Karen M. Weiler

The appellant corporation issued share certificates as part of a stock roll program, representing them as fully paid when they were not.

A third party pledged one of these certificates to the respondent bank as collateral for a loan.

When the borrower defaulted, the bank sought to realize on the shares, but the appellant refused to acknowledge the bank as the valid owner.

The trial judge found the bank was a good faith purchaser and granted an oppression remedy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the bank was a good faith purchaser, the appellant was estopped from denying the validity of the certificate, and the restriction on transfer did not prevent the transfer to the bank.

The court also dismissed the third-party claim against a credit union for vicarious liability.

The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) served a tax debtor and its account debtors with Requirements to Pay for unremitted GST prior to the tax debtor's assignment in bankruptcy.

The appellant, a secured creditor of the tax debtor, argued that the bankruptcy stayed the CCRA's right to receive the payments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 317(3) of the Excise Tax Act, the funds became the property of Her Majesty upon receipt of the Requirement to Pay.

Consequently, the tax debtor had no residual right in the funds, and they did not become the property of the trustee in bankruptcy.

The parties signed Minutes of Settlement in 1996 providing for child and spousal support, which could be varied upon a material change in circumstances.

Shortly after signing, the appellant husband cashed in significant stock options and received a substantial salary increase, but failed to disclose this to the respondent wife.

The trial judge found these events constituted a material change in circumstances, implied a duty to disclose, and awarded retroactive child and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on the characterization of the stock options as income, the material change in circumstances, and the implied duty to disclose.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in awarding the Federal Child Support Guidelines table amount for the period prior to the Guidelines coming into force in May 1997.

The appellant manufacturer sought coverage under its comprehensive general liability insurance policy for costs incurred to remedy a defective transformer incorporated into its product.

The motions judge held the loss was caused by an 'occurrence' (defined as an accident) but applied an exclusion clause to part of the claim.

On appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal held that defective manufacture does not constitute an 'accident' or 'occurrence' under the policy.

The cross-appeal was allowed, and a declaration was issued that the policy did not apply to the claim.

The appellant motorcyclist was stopped at a police roadcheck and refused an officer's request to remove his helmet for inspection.

He was arrested and charged with obstructing a peace officer under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Highway Traffic Act imposes a duty on motorcyclists to submit their helmets for inspection, the legislature provided a specific enforcement mechanism (a fine) for failing to do so.

Because the officer did not attempt to use this statutory enforcement mechanism, he was not entitled to invoke the more serious Criminal Code offence of obstructing a peace officer.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The Crown appealed an eleven-month conditional sentence and one-year probation order imposed on the respondent following guilty pleas to robbery, break and enter, uttering a death threat, and theft under.

The offences included a home invasion committed while the respondent was on release and probation orders.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit, allowed the appeal, and substituted a further period of imprisonment of 8 months, taking into account pre-trial custody and time served under the conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of 11 months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the appellant did not meet the requirements for setting aside a guilty plea as set out in R. v. Adgey.

The court also found the 11-month sentence to be fit and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed the refusal of an application to transfer his first degree murder charge to the Youth Court.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the transfer judge's findings of fact and agreed that the appellant failed to show the public could be adequately protected under the Young Offenders Act disposition scheme.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who had a long history of unsuccessful litigation and significant spousal support arrears, appealed two orders.

The first order dismissed his application to vary spousal support and declared him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, requiring him to obtain leave before initiating further proceedings.

The second order dismissed his subsequent application for leave to vary support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no conflict between s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act and s. 17 of the Divorce Act, and concluding that the vexatious proceedings order was appropriate given the appellant's abusive litigation conduct.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision interpreting a commercial lease.

The motion judge held the tenant was entitled to a rent reduction for increases in real estate taxes and ordered a reference to determine the apportionment of snow removal costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the lease only protected the tenant from tax increases resulting from a specific 1998 assessment appeal, not from general rate increases.

However, the Court upheld the order for a reference regarding snow removal costs, finding the lease's audit clause did not preclude it.

The respondent sued the appellant doctor for negligently administering a spinal anaesthetic, which she alleged caused sensory loss and pain in her buttock and right thigh.

A jury found the appellant liable.

The appellant appealed the finding of liability, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of causation, that the trial judge's charge to the jury was defective, and that the trial judge erred in answering a jury question.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on causation, the jury charge was adequate and did not cause a miscarriage of justice, and the trial judge properly answered the jury's question.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's decision finding that the respondents' newly acquired vehicle was insured as an 'additional automobile' under the Standard Ontario Automobile Policy.

On appeal, the parties agreed to a new fact that the respondent owned another operable vehicle that was not insured by any company.

The Court of Appeal held that the plain wording of section 2.2.1 requires the owner to insure all owned automobiles with the same insurer to trigger the automatic 14-day coverage for an additional vehicle.

Because the respondent owned an uninsured operable vehicle, the precondition was not met.

The appeal was allowed and the insurer was not required to defend or indemnify the respondents.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for defamation.

The trial judge preferred the evidence of a witness who recorded the appellant's comments, concluding the words left the clear inference that the respondent was guilty of corrupt and criminal behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the high standard of deference owed to a trial judge's findings of fact.

The appellant appealed his convictions for carrying ammunition in a careless manner and possession of a restricted firearm, arguing that the police lacked articulable cause to stop his vehicle and that his Charter rights under ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police had articulable cause to stop the vehicle based on a seatbelt infraction and suspicious driving behaviour.

The Court also agreed that although the appellant's s. 10 rights were violated, the real evidence obtained (a firearm and bullets) should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside a previous order and for directions regarding an appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the motion, setting aside the lower court's order and permitting either party to set the matter down for trial, conditional upon the appellant making specified payments to the respondent and the Family Responsibility Office.

The court also directed the payout of funds held in court as security for costs.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal determined that the appeal was moot given an order made in a related motion, and disposed of the appeal accordingly.

The appellant appealed an order striking his pleadings due to a long history of delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion, noting there was no material to support any other conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

After discharging his counsel, he sought a physical copy of the complainant's videotaped statement.

The Crown refused to provide the physical tape but offered supervised viewing at the Crown's office.

The accused was convicted at trial.

On appeal, the summary conviction appeal court granted a stay of proceedings, finding the Crown's restriction on access unjustified.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Crown's disclosure obligations to an unrepresented accused in sensitive cases are satisfied by providing supervised access to the videotape.

The conviction was restored and the stay of proceedings was set aside.

The appellant brought a proposed class action against the manufacturers of the prescription drug Prepulsid.

The respondents successfully moved to strike paragraphs of the statement of claim alleging fraudulent or negligent filings with Health Canada and claiming reimbursement of the purchase price.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstating the paragraphs regarding regulatory filings as they were sustainable under a negligence or negligent misstatement claim.

However, the court upheld the striking of the reimbursement claims, finding they could not be sustained under negligence, breach of contract, or unjust enrichment.

The appellant purchasers entered into Agreements of Purchase and Sale with the respondent vendors to acquire farmlands for a golf course development.

The agreements were conditional on obtaining severance approvals for estate lots to be retained by the vendors.

The purchasers waived this condition and sought to close without the approvals, which the vendors refused.

The trial judge found the waiver clause ambiguous and held that the true intention of the parties required severance approvals prior to closing, declaring the agreements null and void and ordering the deposits forfeited.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation and confirming that the purchasers' failure to perform the contract justified the forfeiture of the deposits.