John I. Laskin

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

At trial, the complainant was unable to testify due to her fear of the appellant.

The trial judge admitted her videotaped statement to police under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found that while the necessity requirement was met, the trial judge erred in finding threshold reliability.

The statement lacked an oath or warning about the consequences of lying, there was no evidence explaining how the statement came to be given, and the complainant expressed a strong motive to fabricate.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge and summary conviction appeal court judge erroneously relied on inadmissible hearsay to find that a vehicle was owned by a person known to the appellant.

The Crown conceded the error.

The Court of Appeal agreed, granted leave to appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a vicious and unprovoked assault that left the victim with serious injuries and permanent disability.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to refer to two witnesses' evidence, by accepting the identification evidence of a specific witness, and by refusing to allow proof of a prior inconsistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's reasons or evidentiary rulings, and upholding the sentence given the severity of the attack.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving causing death after driving his vehicle off a dock as a prank, resulting in the drowning of a passenger and a dog.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's admission of prior discreditable conduct, finding it relevant to the dangerous driving charge.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's statements to police or his credibility.

The sentence of two years less a day and a five-year driving prohibition was upheld, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant, Starr Toof, appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for negligent misrepresentation in connection with the sale of a used printing press to the respondent, J B Printing Limited.

During a pre-purchase inspection, Starr Toof's representatives made positive statements about the press's condition and failed to disclose damage to an important component.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct legal principles and that his findings of mixed fact and law regarding duty of care, reasonable reliance, and misrepresentation were entitled to deference absent palpable and overriding error.

A dissenting opinion argued that no duty of care existed and that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding intent and an admission allegedly made to his girlfriend, and by mistakenly referring to voir dire evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge effectively gave a 'rolled up' charge on intent, properly instructed the jury on the admission, and that the mistaken reference to voir dire evidence did not create a serious risk of misleading the jury or undermine the verdicts.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of counterfeit money.

She argued the trial judge erred in inferring she knew the bills were counterfeit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was open to the trial judge to find the appellant gave two inconsistent stories when confronted, and to use those inconsistent statements to infer knowledge that the bills were counterfeit.

The Crown appealed a 9-month sentence imposed on the respondent for sexually molesting his stepdaughter over a three-year period.

The victim was between nine and twelve years old.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit given the intrusive nature of the conduct and the blatant breach of trust.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to two years less a day in custody, followed by the probation order imposed at trial.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a committal for trial.

The appellant argued that the committing judge erred in accepting documentary evidence showing that investment funds were transferred to the appellant's own account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the committing judge erred in admitting the evidence, such an error did not constitute a jurisdictional error, and there was a basis for the committal.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment obtained by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The Court noted that the appellants offered no explanation for their lengthy delay in moving to set aside the default judgment, which alone was sufficient to dispose of the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action against the City of Toronto for breach of contract and other claims arising from a public tender process.

The trial judge dismissed the action primarily because it was barred by the six-year limitation period under the Limitation Act, finding the appellant knew or ought to have known the material facts by September 1990 but did not commence the action until February 1997.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge's limitation period analysis and found no palpable and overriding error in her alternative findings dismissing the substantive claims.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the equalization payment, spousal support, access, and costs components of a trial judgment.

The Court of Appeal varied the equalization payment to $64,000 on consent, fixed spousal support at $500 per month for three years on consent, upheld the access order based on an assessor's recommendation, and varied trial costs to $32,000.

The parties also resolved outstanding support arrears and ongoing child support.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against the respondent gynaecologist.

During a laparoscopic bilateral oophorectomy, the appellant's colon was burned by a cautery instrument.

The trial judge found that the respondent caused the burn but concluded there was insufficient evidence to find he fell below the standard of care, as the appellants' expert did not address the specific location where the respondent testified he applied the cautery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was open to the trial judge to decline to draw an inference of negligence given the gap in the expert evidence.

The respondent sold goods to 'Promised Land' and sued the appellant numbered company for unpaid invoices.

The trial judge granted judgment for the respondent.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge decided the case on an unpleaded basis and improperly pierced the corporate veil, as the goods were allegedly purchased by a related entity, Promised Land Inc. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the pleadings squarely raised the issue of the proper defendant, and the appellant and its related entity dealt interchangeably with the respondent, making both proper defendants.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the submissions and new evidence filed by both parties but found no basis to interfere with the lower court's order.

The appeal was dismissed.

The court noted that the new evidence might be relevant to the appellant's child support obligation, and the dismissal was without prejudice to his right to bring an application to vary child support.

Costs of $1,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The court issued an endorsement to settle the terms of its orders following an appeal.

The court determined that interest on costs should run from September 29, 2004, the date the costs order was made, rather than the date of the main judgment.

The court declined to alter the trial judge's order regarding carriage of the reference, noting it was not argued and should not be modified absent agreement or if affected by the appeal reasons.

The court also declined to cross-reference the orders in the two separate actions, noting the agreement that there can be no double recovery.

The parties settled their dispute prior to the hearing.

The Court of Appeal endorsed that the appeal was abandoned without costs.

The appellants sued their former lawyer, alleging he entered into a settlement with their property insurer without proper authority and breached his fiduciary duty by providing a statement to the insurer's counsel confirming the settlement.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the appellants had made an informed decision to settle and that, even if the lawyer had been negligent, the appellants suffered no damages because the settlement amount exceeded what they could have reasonably recovered under the policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact were supported by the evidence and there was no palpable and overriding error.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges of attempted murder and aggravated assault against the respondents due to a 51-month delay from arrest to trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his assessment of the inherent time requirements of the case, particularly regarding a recanting witness and inaccurate time estimates for the preliminary inquiry.

The Court concluded that the delay, while lengthy, did not violate the respondents' s. 11(b) Charter rights given the minimal prejudice suffered and society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The stay was set aside and a trial ordered.

The Crown appealed from a summary conviction appeal judge's order setting aside the accused's conviction and ordering a new trial.

The trial judge had based the conviction on both the complainant's evidence and a videotape, but the Crown conceded the conviction could only be supported by the video alone, which the trial judge was not prepared to do.

The Court of Appeal agreed there was a miscarriage of justice but rejected the argument that the verdict was unreasonable and warranted an acquittal.

The Court upheld the order for a new trial and dismissed the appeal.