Virginia Leigh Workman

The Applicant sought an order extending the deadline to apply for an openness order under s. 196(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, relying on the court's parens patriae jurisdiction.

The motion was brought due to a procedural error where the application was served but not issued within the statutory 30-day limit.

The Children's Aid Society consented, while the Office of the Children's Lawyer did not oppose the exercise of parens patriae but required the legal test to be met.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no unintentional legislative gap in the Act and concluding that exercising parens patriae jurisdiction was not necessary to protect the child's best interests, as the child had already filed their own timely openness application.

The applicant brought an urgent motion seeking child support based on imputed income, a restraining order, and continued payment of household expenses.

The respondent sought an interim parenting schedule.

The court imputed income to the respondent for child support purposes, ordered the respondent to continue paying household expenses, and established a new parenting time schedule.

The request for a restraining order was denied due to insufficient evidence of reasonable grounds for fear.

In this family law trial, the court determined issues of decision-making, parenting time, child and spousal support, and equalization following a high-conflict separation.

The mother was awarded sole decision-making authority for most issues due to poor communication between the parents, with joint decision-making reserved for the child's psychological needs.

The father was granted a parenting schedule of 10 overnights per 28-day cycle.

The mother was awarded short-term, needs-based spousal support and retroactive child support.

For equalization, funds advanced by the mother's parents were deemed a loan rather than a gift, and the father was ordered to reimburse the mother for carrying costs of the matrimonial home during his exclusive possession.

Following a family law trial, the court issued an endorsement to resolve issues raised in written submissions regarding the calculation of child support and costs.

The court determined the appropriate formula for calculating support when one child is entitled to 100 percent of the Guidelines amount and another to 25 percent.

The court dismissed the respondent's requests for further credits towards education expenses.

As the successful party whose offer to settle was close to the final judgment, the applicant was awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $17,000.

This case involved cross-motions to change a final order concerning child support and Section 7 special and extraordinary expenses for the parties' two children.

The court determined the respondent's income and imputed income to the applicant for child support purposes.

It then calculated the parties' proportionate shares for the children's post-secondary education expenses, including the children's expected contributions and the treatment of personal expenses.

The decision also addressed the respondent's obligation to pay monthly child support, specifically for a child's "gap year" and for a child attending school away from home, providing detailed directions for retroactive calculation.

The respondent's request to terminate education expense obligations after four years post-high school was dismissed.

The parties, separated parents of three children, brought cross-motions concerning the temporary residence of their children and the partition and sale of their matrimonial home.

The court upheld the existing temporary residence arrangement, emphasizing the children's views and the ongoing work of the Children's Lawyer.

The court also ordered the immediate partition and sale of the matrimonial home, dismissing the respondent's concerns about market timing during COVID-19 and unresolved financial issues, finding no prejudice to property rights under the Family Law Act.

The applicant brought a motion to vary existing access orders and requested a police enforcement clause, seeking access in his home instead of the current in-and-out arrangement in the matrimonial home.

The matter was referred to a triage judge under the COVID-19 protocol to determine urgency.

The court found the matter was not urgent, as the children's safety was not at risk.

The judge emphasized that parents should prioritize the children's best interests, follow Health Canada safety protocols, and avoid litigation during the pandemic.

The applicant's past actions regarding COVID-19 recommendations raised legitimate concerns for the respondent.

The motion was dismissed as not urgent.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion for the reinstatement of parenting time arrangements, alleging the respondent mother was denying access due to concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court, acting as Triage Judge, reviewed the materials and determined that the motion was not urgent or an emergency under the Chief Justice's Notice regarding suspended court operations.

The court clarified that "urgent and emergency matters" in family law, particularly concerning the well-being of a child, were intended to mirror the language of the Hague Convention regarding wrongful removal or retention, and did not apply to general parenting time disputes.

The motion was dismissed, and the parties were encouraged to resolve the matter cooperatively.

Following an 11-day family law trial, the successful applicant sought costs on a full recovery basis.

The self-represented respondent failed to provide costs submissions.

The court found the respondent's conduct unreasonable, as he insisted on unsupported positions and a trial despite the applicant's reasonable offer to settle.

The court awarded the applicant $54,000 in costs, with one-third enforceable as support.

The applicant father and respondent mother engaged in a high-conflict custody and access dispute over their five-year-old child.

The mother sought sole custody and decision-making, while the father sought expanded access and parallel parenting.

Following a 44-day trial and a section 30 assessment, the court granted the mother sole custody and primary residence, but significantly expanded the father's parenting time to include phased-in overnight visits.

