harm and failing to comply with an undertaking.

The appellant and a co-accused assaulted the victim after suspecting him of stealing money, kicking and punching him while he was on the ground.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the sentencing judge's failure to explicitly consider a conditional sentence, as it had not been requested by defence counsel and was inappropriate given the appellant's breaches of release conditions.

The court also held the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder of his girlfriend and sentenced to life imprisonment with 10 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the jury charge on motive and reasonable doubt was flawed.

The Crown appealed the sentence, seeking an increased period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, holding the trial judge erred in minimizing the aggravating features of intimate partner violence and indignities to the victim's body.

The period of parole ineligibility was increased to 12 years.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that he did not understand the potential consequences of his guilty pleas until he reviewed the complainant's victim impact statement, and that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow him to withdraw his pleas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the appellant failed to appreciate the nature of the charges or the sentencing consequences.

The desire to dispute comments in a victim impact statement unrelated to the essential elements of the offence was not a valid ground to set aside the pleas.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding he had the requisite mens rea.

The appellant had consumed a significantly increased dosage of prescription medication before driving, despite experiencing recent memory loss and knowing the drug could cause drowsiness.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the conviction, applying the test from R. v. King to find the appellant could reasonably have foreseen the impairment or was reckless.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the appeal judge's decision and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in concluding that a boot print found at the scene matched his boot print.

The Crown had called two expert witnesses on footwear analysis who testified that the characteristics of the boot print were not manufacturing defects but natural wear and tear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was entitled to accept the expert evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was abandoned and dismissed.

On the sentence appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by failing to credit the appellant for one year of pre-trial custody spent at the Toronto East Detention Centre, having mistakenly believed the time was solely due to parole revocation.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the sentence was reduced by one year to 12 years consecutive.

The appellant was convicted of counselling to commit the indictable offence of trafficking and sentenced to two years consecutive, based on a joint submission.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle in accepting the two-year range, noting the drug was a small quantity of marijuana for personal use.

Leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced to six months consecutive.

The landlord appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that a commercial lease was terminated because the tenant sublet the premises without consent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the landlord's prior consents to subleases did not authorize the new sublease.

The Court held that section 20(7) of the Commercial Tenancies Act does not preclude resort to the court's equitable jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture under section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The issue of whether the tenant was entitled to relief from forfeiture was referred for trial.

The landlord appealed a trial judgment declaring the tenant's rights under a commercial lease.

The trial judge had found in favour of the tenant regarding the validity of an option to purchase, the basic rent, the landlord's obligation to deliver the premises in good working order, and the tenant's right to rent abatement and set-off due to building code deficiencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and his interpretation of the lease was reasonable.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that a transaction involving cows was an option to purchase rather than a security interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's finding that the substance of the transaction was an option to purchase, which does not create a security interest under the Personal Property Security Act.

The court also declined to review the procedural issue of whether a trial of an issue should have been directed, as the parties had agreed to the procedure followed.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent sold an automobile to Crown Leasing Ltd., who took possession and presented a cheque that was subsequently dishonoured.

The application judge held that title did not pass.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in law, holding that the usual inference that title passes with possession should have been drawn.

However, because the application judge did not decide whether the appellants were innocent third-party purchasers for value, and the evidence was conflicting, the Court set aside the judgment and directed a trial of that issue.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim against the respondents.

The appellant argued that he met the one-year limitation period by advising the respondent of his claim within one year.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that notice of a claim does not satisfy the statutory requirement that a 'suit is brought' within the limitation period.

The court also found no evidence that the respondent's conduct estopped them from relying on the limitation period.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's construction of the Minutes of Settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge properly construed the Minutes of Settlement and that the appellant's explanation was not in the material before the motion judge and could not be considered.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision regarding a deli business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent's evidence and the appellant's own conduct provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for the trial judge's finding.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for a serious historical offence committed 20 years prior.

The Court of Appeal noted that a period of substantial incarceration would have been warranted despite the passage of time and the respondent's positive lifestyle.

However, because the respondent had already successfully completed 9 months of the conditional sentence, the Court declined to interfere and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent was hired as a bingo hall manager and later signed an employment contract stating she could not be dismissed.

After being fired, she sued for wrongful dismissal.

The trial judge found the contract was for life and awarded $712,000 in damages, including lost wages until age 65 and lost profits from lottery ticket sales.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the contract lacked the explicit language required for a lifetime guarantee and interpreted it as an indefinite term contract.

The court reduced the damages to $30,800, representing a 12-month reasonable notice period, and excluded damages for lottery ticket sales as too remote.

In an addendum on costs following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded costs to the respondents.

The costs were fixed on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $6,687.50 all inclusive.

The appellant was arrested for impaired driving and asked to speak to a specific lawyer.

After waiting over an hour for the lawyer to return the call, the police offered the appellant the opportunity to speak with duty counsel, which he refused.

He subsequently provided breath samples.

The trial judge excluded the breathalyzer results, finding a breach of the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter rights, and acquitted him.

The summary conviction appeal judge set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, holding that the availability of duty counsel is a crucial factor in determining reasonable diligence, and the appellant failed to exercise his right to counsel diligently when he refused duty counsel.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and other offences arising from the confinement and fatal beating of the deceased.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of a witness's prior statement to police under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule, the jury instructions on the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, and several other aspects of the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the witness's statement was properly admitted under both the traditional past recollection recorded criteria and the principled approach to hearsay, and that the trial judge's instructions to the jury were adequate and correct in law.