The court ordered a divided parallel parenting regime for decision-making, granting the mother authority over education and routine medical care, and the father authority over routine dental care and final decision-making for major medical and dental issues.

Following a successful motion for temporary joint custody and shared parenting time, the applicant sought substantial indemnity for costs, fixed at $8,000.

The respondent proposed partial indemnity of $2,500, payable by deduction from any equalization payment.

The court, applying Rule 24, awarded partial indemnity costs of $2,500 to the applicant, payable forthwith by the respondent.

The applicant father and respondent mother both brought motions for temporary orders regarding parenting time, custody, and child support.

The father sought a specific parenting schedule and permission to take the children on vacation, while the mother sought sole custody and an adjustment to child support.

The court found that the mother was unreasonably restricting the father's access and acting on extraneous considerations.

The court declined to make a custody order, implemented the father's proposed parenting schedule, permitted the vacation travel, and ordered the father to pay a small monthly amount for section 7 expenses while dismissing the mother's request to vary base child support.

Following an earlier endorsement determining entitlement regarding retroactive child support and section 7 expenses, the court was asked to resolve competing calculations and determine costs.

The dispute concerned retroactive child support for one child while ongoing support had previously been paid for two children, creating difficulty in crediting payments already made.

The court declined to apply the calculation approaches discussed in Field v. Field and instead adopted a modified method that accounted for ongoing support for one child while adjusting retroactive support for the other.

After accounting for payments and section 7 expenses, the court found a small balance owing from the applicant to the respondent but offset that amount with a minimal costs award to the applicant.

On a family law motion concerning retroactive child support, ongoing support, and s.7 post-secondary expenses for two children, the court held that one child ceased to be a child of the marriage when he finished school and began full-time employment, barring retroactive and s.7 claims for him.

For the second child, the court found he resided with the father for a period, terminated support for that interval, continued support until full-time employment commenced, and limited retroactive support to the three years preceding the mother's motion.

The court rejected a claim of blameworthy conduct sufficient to justify reaching back to 2000.

It further held that one-third of the support payor's RSP withdrawals should be included in income for child support purposes and ordered a proportionate contribution to post-secondary expenses.

Following a motion to change a child support order, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The moving party had been successful in obtaining an order requiring the responding party to pay full table child support due to a reduction in parenting time exercised by the responding party, though she was unsuccessful on other arguments including the characterization of the prior order and certain claimed s. 7 expenses.

Applying Rules 18 and 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court assessed success, reasonableness of the parties’ positions, offers to settle, and the time reasonably attributable to the motion.

The court found that while both parties advanced some unreasonable positions, neither acted in bad faith.

Considering partial success and proportionality, the court awarded reduced costs to the moving party.

The applicant brought a motion to change a prior final order relating to child support and special expenses for three children.

The previous order required the respondent to pay 80% of the Child Support Guidelines table amount based on an expectation of extensive parenting time.

The court found a material change in circumstances because the respondent was exercising significantly less access than contemplated when the reduced support level was agreed upon.

Full table child support was ordered effective November 1, 2011 with further adjustment based on updated income figures.

Only limited section 7 expenses were allowed, including tutoring and orthodontic expenses, while most extracurricular activities were found not to qualify as extraordinary given the level of table support.

The applicant sought enforcement and security for spousal support obligations after the respondent repeatedly failed to comply with court-ordered financial disclosure and support payments in protracted family litigation.

The record demonstrated a pattern of nondisclosure, including failure to reveal income sources, motor vehicle accident claims, and billing practices, despite numerous prior orders requiring disclosure.

Relying on the court’s authority under the Courts of Justice Act and s. 34 of the Family Law Act, and applying principles from appellate authority governing vesting orders, the court found that the respondent’s conduct demonstrated that support obligations were unlikely to be complied with absent intrusive enforcement measures.

The court struck the respondent’s pleadings for non-compliance and granted a vesting and security order over the matrimonial home to secure spousal support.

Additional disclosure and enforcement orders were made, along with costs against the respondent.

Following a family law trial concerning parenting-related issues, the court was required to determine costs.

The respondent sought costs after succeeding on two of three issues, while the applicant argued each party should bear their own costs.

The court found that success was divided between the parties and that both had acted unreasonably at times during the litigation.

Given the mixed outcome and equal importance of the issues, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs and that no costs be awarded for the costs submissions.

The appellant appealed an order striking his pleadings due to a long history of delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion, noting there was no material to support any other conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.